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
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LIFE OF HANNIBAL.

BY

THOMAS ARNOLD, D. D.

NEW YORK:
AMERICAN BOOK EXCHANGE,
55 BEEKMAN STREET.
1879.

$+2$

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

From Dr. Arnold's pleasing and judicious History of Rome we extract the best extant popular Life of Hannibal, and add a very fine volume to our Series of Biographies. Some gaps that break the continuity of Dr. Arnold's narrative we have filled up from Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. We have also omitted passages that relate to the general history of Rome, and in no way pertain to the biography of Hannibal.

Following our plan of giving an account of the author of each of these volumes, we here add a full sketch of Dr. Arnold's life.

"Thomas Arnold, a clergyman of the Church of England, was born at West Cowes, in the Isle of Wight, on June 13, 1795.

He was the son of William and Martha Arnold, the former of whom occupied the situation of collector of customs at Cowes. Deprived at an early age of his father, who died suddenly of spasm in the heart in 1801, his initiatory education was confided by his mother to her sister, Miss Delafield, who with affectionate fidelity discharged to him the office with which she had been intrusted. From her tuition he passed to that of Dr. Griffiths, at Warminster, in Wiltshire, in 1803; and in 1807 he was removed to Winchester, where he remained until 1811, having entered as a commoner, and afterwards became a scholar of the college. In after life he retained a lively feeling of interest in Winchester School, and remembered with admiration and profit the regulative tact of Dr. Goddard, and the preceptorial ability of Dr. Gabell, who were successively head masters during his stay there.

"As a schoolboy, he was not particularly distinguished by any of those attainments which usually determine the honors of the

class. Beyond a very retentive memory, a love for solitary reading, and a certain precocity in the writing of English verse, he afforded but few indications of any superior power of intellect or any decided impulse towards literary pursuits. He was shy and somewhat stiff in his manners, inclined to prefer the society of persons more advanced in life to that of his schoolmates, and somewhat inordinately resolute in holding by any opinion he had formed or any purpose he had adopted. At the same time it is easy to trace in the favorite pursuits of his boyhood, and in the development of his youthful character, many of the most characteristic features of the future man. He was strong and fast in the friendships he formed amongst his fellows. He was already a careful and curious observer of character, and instinctively cleaved to the noble and the gentle, the vigorous and the pure, in whomsoever found. He was almost from infancy devotedly attached to the study of history and geography, as well as to ballad poetry. Al-

ready, however, he had begun to allot separate places in his mind to the romantic and to the real in narration; and whilst he relished both, he steadily refused to accept the one for the other. No boy had a heartier enjoyment of the myth or the ballad; but even as a boy, he had begun to look with distrust upon much of the ancient history as, 'if not totally false, at least scandalously exaggerated.' In the stillness of these studies, and in the stream of schoolboy society, there can be little doubt that (according to 'a true saying' of the great German poet) the talents and the character of the future historian of Rome and head master of Rugby began to receive their peculiar mould.[1]

"From Winchester he removed to Oxford, in 1811, where he became a scholar at Corpus Christi College; and, in 1815, he was elected Fellow of Oriel College,

1 "Es bildet ein Talent sich in der stille;
Sich ein charakter in dem strom der Welt."
Goethe.

and there he continued to reside till 1819. This interval was diligently devoted to the pursuit of classical and historical studies, to preparing himself for ordination, and to searching investigations, under the stimulus of continual discussion with a band of talented and congenial associates, of some of the profoundest questions in theology, ecclesiastical polity and social philosophy. The authors he most carefully studied at this period, were Thucydides and Aristotle, and for their writings he formed an attachment which remained to the close of his life, and exerted a powerful influence upon his mode of thought and opinions, as well as upon his literary occupations in subsequent years. Herodotus also came in for a considerable share of his regard, but more, apparently, as a book of recreation than one for work. In prosecuting his historical studies he adopted the plan which he afterwards recommended to his students in his lectures at Oxford, that of selecting some one period of which he made himself

thoroughly master, and with reference to which he surveyed the events and persons that came under his notice, either in the course of his more general reading, or as an observer of what was going on around him. In theology, his mind, accustomed freely and fearlessly to investigate whatever came before it, and swayed by an almost scrupulous dread of aught that might appear to savor of insincerity, was doomed to long and anxious hesitation upon several points of fundamental importance before arriving at a serene and settled acceptance of the great verities of Christianity. Once satisfied, however, of these, his faith remained clear and firm; and, having received his religion, not by tradition from men, but as the result of an earnest, penetrating, and honest examination of the evidence on which it rests, he not only held it with a steadfast grasp, but realized it, and felt it as a living and guiding power. From this time forward his life became supremely that of a *religious* man. He had not only embraced orthodox

sentiments, and seen his way to an honest conformity with the ecclesiastical arrangements and worship of the church to which he belonged, but he had experienced within his own soul the renovating and transforming energy of divine truth. Christianity was no longer a something which he had taken upon him; it was a life, a nature within him. Long exercised with doubts and difficulties as to the person and claims of Jesus Christ, he had at length reached to such an intense and all-subduing conviction on these points, that a continual consciousness of love and adoration, of joy and confidence towards the Redeemer, seems to have occupied his bosom. To the name of Christ he was prepared to 'surrender his whole soul,' and to render before it 'obedience, reverence without measure, intense humility, most reserved adoration.'[1] It was his joy and consolation, when lost amid the mysteries which surround the being and government of the Infinite, to remember that, 'in that un-

[1] Sermons, vol. iv. p. 210.

known world in which our thoughts become instantly lost, still there is one object on which our thoughts and imaginations may fasten, no less than our affections; that, amidst the light, dark from excess of brilliance, which surrounds the throne of God, we may discern the gracious form of the Son of Man.[1] This vivid realization of Christ as the centre and source of his religion, communicated peculiar animation as well as a single-hearted simplicity to his piety. To be like Christ—to please Christ—to have communion with Christ—to enjoy blessings from Christ:—these became the leading ideas and the ever-present impulses of his religion. Hence not only had all religious doubt and perplexity disappeared, but a new impulse was communicated to his whole spiritual life; his battle with evil, in all its forms, became more intense; his activity became more subject to a high sense of duty, and an earnest desire to acquit himself well as a good soldier of Jesus

1 Sermons, vol. iii. p. 90.

Christ; and, amidst the throng and bustle of this world, he ever maintained a conscious sense of the spiritual state which had been revealed to him, and to which he felt himself continually drawn by his love to his Redeemer. He did not often talk about religion; he had no inclination to gossip about his experience, or dwell upon the frames and feelings through which he passed; he had not much of the accredited phraseology of piety even when he discoursed on spiritual topics. But no man could observe him for any length of time without feeling persuaded that, more than most men, he was directed by religious principle and feeling in all his conduct. The fountain of his piety was in his heart's core; and its streams mingled easily with all the issues of his life. As his biographer has beautifully remarked, 'his natural faculties were not unclothed, but clothed upon; they were at once colored by, and gave a color to, the belief which they received.[1]

1 Life of Stanley, vol. i. p. 81.

"He left Oxford in 1819, and settled at Laleham near Staines, where he was occupied chiefly in superintending the studies of seven or eight young men who were preparing for the university. His spare time was devoted to the prosecution of studies in philology and history, more particularly to the study of Thucydides, and of the new light which had been cast upon Roman history, and upon historical method in general, by the researches of Niebuhr. He was also occasionally engaged in preaching, and it was whilst here that he published the first volume of his sermons. Shortly after he settled at Laleham he entered into the marriage relation with Mary, youngest daughter of the Rev. John Penrose, Rector of Fledborough, Nottinghamshire.

"Under the plastic influences of domestic life, and amid the congenial occupations which divided his time at Laleham, his character was gradually maturing, his intellectual powers were becoming more fully developed, his opinions on social and ecclesiastical ques-

tions were acquiring consolidation and precision, and he was laying up a stock of experience and forming plans which demanded a much wider sphere for their operation than such a post as that which he now occupied could present. It was not long before such a sphere opened before him. After nine years spent at Laleham, he was induced to offer himself as a candidate for the headmastership of Rugby, which had became vacant; and though he entered somewhat late upon the contest, and though none of the electors were personally known to him, he was nevertheless successful. He was elected in December, 1827; in June, 1828, he received priest's orders; in April and November of the same year he took his degree of B. D. and D. D.; and in August entered on his new office.

"In one of the testimonials which accompanied his application to the trustees of Rugby, the writer stated it as his conviction, that 'if Mr. Arnold were elected, he would change the face of education all through the

public schools of England.' Nobly was this somewhat hazardous pledge redeemed by him in whose name it had been given. Arnold's head-mastership at Rugby constituted a new era in the history of public education in England. By his skill, devotedness, and high moral earnestness, even more than by his scholarship or his direct tutorial influence, he completely 'changed the face of education' at that great institution, and set the example which has acted upon all the educational institutions of the empire. Under his superintendence the school became not merely a place where a certain amount of classical or general learning was to be obtained, but a sphere of intellectual, moral, and religious discipline, where healthy characters were formed, and men were trained for the duties, and struggles, and responsibilities of life.

"Rugby was privileged to enjoy his superintendence for nearly fourteen years. During this period his energies were chiefly devoted to the business of the school; but he

found time also for much literary work, as well as for an extensive correspondence. Five volumes of sermons, an edition of Thucydides, with English notes and dissertations, a History of Rome in three vols. 8vo., besides numerous articles in reviews, journals, newspapers, and encyclopædias, are extant to attest the untiring activity of his mind, and his patient diligence during this period. His interest also in public matters was incessant, especially in such as bore upon the social welfare and moral improvement of the masses. Ecclesiastical questions occupied at all times a large share of his regard; he was earnest for church reform, and continually disposed to take a despairing view of the prospects of the hierarchy. From the outset he had watched with intense interest the progress of those opinions and tendencies at Oxford which have of late years excited so much public attention, and have issued in results which Arnold was among the first to predict.

"In 1841 Dr. Arnold received from Lord

Melbourne, then prime minister, the offer of the chair of Modern History at Oxford, an offer which he accepted with peculiar satisfaction. The situation was one which connected him once more with the university where his own earlier studies had been conducted, and for which he ever retained the liveliest affection; its duties were not onerous, and they fell in with the course of his favorite pursuits; and it afforded him a provision against the time when he should be compelled to retire from the responsibilities of such an institution as Rugby, and seek that lettered ease to which, amidst all the distractions of his active life, he was continually looking forward as the ultimatum of his earthly ambition. On the duties of this new office he entered on 2d December, 1841, by delivering his inaugural lecture, amidst circumstances which he felt to be peculiarly gratifying and flattering. Seven other lectures were delivered during the first three weeks of the Lent term of 1842; the whole have been published since his death.

"A few months after the delivery of his lectures, Arnold was suddenly removed from his earthly duties and anticipated enjoyments by an attack of angina pectoris. The midsummer vacation had arrived, and he was preparing to set out with his family to Fox How, a favorite retreat, where he had purchased some property and built a house, in Westmoreland. After a busy day spent in various duties, he retired to rest apparently in perfect health. Between five and six next morning he awoke in severe pain. All attempts to arrest the fatal malady proved fruitless. He bore with heroic fortitude and Christian resignation his sufferings, until eight o'clock, when he expired. The day on which he died was Sunday, the 12th of June, 1842. 'What that Sunday was in Rugby,' says his biographer, 'it is hard fully to represent: the incredulity—the bewilderment—the agitating inquiries for every detail—the blank, more awful than sorrow, that prevailed through the vacant services of that long and dreary day—the feeling as if the

very place had passed away with him who had so emphatically been in every sense its head—the sympathy which hardly dared to contemplate, and which yet could not but fix the thoughts and looks of all on the desolate house where the fatherless family were gathered round the chamber of death.' His remains were interred on the following Friday in the chancel of Rugby chapel, immediately under the communion-table.

"We have no space left to attempt a delineation of the separate features of Arnold's character. We can only remark, in general, that the great peculiarity and charm of his nature seemed to lie in the regal supremacy of the moral and spiritual element over his whole being and powers. His intellectual faculties were not such as to surpass those of many who were his contemporaries; in scholarship he occupied a subordinate place to several who filled situations like his; and he had not much of what is usually called tact, in his dealings, either with the juvenile or the adult mind. What gave him his

power, and secured for him so deeply the respect and veneration of his pupils and acquaintances, was the intensely religious character of his whole life. He seemed ever to act from a severe and lofty estimate of duty. To be just, honest and truthful, he ever held to be the first aim of his being. Amid the trials and the duties of life alike, he endured, as seeing Him 'who is invisible.' Like Milton, who had also been a schoolmaster, his principle seems to have been—'Were it the meanest under-service, if God, by his secretary, Conscience, enjoin it, it were sad for me if I should draw back.' With all this, there was intense sympathy with his fellows, the tenderest domestic affections, the most generous friendship, the most expansive benevolence. But to understand aright his claims upon our respect and homage, the history of his life must be read at large. As has been truly observed by one who seems to have known him well—'His Thucydides, his History, his Sermons, his miscellaneous

writings, are all proofs of his ability and goodness. Yet the story of his life is worth them all.' "—*Edin. Rev.* vol. lxxxi. p. 234. His life has been most ably written by Rev. A. P. Stanley, M. A., in two volumes, 8vo. London, 1845.

We only need to add, that Dr. Arnold is everywhere quoted as an authority on the subject of Hannibal and his Italian campaigns. An excellent and most fascinating life of the greatest general of antiquity, by one of the wisest of modern scholars, certainly needs no commendation from us.

O. W. WIGHT.

April, 1859.

LIFE OF HANNIBAL.

Twice in history has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation; and in both cases the nation has been victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome; for sixteen years Napoleon Buonaparte strove against England: the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo. B. C. 219.

True it is, as Polybius has said, that Hannibal was supported by the zealous exertions of Carthage; and the strength of the opposition to his policy has been very possibly exaggerated

by the Roman writers. But the zeal of his country in the contest, as Polybius himself remarks in another place, was itself the work of his family. Never did great men more show themselves the living spirit of a nation than Hamilcar, and Hasdrubal, and Hannibal, during a period of nearly fifty years, approved themselves to be to Carthage. It is not then merely through our ignorance of the internal state of Carthage, that Hannibal stands so prominent in all our conceptions of the second Punic war: he was really its moving and directing power; and the energy of his country was but a light reflected from his own. History therefore gathers itself into his single person: in that vast tempest, which, from north and south, from the west and the east, broke upon Italy, we see nothing but Hannibal.

But if Hannibal's genius may be likened to the Homeric god, who in his

hatred of the Trojans rises from the deep to rally the fainting Greeks, and to lead them against the enemy; so the calm courage with which Hector met his more than human adversary in his country's cause, is no unworthy image of the unyielding magnanimity displayed by the aristocracy of Rome. As Hannibal utterly eclipses Carthage, so on the contrary Fabius, Marcellus, Claudius Nero, even Scipio himself, are as nothing when compared to the spirit, and wisdom, and power of Rome. The senate which voted its thanks to its political enemy Varro, after his disastrous defeat, "because he had not despaired of the Commonwealth," and which disdained either to solicit, or to reprove, or to threaten, or in any way to notice the twelve colonies which had refused their accustomed supplies of men for the army, is far more to be honored than the conqueror of Zama.

This we should the more carefully bear in mind, because our tendency is to admire individual greatness far more than national; and as no single Roman will bear comparison with Hannibal, we are apt to murmur at the event of the contest, and to think that the victory was awarded to the least worthy of the combatants. On the contrary, never was the wisdom of God's providence more manifest than in the issue of the struggle between Rome and Carthage. It was clearly for the good of mankind, that Hannibal should be conquered: his triumph would have stopped the progress of the world. For great men can only act permanently by forming great nations; and no one man, even though it were Hannibal himself, can in one generation effect such a work. But where the nation has been merely enkindled for a while by a great man's spirit, the light passes away with him

who communicated it; and the nation, when he is gone, is like a dead body, to which magic power had for a moment given an unnatural life: when the charm has ceased, the body is cold and stiff as before. He who grieves over the battle of Zama, should carry on his thoughts to a period thirty years later, when Hannibal must, in the course of nature, have been dead, and consider how the isolated Phœnician city of Carthage was fitted to receive and to consolidate the civilization of Greece, or by its laws and institutions to bind together barbarians of every race and language into an organized empire, and prepare them for becoming, when that empire was dissolved, the free members of the commonwealth of Christian Europe.

The year of Hannibal's birth is not mentioned by any ancient writer, but from the statements concerning his age

at the battle of Zama, it appears that he must have been born in the very year in which his father, Hamilcar, was first appointed to the command in Sicily. He was only nine years of age when his father took him with him into Spain; and it was on this occasion that Hamilcar made him swear upon the altar, eternal hostility to Rome. The story was told by Hannibal himself, many years afterwards, to Antiochus, and is one of the best attested in ancient history.[1] Child as he then was, Hannibal never forgot his vow, and his whole life was one continued struggle against the power and domination of Rome. He was early trained in arms under the eye of his father, and probably accompanied him on most of his campaigns in

R. C. 247

1 Polyb. iii. 11; Liv. xxi. 1; xxxv. 19; Corn. Nep. *Hann.*; Appian. *Hisp.* 9; Val. Max. ix. 3, ext. § 3.

Spain. We find him present with him in the battle in which Hamilcar perished; and though only eighteen years old at this time, he had already displayed so much courage and capacity for war, that he was entrusted by Hasdrubal (the son-in-law and successor of Hamilcar) with the chief command of most of the military enterprises planned by that general. Of the details of these campaigns we know nothing; but it is clear that Hannibal thus early gave proof of that remarkable power over the minds of men, which he afterwards displayed in so eminent a degree, and secured to himself the devoted attachment of the army under his command. The consequence was, that on the assassination of Hasdrubal, the soldiers unanimously proclaimed B. C. 221. their youthful leader commander-in-chief, and the government of Carthage hastened to ratify an appointment which

they had not, in fact, the power to prevent.

Hannibal was at this time in the twenty-sixth year of his age. There can be no doubt that he already looked forward to the invasion and conquest of Italy as the goal of his ambition; but it was necessary for him, first, to complete the work which had been so ably begun by his two predecessors, and to establish the Carthaginian power as firmly as possible in Spain, before he made that country the base of his subsequent operations. This was the work of two campaigns. Immediately after he had received the command, he turned his arms against the Olcades a nation of the interior, who were speedily compelled to submit by the fall of their capital city, Althæa. Hannibal levied large sums of money from them and the neighboring tribes, after which he returned into winter quarters at New

Carthage. The next year he penetrated farther into the country, in order to assail the powerful tribe of the Vaccæans, and reduced their two strong and populous cities of Helmantica and Arbocala. On his return from this expedition, he was involved in great danger by a sudden attack from the Carpetanians, together with the remaining forces of the Olcades and Vaccæans, but by a dexterous manœuvre he placed the river Tagus between himself and the enemy, and the barbarian army was cut to pieces in the attempt to force their passage. After these successes he again returned to spend the winter at New Carthage.[1]

Two years, we have seen, had been employed in expeditions against the native Spaniards; the third year was devoted to the siege of Saguntum. Hannibal's pretext for attacking it was, that

1 Polyb. iii. 13–15; Liv. xxi. 5.

the Saguntines had oppressed one of the Spanish tribes in alliance with Carthage; but no caution in the Saguntine government could have avoided a quarrel, which their enemy was determined to provoke. Saguntum, although not a city of native Spaniards, resisted as obstinately as if the very air of Spain had breathed into foreign settlers on its soil the spirit so often, in many different ages, displayed by the Spanish people. Saguntum was defended like Numantia and Gerona: the siege lasted eight months; and when all hope was gone, several of the chiefs kindled a fire in the market-place, and after having thrown in their most precious effects, leapt into it themselves, and perished. Still the spoil found in the place was very considerable; there was a large treasure of money, which Hannibal kept for his war expenses; there were numerous captives, whom he distributed amongst his

soldiers as their share of the plunder; and there was much costly furniture from the public and private buildings, which he sent home to decorate the temples and palaces of Carthage.

It must have been towards the close of the year, but apparently before the consuls were returned from Illyria, that the news of the fall of Saguntum reached Rome. Immediately ambassadors were sent to Carthage; M. Fabius Buteo, who had been consul seven and twenty years before, C. Licinius Varus and Q. Bæbius Tamphilus. Their orders were simply to demand that Hannibal and his principal officers should be given up for their attack upon the allies of Rome, in breach of the treaty, and, if this were refused, to declare war. The Carthaginians tried to discuss the previous question, whether the attack on Saguntum was a breach of the treaty; but to this the Romans would not listen.

At length M. Fabius gathered up his toga, as if he were wrapping up something in it, and holding it out thus together, he said, "Behold, here are peace and war; take which you choose!" The Carthaginian suffete or judge answered, "Give whichever thou wilt." Hereupon Fabius shook out the folds of his toga, saying, "Then here we give you war;" to which several members of the council shouted in answer, "With all our hearts we welcome it." Thus the Roman ambassador left Carthage, and returned straight to Rome.

But before the result of the embassy could be known in Spain, Hannibal had been making preparations for his intended expedition, in a manner which showed, not only that he was sure of the support of his government, but that he was able to dispose at his pleasure of all the military resources of Carthage. At his suggestion fresh troops from Africa were

sent over to Spain to secure it during his absence, and to be commanded by his own brother, Hasdrubal; and their place was to be supplied by other troops raised in Spain, so that Africa was to be defended by Spaniards, and Spain by Africans, the soldiers of each nation, when quartered amongst foreigners, being cut off from all temptation or opportunity to revolt. So completely was he allowed to direct every military measure, that he is said to have sent Spanish and Numidian troops to garrison Carthage itself; in other words, this was a part of his general plan, and was adopted accordingly by the government. Meanwhile, he had sent ambassadors into Gaul, and even across the Alps, to the Gauls who had so lately been at war with the Romans, both to obtain information as to the country through which his march lay, and to secure the assistance and guidance of the Gauls in

his passage of the Alps, and their co-operation in arms when he should arrive in Italy. His Spanish troops he had dismissed to their several homes, at the end of the last campaign, that they might carry their spoils with them, and tell of their exploits to their countrymen, and enjoy, during the winter, that almost listless ease which is the barbarian's relief from war and plunder. At length he received the news of the Roman embassy to Carthage, and the actual declaration of war; his officers also had returned from Cisalpine Gaul. "The natural difficulties of the passage of the Alps were great," they said, "but by no means insuperable; while the disposition of the Gauls was most friendly, and they were eagerly expecting his arrival." Then Hannibal called his soldiers together, and told them openly that he was going to lead them into Italy. "The Romans,"

B. C. 218.

he said, "have demanded that I and my principal officers should be delivered up to them as malefactors. Soldiers, will you suffer such an indignity? The Gauls are holding out their arms to us, inviting us to come to them, and to assist them in revenging their manifold injuries. And the country which we shall invade, so rich in corn and wine and oil, so full of flocks and herds, so covered with flourishing cities, will be the richest prize that could be offered by the gods to reward your valor." One common shout from the soldiers assured him of their readiness to follow him. He thanked them, fixed the day on which they were to be ready to march, and then dismissed them.

In this interval, and now on the very eve of commencing his appointed work, to which for eighteen years he had been solemnly devoted, and to which he had so long been looking forward with

almost sickening hope, he left the head-quarters of his army to visit Gades, and there, in the temple of the supreme god of Tyre, and all the colonies of Tyre, to offer his prayers and vows for the success of his enterprise. He was attended only by those immediately attached to his person; and amongst these was a Sicilian Greek, Silenus, who followed him throughout his Italian expedition, and lived at his table. When the sacrifice was over, Hannibal returned to his army at New Carthage; and every thing being ready, and the season sufficiently advanced, for it was now late in May, he set out on his march for the Iberus.

And here the fulness of his mind, and his strong sense of being the devoted instrument of his country's gods to destroy their enemies, haunted him by night as they possessed him by day. In his sleep, so he told Silenus, he fancied that

the supreme god of his fathers had called him into the presence of all the gods of Carthage, who were sitting on their thrones in council. There he received a solemn charge to invade Italy; and one of the heavenly council went with him and with his army, to guide him on his way. He went on, and his divine guide commanded him, "See that thou look not behind thee." But after a while, impatient of the restraint, he turned to look back; and there he beheld a huge and monstrous form, thick set all over with serpents; wherever it moved orchards and woods and houses fell crashing before it. He asked his guide in wonder, what that monster form was? The god answered, "Thou seest the desolation of Italy; go on thy way, straight forward, and cast no look behind." Thus, with no divided heart, and with an entire resignation of all personal and domestic enjoyments for-

ever, Hannibal went forth at the age of twenty-seven, to do the work of his country's gods, and to redeem his early vow.

The consuls at Rome came into office at this period on the 15th of March; it was possible therefore for a consular army to arrive on the scene of action in time to dispute with Hannibal not only the passage of the Rhone, but that of the Pyrenees. But the Romans exaggerated the difficulties of his march, and seem to have expected that the resistance of the Spanish tribes between the Iberus and the Pyrenees, and of the Gauls between the Pyrenees and the Rhone, would so delay him that he would not reach the Rhone till the end of the season. They therefore made their preparations leisurely.

Of the consuls for this year, the year of Rome 536, and 218 before the Christian era, one was P. Cornelius Scipio,

the son of L. Scipio, who had been consul in the sixth year of the first Punic War, and the grandson of L. Scipio Barbatus, whose services in the third Samnite war are recorded in his famous epitaph. The other was Ti. Sempronius Longus, probably, but not certainly, the son of that C. Sempronius Blæsus, who had been consul in the year 501. The consuls' provinces were to be Spain and Sicily; Scipio, with two Roman legions, and 15,600 of the Italian allies, and with a fleet of sixty quinqueremes, was to command in Spain; Sempronius, with a somewhat larger army, and a fleet of 160 quinqueremes, was to cross over to Lilybæum, and from thence, if circumstances favored, to make a descent on Africa. A third army, consisting also of two Roman legions, and 11,000 of the allies, was stationed in Cisalpine Gaul, under the prætor, L. Manlius Vulso. The Romans suspected that the Gauls

would rise in arms ere long; and they hastened to send out the colonists of two colonies, which had been resolved on before, but not actually founded, to occupy the important stations of Placentia and Cremona on the opposite banks of the Po. The colonists sent to each of these places were no fewer than six thousand; and they received notice to be at their colonies in thirty days. Three commissioners, one of them, C. Lutatius Catulus, being of consular rank, were sent out, as usual, to superintend the allotment of lands to the settlers; and these 12,000 men, together with the prætor's army, were supposed to be capable of keeping the Gauls quiet.

It is a curious fact, that the danger on the side of Spain was considered to be so much the least urgent, that Scipio's army was raised the last, after those of his colleague and of the prætor L. Manlius. Indeed Scipio was still at Rome,

when tidings came that the Boians and Insubrians had revolted, had dispersed the new settlers at Placentia and Cremona, and driven them to take refuge at Mutina, had treacherously seized the three commissioners at a conference, and had defeated the prætor L. Manlius, and obliged him also to take shelter in one of the towns of Cisalpine Gaul, where they were blockading him. One of Scipio's legions, with five thousand of the allies, was immediately sent off into Gaul under another prætor, C. Antilius Serranus; and Scipio waited till his own army should again be completed by new levies. Thus he cannot have left Rome till late in the summer; and when he arrived with his fleet and army at the mouth of the eastern branch of the Rhone, he found that Hannibal had crossed the Pyrenees; but he still hoped to impede his passage of the river.

Hannibal meanwhile, having set out

from New Carthage with an army of 90,000 foot, and 12,000 horse, crossed the Iberus; and from thenceforward the hostile operations of his march began. He might probably have marched through the country between the Iberus and the Pyrenees, had that been his sole object, as easily as he made his way from the Pyrenees to the Rhone; a few presents and civilities would easily have induced the Spanish chiefs to allow him a free passage. But some of the tribes northward of the Iberus were friendly to Rome: on the coast were the Greek cities of Rhoda and Emporiæ, Massaliot colonies, and thus attached to the Romans as the old allies of their mother city: if this part of Spain were left unconquered, the Romans would immediately make use of it as the base of their operations, and proceed from thence to attack the whole Carthaginian dominion. Accordingly, Hannibal employed his

army in subduing the whole country, which he effected with no great loss of time, but at a heavy expense of men, as he was obliged to carry the enemy's strongholds by assault, rather than incur the delay of besieging them. He left Hanno with eleven thousand men to retain possession of the newly-conquered country: and he further diminished his army by sending home as many more of his Spanish soldiers, probably those who had most distinguished themselves, as an earnest to the rest, that they too, if they did their duty well, might expect a similar release, and might look forward to return ere long to their homes, full of spoil and glory. These detachments, together with the heavy loss sustained in the field, reduced the force with which Hannibal entered Gaul to no more than 50,000 foot, and 9,000 horse.

From the Pyrenees to the Rhone his progress was easy. Here he had no wish

to make regular conquests; and presents to the chiefs mostly succeeded in conciliating their friendship, so that he was allowed to pass freely. But on the left bank of the Rhone, the influence of the Massaliots with the Gaulish tribes had disposed them to resist the invader; and the passage of the Rhone was not to be effected without a contest.

Scipio by this time had landed his army near the eastern mouth of the Rhone; and his information of Hannibal's movements was vague and imperfect. His men had suffered from seasickness on their voyage from Pisa to the Rhone; and he wished to give them a short time to recover their strength and spirits, before he led them against the enemy. He still felt confident that Hannibal's advance from the Pyrenees must be slow, supposing that he would be obliged to fight his way; so that he never doubted that he should have ample

time to oppose his passage of the Rhone. Meanwhile he sent out 300 horse, with some Gauls, who were in the service of the Massaliots, ordering them to ascend the left bank of the Rhone, and discover, if possible, the situation of the enemy. He seems to have been unwilling to place the river on his rear, and therefore never to have thought of conducting his operations on the right bank, or even of sending out reconnoitring parties in this direction.

The resolution which Scipio formed a few days afterwards, of sending his army to Spain, when he himself returned to Italy, was deserving of such high praise, that we must hesitate to accuse him of over-caution or needless delay at this critical moment. Yet he was sitting idle at the mouth of the Rhone, while the Gauls were vainly endeavoring to oppose Hannibal's passage of the river. We must understand that Hannibal kept

his army as far away from the sea as possible in order to conceal his movements from the Romans; therefore he came upon the Rhone, not on the line of the later Roman road from Spain to Italy, which crossed the river at Tarasco, between Avignon and Arles, but at a point much higher up, above its confluence with the Durance, and nearly half way, if we can trust Polybius's reckoning, from the sea to its confluence with the Isere. Here he obtained from the natives on the right bank, by paying a fixed price, all their boats and vessels of every description with which they were accustomed to traffic down the river: they allowed him also to cut timber for the construction of others; and thus in two days he was provided with the means of transporting his army. But finding that the Gauls were assembled on the eastern bank to oppose his passage, he sent off a detachment of his ar-

my by night with native guides, to ascend the right bank, for about two and twenty miles, and there to cross as they could, where there was no enemy to stop them. The woods, which then lined the river, supplied this detachment with the means of constructing barks and rafts enough for the passage; they took advantage of one of the many islands in this part of the Rhone, to cross where the stream was divided; and thus they all reached the left bank in safety. There they took up a strong position, probably one of those strange masses of rock which rise here and there with steep cliffy sides like islands out of the vast plain, and rested for four-and-twenty hours after their exertions in the march and the passage of the river.

Hannibal allowed eight-and-forty hours to pass from the time when the detachment left his camp; and then, on the morning of the fifth day after his ar

rival on the Rhone, he made his preparations for the passage of his main army. The mighty stream of the river, fed by the snows of the high Alps, is swelled rather than diminished by the heats of summer; so that, although the season was that when the southern rivers are generally at their lowest, it was rolling the vast mass of its waters along with a startling fulness and rapidity. The heaviest vessels were therefore placed on the left, highest up the stream, to form something of a breakwater for the smaller craft crossing below; the small boats held the flower of the light-armed foot, while the cavalry were in the larger vessels; most of the horses being towed astern swimming, and a single soldier holding three or four together by their bridles. Every thing was ready, and the Gauls on the opposite side had poured out of their camp, and lined the bank in scattered groups at the most ac-

cessible points, thinking that their task of stopping the enemy's landing would be easily accomplished. At length Hannibal's eye observed a column of smoke rising on the farther shore, above or on the right of the barbarians. This was the concerted signal which assured him of the arrival of his detachment; and he instantly ordered his men to embark, and to push across with all possible speed. They pulled vigorously against the rapid stream, cheering each other to the work; while behind them were their friends, cheering them also from the bank; and before them were the Gauls, singing their war-songs, and calling them to come on with tones and gestures of defiance. But on a sudden a mass of fire was seen on the rear of the barbarians; the Gauls on the bank looked behind, and began to turn away from the river; and presently the bright arms and white linen coats of the African and

Spanish soldiers appeared above the bank, breaking in upon the disorderly line of the Gauls. Hannibal himself, who was with the party crossing the river, leaped on shore amongst the first, and, forming his men as fast as they landed, led them instantly to the charge. But the Gauls, confused and bewildered, made little resistance; they fled in utter rout; whilst Hannibal, not losing a moment, sent back his vessels and boats for a fresh detachment of his army; and before night his whole force, with the exception of his elephants, was safely established on the eastern side of the Rhone.

As the river was no longer between him and the enemy, Hannibal early on the next morning sent out a party of Numidian cavalry to discover the position and number of Scipio's forces, and then called his army together, to see and hear the communications of some chiefs of the

Cisalpine Gauls, who were just arrived from the other side of the Alps. Their words were explained to the Africans and Spaniards in the army by interpreters; but the very sight of the chiefs was itself an encouragement; for it told the soldiers that the communication with Cisalpine Gaul was not impracticable, and that the Gauls had undertaken so long a journey for the purpose of obtaining the aid of the Carthaginian army against their old enemies, the Romans. Besides, the interpreters explained to the soldiers that the chiefs undertook to guide them into Italy by a short and safe route, on which they would be able to find provisions; and spoke strongly of the great extent and richness of Italy, when they did arrive there, and how zealously the Gauls would aid them. Hannibal then came forward himself and addressed his army: their work, he said, was more than accomplished by the

passage of the Rhone; their own eyes and ears had witnessed the zeal of their Gaulish allies in their cause; for the rest, their business was to do their duty, and obey his orders implicitly, leaving every thing else to him. The cheers and shouts of the soldiers again satisfied him how fully he might depend upon them; and he then addressed his prayers and vows to the gods of Carthage, imploring them to watch over the army, and to prosper its work to the end, as they had prospered its beginning. The soldiers were now dismissed, with orders to prepare for their march on the morrow.

Scarcely was the assembly broken up, when some of the Numidians who had been sent out in the morning, were seen riding for their lives to the camp, manifestly in flight from a victorious enemy. Not half of the original party returned; for they had fallen in with Scipio's detachment of Roman and Gaulish horse,

and after an obstinate conflict had been completely beaten. Presently after, the Roman horsemen appeared in pursuit; but when they observed the Carthaginian camp, they wheeled and rode off, to carry back word to their general. Then at last Scipio put his army in motion, and ascended the left bank of the river to find and engage the enemy. But when he arrived at the spot where his cavalry had seen the Carthaginian camp, he found it deserted, and was told that Hannibal had been gone three days, having marched northwards, ascending the left bank of the river. To follow him seemed desperate: it was plunging into a country wholly unknown to the Romans, where they had neither allies nor guides, nor resources of any kind; and where the natives, over and above the common jealousy felt by all barbarians toward a foreign army, were likely, as Gauls, to regard the Romans with pe-

culiar hostility. But if Hannibal could not be followed now, he might easily be met on his first arrival in Italy; from the mouth of the Rhone to Pisa was the chord of a circle, while Hannibal was going to make a long circuit; and the Romans had an army already in Cisalpine Gaul; while the enemy would reach the scene of action exhausted with the fatigues and privations of his march across the Alps. Accordingly Scipio descended the Rhone again, embarked his army, and sent it on to Spain under the command of his brother Cnæus Scipio, as his lieutenant; while he himself in his own ship sailed for Pisa, and immediately crossed the Apennines to take the command of the forces of the two prætors, Manlius and Atilius, who, as we have seen, had an army of about 25,000 men, over and above the colonists of Placentia and Cremona, still disposable in Cisalpine Gaul.

This resolution of Scipio to send his own army on to Spain, and to meet Hannibal with the army of the two prætors, appears to show that he possessed the highest qualities of a general, which involve the wisdom of a statesman no less than of a soldier. As a mere military question, his calculation, though baffled by the event, was sound: but if we view it in a higher light, the importance to the Romans of retaining their hold on Spain would have justified a far greater hazard; for if the Carthaginians were suffered to consolidate their dominion in Spain, and to avail themselves of its immense resources, not in money only, but in men, the hardiest and steadiest of barbarians, and, under the training of such generals as Hannibal and his brother, equal to the best soldiers in the world, the Romans would hardly have been able to maintain the contest. Had not P. Scipio then dispatched his army to Spain at this criti-

ical moment, instead of carrying it home to Italy, his son in all probability would never have won the battle of Zama.

Meanwhile Hannibal, on the day after the skirmish with Scipio's horse, had sent forward his infantry, keeping the cavalry to cover his operations, as he still expected the Romans to pursue him; while he himself waited to superintend the passage of the elephants. These were thirty-seven in number; and their dread of the water made their transport a very difficult operation. It was effected by fastening to the bank large rafts of 200 feet in length, covered carefully with earth: to the end of these, smaller rafts were attached, covered with earth in the same manner, and with towing lines extended to a number of the largest barks, which were to tow them over the stream. The elephants, two females leading the way, were brought upon the rafts by their drivers without

difficulty; and as soon as they came upon the smaller rafts, these were cut loose at once from the larger, and towed out into the middle of the river. Some of the elephants in their terror leaped overboard, and drowned their drivers; but they themselves, it is said, held their huge trunks above water, and struggled to the shore; so that the whole thirty-seven were landed in safety. Then Hannibal called in his cavalry, and covering his march with them and with the elephants, set forward up the left bank of the Rhone to overtake the infantry.

In four days they reached the spot where the Isere, coming down from the main Alps, brings to the Rhone a stream hardly less full or mighty than his own. In the plains above the confluence two Gaulish brothers were contending which should be chief of their tribe; and the elder called in the stranger general to support his cause. Hannibal readily complied,

established him firmly on the throne, and received important aid from him in return. He supplied the Carthaginian army plentifully with provisions, furnished them with new arms, gave them new clothing, especially shoes, which were found very useful in the subsequent march, and accompanied them to the first entrance on the mountain country, to secure them from attacks on the part of his countrymen.

The attentive reader, who is acquainted with the geography of the Alps and their neighborhood, will perceive that this account of Hannibal's march is vague. It does not appear whether the Carthaginians ascended the left bank of the Isere, or the right bank; or whether they continued to ascend the Rhone for a time, and leaving it only so far as to avoid the great angle which it makes at Lyons, rejoined it again just before they entered the mountain country, a little to

the left of the present road from Lyons to Chamberri. But these uncertainties cannot now be removed, because Polybius neither possessed a sufficient knowledge of the bearings of the country, nor sufficient liveliness as a painter, to describe the line of the march so as to be clearly recognized. I believe, however, that Hannibal crossed the Isere, and continued to ascend the Rhone; and that afterwards, striking off to the right across the plains of Dauphine, he reached what Polybius calls the first ascent of the Alps, at the northern extremity of that ridge of limestone mountains, which, rising abruptly from the plain to the height of 4000 or 5000 feet, and filling up the whole space between the Rhone at Belley and the Isere below Grenoble, first introduces the traveller coming from Lyons to the remarkable features of Alpine scenery.

At the end of the lowland country,

the Gaulish chief, who had accompanied Hannibal thus far, took leave of him: his influence probably did not extend to the Alpine valleys; and the mountaineers, far from respecting his safe conduct, might be in the habit of making plundering inroads on his own territory. Here, then, Hannibal was left to himself; and he found that the natives were prepared to beset his passage. They occupied all such points as commanded the road; which, as usual, was a sort of terrace cut in the mountain side, overhanging the valley whereby it penetrated to the central ridge. But as the mountain line is of no great breadth here, the natives guarded the defile only by day, and withdrew when night came on to their own homes, in a town or village among the mountains, and lying in the valley behind them. Hannibal, having learnt this from some of his Gaulish guides whom he sent among them, encamped

in their sight just below the entrance of the defile; and as soon as it was dusk, he set out with a detachment of light troops, made his way through the pass, and occupied the positions which the barbarians, after their usual practice, had abandoned at the approach of night.

Day dawned; the main army broke up from its camp, and began to enter the defile; while the natives, finding their positions occupied by the enemy, at first looked on quietly, and offered no disturbance to the march. But when they saw the long narrow line of the Carthaginian army winding along the steep mountain side, and the cavalry and baggage cattle struggling at every step with the difficulties of the road, the temptation to plunder was too strong to be resisted; and from many points of the mountain, above the road, they rushed down upon the Carthaginians. The confusion was terrible; for the road

or track was so narrow, that the least crowd or disorder pushed the heavily loaded baggage cattle down the steep below; and the horses, wounded by the barbarians' missiles, and plunging about wildly in their pain and terror, increased the mischief. At last Hannibal was obliged to charge down from his position, which commanded the whole scene of confusion, and to drive the barbarians off. This he effected: yet the conflict of so many men on the narrow road made the disorder worse for a time; and he unavoidably occasioned the destruction of many of his own men. At last, the barbarians being quite beaten off, the army wound its way out of the defile in safety, and rested in the wide and rich valley which extends from the Lake of Bourget, with scarcely a perceptible change of level, to the Isere at Montmeillan. Hannibal meanwhile attacked and stormed the town, which

was the barbarians' principal stronghold; and here he recovered not only a great many of his own men, horses and baggage cattle, but also found a large supply of corn and cattle belonging to the barbarians, which he immediately made use of for the consumption of his soldiers.

In the plain which he had now reached, he halted for a whole day, and then resuming his march, proceeded for three days up the valley of the Isere on the right bank, without encountering any difficulty. Then the natives met him with branches of trees in their hands, and wreaths on their heads, in token of peace: they spoke fairly, offered hostages, and wished, they said, neither to do the Carthaginians any injury, nor to receive any from them. Hannibal mistrusted them, yet did not wish to offend them; he accepted their terms, received their hostages, and ob-

tained large supplies of cattle; and their whole behavior seemed so trustworthy, that at last he accepted their guidance, it is said, through a difficult part of the country, which he was now approaching. For all the Alpine valleys become narrower, as they draw near to the central chain; and the mountains often come so close to the stream, that the roads in old times were often obliged to leave the valley and ascend the hills by any accessible point, to descend again when the gorge became wider, and follow the stream as before. If this is not done, and the track is carried nearer the river, it passes often through defiles of the most formidable character, being no more than a narrow ledge above a furious torrent, with cliffs rising above it absolutely precipitous, and coming down on the other side of the torrent abruptly to the water, leaving no passage

by which man, or even goat, could make its way.

It appears that the barbarians persuaded Hannibal to pass through one of these defiles, instead of going round it; and while his army was involved in it, they suddenly, and without provocation, as we are told, attacked him. Making their way along the mountain sides, above the defile, they rolled down masses of rock on the Carthaginians below, or even threw stones upon them from their hands, stones and rocks being equally fatal against an enemy so entangled. It was well for Hannibal, that, still doubting the barbarians' faith, he had sent forward his cavalry and baggage, and covered the march with his infantry, who thus had to sustain the brunt of the attack. Foot soldiers on such ground were able to move where horses would be quite helpless; and thus, at last, Hannibal, with

his infantry, forced his way to the summit of one of the bare cliffs overhanging the defile, and remained there during the night, whilst the cavalry and baggage slowly struggled out of the defile. Thus, again baffled, the barbarians made no more general attacks on the army; some partial annoyance was occasioned at intervals; and some baggage was carried off; but it was observed, that wherever the elephants were, the line of march was secure; for the barbarians beheld those huge creatures with terror, having never had the slightest knowledge of them, and not daring to approach when they saw them.

Without any farther recorded difficulty, the army, on the ninth day after they had left the plains of Dauphiné, arrived at the summit of the central ridge of the Alps. Here there is always a plain of some extent, immediately overhung by the snowy summits

of the high mountains, but itself in summer presenting, in many parts, a carpet of the freshest grass, with the chalets of the shepherds scattered over it, and gay with a thousand flowers. But far different is its aspect through the greatest part of the year: then it is one unvaried waste of snow; and the little lakes, which, on many of the passes, enliven the summer landscape, are now frozen over and covered with snow, so as to be no longer distinguishable. Hannibal was on the summit of the Alps about the end of October; the first winter snows had already fallen; but two hundred years before the Christian era, when all Germany was one vast forest, the climate of the Alps was far colder than at present, and the snow lay on the passes all through the year. Thus the soldiers were in dreary quarters; they remained two days on the summit, resting from their fatigues, and giving

opportunity to many of the stragglers, and of the horses and cattle, to rejoin them by following their track; but they were cold, and worn, and disheartened; and mountains still rose before them, through which, as they knew too well, even their descent might be perilous and painful.

But their great general, who felt that he now stood victorious on the ramparts of Italy, and that the torrent which rolled before him was carrying its waters to the rich plains of Cisalpine Gaul, endeavored to kindle his soldiers with his own spirit of hope. He called them together; he pointed out the valley beneath, to which the descent seemed the work of a moment: "That valley," he said, "Is Italy; it leads us to the country of our friends the Gauls; and yonder is our way to Rome." His eyes were eagerly fixed on that point of the horizon; and as he gazed, the dis-

tance between seemed to vanish, till he could almost fancy that he was crossing the Tiber, and assailing the capital.

After the two days' rest the descent began. Hannibal experienced no more open hostility from the barbarians, only some petty attempts here and there to plunder; a fact strange in itself, but doubly so, if he were really descending the valley of the Doria Baltea, through the country of the Salassians, the most untamable robbers of all the Alpine barbarians. It is possible that the influence of the Insubrians may partly have restrained the mountaineers; and partly also they may have been deterred by the ill success of former attacks, and may by this time have regarded the strange army and its monstrous beasts with something of superstitious terror. But the natural difficulties of the ground on the descent were greater than ever. The snow covered the track so that the

men often lost it, and fell down the steep below: at last they came to a place where an avalanche had carried it away altogether for about three hundred yards, leaving the mountain side a mere wreck of scattered rocks and snow. To go round was impossible; for the depth of the snow on the heights above rendered it hopeless to scale them; nothing therefore was left but to repair the road. A summit of some extent was found, and cleared of the snow; and here the army were obliged to encamp, whilst the work went on. There was no want of hands; and every man was laboring for his life: the road, therefore, was restored, and supported with solid substructions below; and in a single day it was made practicable for the cavalry and baggage cattle, which were immediately sent forward. and reached the lower valley in safety, where they were turned out to pasture.

A harder labor was required to make a passage for the elephants: the way for them must be wide and solid; and the work could not be accomplished in less than three days. The poor animals suffered severely in the interval from hunger; for no forage was to be found in that wilderness of snow, nor any trees whose leaves might supply the place of other herbage. At last, they too were able to proceed with safety: Hannibal overtook his cavalry and baggage; and in three days more the whole army had got clear of the Alpine valleys, and entered the country of their friends, the Insubrians, on the wide plain of northern Italy.

Hannibal was arrived in Italy, but with a force so weakened by its losses in men and horses, and by the exhausted state of the survivors, that he might seem to have accomplished his great march in vain. According to his own

statement, which there is no reason to doubt, he brought out of the Alpine valleys no more than 12,000 African and 8,000 Spanish infantry, with 6,000 cavalry; so that his march from the Pyrenees to the plains of northern Italy must have cost him 33,000 men; an enormous loss, which proves how severely the army must have suffered from the privations of the march and the severity of the Alpine climate; for not half of these 33,000 men can have fallen in battle. With his army in this condition, some period of repose was absolutely necessary: accordingly, Hannibal remained in the country of the Insubrians, till rest, and a more temperate climate, and wholesome food, with which the Gauls plentifully supplied him, restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers, and made them again ready for action. His first movement was against the Taurinians, a Ligurian

people, who were constant enemies of the Insubrians, and therefore would not listen to Hannibal, when he invited them to join his cause. He therefore attacked and stormed their principal town, put the garrison to the sword, and struck such terror into the neighboring tribes, that they submitted immediately, and became his allies. This was his first accession of strength in Italy, the first fruits, as he hoped, of a long succession of defections among the allies of Rome, so that the swords of the Italians might effect for him the conquest of Italy.

Meanwhile Scipio had landed at Pisa, had crossed the Apennines, and taken the command of the prætors' army, sending the prætors themselves back to Rome, had crossed the Po at Placentia, and was ascending its left bank, being anxious to advance with all possible haste, in order to hinder a general rising of the

Gauls by his presence. Hannibal, for the opposite reason, was equally anxious to meet him, being well aware that the Gauls were only restrained from revolting, to the Carthaginians, by fear, and that on his first success in the field they would join him. He therefore descended the left bank of the Po, keeping the river on his right; and Scipio having thrown a bridge over the Ticinus, had entered what are now the Sardinian dominions, and was still advancing westward, with the Po on his left, although, as the river here makes a bend to the southward, he was no longer in its immediate neighborhood.

Each general was aware that his enemy was at hand, and both pushed forward with their cavalry and light troops in advance of their main armies, to reconnoitre each other's position and numbers. Thus was brought on accidentally the first action between Han-

nibal and the Romans in Italy, which, with some exaggeration, has been called the battle of the Ticinus. The Numidians in Hannibal's army, being now properly supported by heavy cavalry, were able to follow their own manner of fighting, and falling on the flanks and rear of the Romans, who were already engaged in front with Hannibal's heavy horsemen, took ample vengeance for their defeat on the Rhone. The Romans were routed; and the consul himself was severely wounded, and owed his life, it is said, to the courage and fidelity of a Ligurian slave. With their cavalry thus crippled, it was impossible to act in such an open country; the Romans therefore hastily retreated, recrossed the Ticinus, and broke down the bridge, yet with so much hurry and confusion, that 600 men were left on the right bank, and fell into the enemy's hands; and then crossing the Po

also, established themselves under the walls of their colony Placentia.

Hannibal, finding the bridge over the Ticinus destroyed, reascended the left bank of the Po till he found a convenient point to cross, and then, having constructed a bridge with the river boats, carried over his army in safety. Immediately, as he had expected, the Gauls on the right bank received him with open arms; and again descending the river, he arrived on the second day after his passage in sight of the Roman army, and on the following day offered them battle. But as the Romans did not move, he chose out a spot for his camp, and posted his army five or six miles from the enemy, and apparently on the east of Placentia, cutting off their direct communication with Ariminum and Rome.

On the first news of Hannibal's arrival in Italy, the senate sent orders to

the other consul, Ti. Sempronius, to return immediately to reinforce his colleague. No event of importance had marked the first summer of the war in Sicily. Hannibal's spirit so animated the Carthaginian government that they were everywhere preparing to act on the offensive; and before the arrival of Sempronius, M. Æmilius, the prætor, had already had to fight a naval action with the enemy, in order to defend Lilybæum. He had defeated them, and prevented their landing, but the Carthaginian fleets still kept the sea; and whilst Sempronius was employing his whole force in the conquest of the Island of Melita, the enemy were cruizing on the northern side of Sicily, and making descents on the coast of Italy. On his return to Lilybæum he was going in pursuit of them, when he received orders to return home and join his colleague. He accordingly left part of

his fleet with the prætor in Sicily, and part he committed to Sex. Pomponius, his lieutenant, for the protection of the coasts of Lucania and Campania; while, from a dread of the dangers and delays of the winter navigation of the Adriatic, his army was to march from Lilybæum to Messana, and after crossing the strait to go by land through the whole length of Italy, the soldiers being bound by oath to appear on a certain day at Ariminum. They completed their long march, it is said, in forty days; and from Ariminum they hastened to the scene of action, and affected their junction with the army of Scipio.

Sempronius found his colleague no longer in his original position, close by Placentia and the Po, but withdrawn to the first hills which bound the great plain on the south, and leave an interval here of about six miles between themselves and the river. But Han-

ıibal's army, lying as it seems, to the eastward, the Roman consul retreated westward, and leaving Placentia to its own resources, crossed to the left bank of the Trebia, and there lay encamped, just where the stream issues from the last hills of the Apennines. It appears that the Romans had several magazines on the right bank of the Po above Placentia, on which the consul probably depended for his subsistence; and these posts, together with the presence of his army, kept the Gauls on the immediate bank of the river quiet, so that they gave Hannibal no assistance. When the Romans fell back behind the Trebia, Hannibal followed them, and encamped about five miles off from them, directly between them and Placentia. But his powerful cavalry kept his communications open in every direction; and the Gauls who lived out of the immediate control of the Roman army and garri-

sons, supplied him with provisions abundantly.

It is not explained by any existing writer how Sempronius was able to affect his junction with his colleague without any opposition from Hannibal. The regular road from Ariminum to Placentia passes through a country unvaried by a single hill; and the approach of a large army should have been announced to Hannibal by his Numidian cavalry, soon enough to allow him to interrupt it. But so much in war depends upon trifling accidents, that it is in vain to guess where we are without information. We only know that the two consular armies were united in Scipio's position on the left bank of the Trebia; that their united forces amounted to 40,000 men; and that Hannibal, with an army so reinforced by the Gauls since his arrival in Italy, that it was little inferior to his enemy's,

was so far from fearing to engage either consul singly, that he wished for nothing so much as to bring on a decisive battle with the combined armies of both. Depending on the support of the Gauls for his subsistence, he must not be too long a burden to them: they had hoped to be led to live on the plunder of the enemy's country, not to maintain him at the expense of their own. In order to force the Romans to a battle, he began to attack their magazines. Clastidium, now Castiggio, a small town on the right bank of the Po, nearly opposite to the mouth of the Ticinus, was betrayed into his hands by the governor; and he here found large supplies of corn.

On the other hand, Sempronius, having no fears for the event of a battle, was longing for the glory of a triumph over such an enemy as Hannibal; and as Scipio was still disabled by his

wound, he had the command of the whole Roman army. Besides, the Gauls who lived in the plain between the Trebia and Placentia, not knowing which side to espouse, had been plundered by Hannibal's cavalry, and besought the consuls to protect them. This was no time, Sempronius thought, to neglect any ally who still remained faithful to Rome: he sent out his cavalry and light troops over the Trebia to drive off the plunderers; and in such skirmishes he obtained some partial success, which made him the more disposed to risk a general battle.

For this, as a Roman officer, and before Hannibal's military talents were fully known, he ought not to be harshly judged; but his manner of engaging was rash, and unworthy of an able general. He allowed the attacks of Hannibal's light cavalry to tempt him to follow them to their own field of battle.

Early in the morning the Numidians crossed the river, and skirmished close up to the Roman camp: the consul first sent out his cavalry, and then his light infantry, to repel them; and when they gave way and recrossed the river, he led his regular infantry out of his camp, and gave orders for the whole army to advance over the Trebia and attack the enemy.

It was mid-winter, and the wide pebbly bed of the Trebia, which the summer traveller may almost pass dry-shod, was now filled with a rapid stream running breast-high. In the night it had rained or snowed heavily; and the morning was raw and chilly, threatening sleet or snow. Yet Sempronius led his soldiers through the river, before they had eaten any thing; and wet, cold, and hungry as they were, he formed them in order of battle on the plain. Meanwhile Hannibal's men had eaten their breakfast in

their tents, and had oiled their bodies, and put on their armor around their fires. Then, when the enemy had crossed the Trebia, and were advancing in the open plain, the Carthaginians marched out to meet them; and about a mile in front of their camp, they formed in order of battle. Their disposition was simple: the heavy infantry, Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans, to the number of 20,000, were drawn up in a single line: the cavalry, 10,000 strong, was, with the elephants, on the two wings; the light infantry and Balerian slingers were in the front of the whole army. This was all Hannibal's visible force. But near the Trebia, and now left in their rear by the advancing Roman legions, were lying close hid in the deep and overgrown bed of a small watercourse, two thousand picked soldiers, horse and foot, commanded by Hannibal's younger brother Mago, whom

he had posted there during the night, and whose ambush the Romans passed with no suspicion. Arrived on the field of battle, the legions were formed in their usual order, with the allied infantry on the wings; and their weak caval ry of 4,000 men, ill able to contend with the numerous horsemen of Hannibal, were on the flanks of the whole line.

The Roman velites, or light infantry, who had been in action since daybreak, and had already shot away half their darts and arrows, were soon driven back upon the hastati and principes, and passed through the intervals of the maniples to the rear. With no less ease were the cavalry beaten on both wings, by Hannibal's horse and elephants. But when the heavy infantry, superior in number and better armed both for offence and defence, closed with the enemy, the confidence of Sempronius seemed to be justified; and the

Romans, numbed and exhausted as they were, yet, by their excellence in all soldierly qualities, maintained the fight with equal advantage.

On a sudden a loud alarm was heard; and Mago, with his chosen band, broke out from his ambush, and assaulted them furiously in the rear. Meantime both wings of the Roman infantry were broken down by the elephants, and overwhelmed by the missiles of the light infantry, till they were utterly routed, and fled towards the Trebia. The legions in the centre, finding themselves assailed on the rear, pushed desperately forwards, forced their way through the enemy's line and marched off the field straight to Placentia. Many of the routed cavalry made off in the same direction and so escaped. But those who fled towards the river were slaughtered unceasingly by the conquerors till they reached it; and the loss here was

enormous. The Carthaginians, however, stopped their pursuit on the bank of the Trebia: the cold was piercing, and to the elephants so intolerable that they almost all perished; even of the men and horses many were lost, so that the wreck of the Roman army reached their camp in safety; and when night came on, Scipio again led them across the river, and, passing unnoticed by the camp of the enemy, took refuge with his colleague within the walls of Placentia.

So ended Hannibal's first campaign in Italy. The Romans, after their defeat, despaired of maintaining their ground on the Po; and the two consular armies retreated in opposite directions, Scipio's upon Ariminum, and that of Sempronius across the Appenines into Etruria. Hannibal remained master of Cisalpine Gaul; but the season did not allow him to besiege Placentia and

Cremona; and the temper of the Gauls rendered it evident that he must not make their country the seat of war in another campaign. Already they bore the burden of supporting his army so impatiently, that he made an attempt, in the dead of the winter, to cross the Apennines into Etruria, and was only driven back by the extreme severity of the weather, the wind sweeping with such fury over the ridges, and through the passes of the mountains, that neither man nor beast could stand against it. He was forced, therefore, to winter in Gaul; but the innate fickleness and treachery of the people led him to suspect that attempts would be made against his life, and that a Gaulish assassin might hope to purchase forgiveness from the Romans for his country's revolt, by destroying the general who had seduced them. He therefore put on a variety of disguises to baffle such

designs; he wore false hair, appearing sometimes as a man of mature years, and sometimes with the gray hairs of old age; and if he had that taste for humor which great men are seldom without, and which some anecdotes of him imply, he must have been often amused by the mistakes thus occasioned, and have derived entertainment from that which policy or necessity had dictated.

We should be glad to catch a distinct view of the state of Rome, when the news first arrived of the battle of the Trebia. Since the disaster of Caudium, more than a hundred years before, there had been known no defeat of two consular armies united; and the surprise and vexation must have been great.—Sempronius, it is said, returned to Rome to hold the comitia; and the people resolved to elect as consul a man who, however unwelcome to the aristocracy,

had already distinguished himself by brilliant victories, in the very country which was now the seat of war. They accordingly chose C. Flaminius for the second time consul; and with him was elected Cn. Servilius Geminus, a man of an old patrician family, and personally attached to the aristocratical party, but unknown to us before his present consulship. Flaminius' election was most unpalatable to the aristocracy; and, as numerous prodigies were reported, and the Sibylline books consulted, and it was certain that various rites would be ordered to propitiate the favor of the gods, he had some reason to suspect that his election would again be declared null and void, and he himself thus deprived of his command; he was anxious therefore to leave Rome as soon as possible; as his colleague was detained by the religious ceremonies, and by the care of superintending the new levies, Flamini-

B. C. 217.

us, it is said, left the city before the 15th of March, when his consulship was to begin, and actually entered upon his office at Ariminum, whither he had gone to superintend the formation of magazines, and to examine the state of the army. But the aristocracy thought it was no time to press party animosities; they made no attempt to disturb Flaminius' election; and he appears to have had his province assigned him without opposition, and to have been appointed to command Sempronius' army in Etruria, while Servilius succeeded Scipio at Ariminum. The levies of soldiers went on vigorously; two legions were employed in Spain; one was sent to Sicily, another to Sardinia, and another to Tarentum; and four legions, more or less thinned by the defeat at the Trebia, still formed the nucleus of two armies in Ariminum and in Etruria. It appears that four new legions were levied, with an

unusually large proportion of soldiers from the Italian allies and the Latin name; and these being divided between the two consuls, the armies opposed to Hannibal on either line, by which he might advance, must have been in point of numbers exceedingly formidable.—Servilius, as we have seen, had his head-quarters at Ariminum; and Scipio, whom he superseded, sailed as proconsul into Spain, to take command of his original army there. Flaminius succeeded to Sempronius in Etruria, and lay encamped, it is said, in the neighborhood of Arretium.

Thus the main Roman armies lay nearly in the same positions which they had held eight years before, to oppose the expected invasion of the Gauls. But as the Gauls then broke into Etruria unperceived, by either Roman army, so the Romans were again surprised by Hannibal on a line where they had not

expected him. He crossed the Apennines, not by the ordinary road to Lucca, descending the valley of the Macra, but, as it appears, by a straighter line down the valley of the Anser or Serchio; and leaving Lucca on his right, he proceeded to struggle through the low and flooded country which lay between the right bank of the Arno and the Apennines below Florence, and of which the marsh or lake of Fucecchio still remains a specimen. Here, again, the sufferings of the army were extreme; but they were rewarded when they reached the firm ground below Fæsulæ, and were let loose upon the plunder of the rich valley of the upper Arno.

Flaminius lay quietly at Arretium, and did not attempt to give battle, but sent messengers to his colleague, to inform him of the enemy's appearance in Etruria. Hannibal was now on the south of the Apennines, and in the

heart of Italy; but the experience of the Samnites and of Pyrrhus had shown that the Etruscans were scarcely more to be relied on than the Gauls; and it was in the south, in Samnium and Lucania and Apulia, that the only materials existed for organizing a new Italian war against Rome. Accordingly Hannibal advanced rapidly into Etruria, and finding that Flaminius still did not move, passed by Arretium, leaving the Roman army in his rear, and marching, as it seemed, to gain the great plain of central Italy, which reaches from Perusia to Spoletum, and was traversed by the great road from Ariminum to Rome.

The consul Flaminius now at last broke up from his position, and followed the enemy. Hannibal laid waste the country on every side with fire and sword, to provoke the Romans to a hasty battle; and leaving Cortona on his left untouched on its mountain seat,

he approached the Lake of Thrasymenus, and followed the road along its north-eastern shore, till it ascended the hills which divide the lake from the basin of the Tiber. Flaminius was fully convinced that Hannibal's object was not to fight a battle, but to lay waste the richest part of Italy: had he wished to engage, why had he not attacked him when he lay at Arretium, and while his colleague was far away at Ariminum? With this impression he pressed on his rear closely, never dreaming that the lion would turn from the pursuit of his defenceless prey, to spring on the shepherds who were dogging his steps behind.

The modern road along the lake, after passing the village of Passignano, runs for some way, close to the water's edge on the right, hemmed in on the left by a line of cliffs, which make it an absolute defile. Then it turns from the lake

and ascends the hills; yet, although they form something of a curve, there is nothing to deserve the name of valley; and the road, after leaving the lake, begins to ascend almost immediately, so that there is a very short distance during which the hills on the right and left command it. The ground, therefore, does not well correspond with the description of Polybius, who states, that the valley in which the Romans were caught, was not the narrow interval between the hills and the lake, but a valley beyond this defile, and running down to the lake, so that the Romans, when engaged in it, had the water not on their right flank, but on their rear. Livy's account is different, and represents the Romans as caught in the defile beyond Passignano, between the cliff and the lake. It is possible that, if the exact line of the ancient road could be discovered, it might assist in solving

the difficulty: in the mean time the battle of Thrasymenus must be one of the many events in ancient military history, where the accounts of historians, differing either with each other or with the actual appearances of the ground, are to us inexplicable.

The consul had encamped in the evening on the side of the lake, just within the present Roman frontier, and on the Tuscan side of Passignano: he had made a forced march, and had arrived at his position so late that he could not examine the ground before him. Early the next morning he set forward again; the morning mist hung thickly over the lake and the low grounds, leaving the heights, as is often the case, quite clear. Flaminius, anxious to overtake his enemy, rejoiced in the friendly veil which thus concealed his advance, and hoped to fall upon Hannibal's army while it was still in marching order, and its col-

umns encumbered with the plunder of the valley of the Arno. He passed through the defile of Passignano, and found no enemy; this confirmed him in his belief that Hannibal did not mean to fight. Already the Numidian cavalry were on the edge of the basin of the Tiber: unless he could overtake them speedily, they would have reached the plain; and Africans, Spaniards, and Gauls, would be rioting in the devastation of the garden of Italy. So the consul rejoiced as the heads of his columns emerged from the defile, and, turning to the left, began to ascend the hills, where he hoped at least to find the rear-guard of the enemy.

At this moment, the stillness of the mist was broken by barbarian war-cries on every side; and both flanks of the Roman column were assailed at once. Their right was overwhelmed by a storm of javelins and arrows, shot as if from

the midst of darkness, and striking into the soldier's unguarded side, where he had no shield to cover him; while ponderous stones, against which no shield or helmit could avail, came crashing down upon their heads. On the left, were heard the trampling of horse, and the well-known war-cries of the Gauls; and presently Hannibal's dreaded cavalry emerged from the mist, and were in an instant in the midst of their ranks; and the huge forms of the Gauls, and their vast broad swords, broke in upon them at the same moment. The head of the Roman column—which was already ascending to the higher ground—found its advance also barred; for here was the enemy whom they had so longed to overtake: here were some of the Spanish and African foot of Hannibal's army drawn up to wait their assault. The Romans instantly attacked these troops, and cut their way through; these must

be the covering parties, they thought, of Hannibal's main battle; and, eager to bring the contest to a decisive issue, they pushed forward up the heights, not doubting that on the summit they should find the whole force of the enemy. And now they were on the top of the ridge, and to their astonishment no enemy was there; but the mist drew up, and, as they looked behind, they saw too plainly where Hannibal was; the whole valley was one scene of carnage, while on the sides of the hills above were the masses of the Spanish and African foot witnessing the destruction of the Roman army, which had scarcely cost them a single stroke.

The advanced troops of the Roman column had thus escaped the slaughter: but, being too few to retrieve the day, they continued their advance, which was now become a flight, and took refuge in one of the neighboring villages.—

Meantime, while the centre of the army was cut to pieces in the valley, the rear was still winding through the defile beyond, between the cliffs and the lake. But they, too, were attacked from the heights above by the Gauls, and forced in confusion into the water. Some of the soldiers, in desperation, struck out into the deep water, swimming; and, weighed down by their armor, presently sank: others ran in as far as was within their depth, and there stood helplessly, till the enemy's cavalry dashed in after them. Then they lifted up their hands, and cried for quarter; but, on this day of sacrifice, the gods of Carthage were not to be defrauded of a single victim; and the horsemen pitilessly fulfilled Hannibal's vow.

Thus, with the exception of the advanced troops of the Roman column, who were about 6,000 men, the rest of the army were utterly destroyed. The

consul himself had not seen the wreck consummated. On finding himself surrounded, he had vainly endeavored to form his men amidst the confusion, and to offer some regular resistance; when this was hopeless, he continued to do his duty as a brave soldier, till one of the Gaulish horsemen, who is said to have known him by sight from his former consulship, rode up and ran him through the body with his lance, crying out, "So perish the man who slaughtered our brethren, and robbed us of the lands of our fathers." In these last words, we probably rather read the unquenchable hatred of the Roman aristocracy to the author of an agrarian law, than the genuine language of the Gaul. Flaminius died bravely, sword in hand, having committed no graver military error than many an impetuous soldier, whose death in his country's cause has been felt to throw a veil over his rashness, and whose

memory is pitied and honored. The party feelings which have so colored the language of the ancient writers respecting him, need not be shared by a modern historian; Flaminius was indeed an unequal antagonist to Hannibal; but in his previous life, as consul and as censor, he had served his country well; and if the defile of Thrasymenus witnessed his rashness, it also contains his honorable grave.

The battle must have been ended before noon; and Hannibal's indefatigable cavalry, after having destroyed the centre and rear of the Roman army, hastened to pursue the troops who had broken off from the front, and had for the present escaped the general overthrow. They were supported by the light-armed foot and the Spaniards, and finding the Romans in the village to which they had retreated, proceeded to invest it on every side. The Romans, cut of from all re-

lief, and with no provisions, surrendered to Maharbal, who commanded the party sent against them. They were brought to Hannibal; with the other prisoners taken in the battle, the whole number amounted to 15,000. The general addressed them by an interpreter; he told the soldiers who had surrendered to Maharbal, that their lives, if he pleased, were still forfeited, for Maharbal had no authority to grant terms without his consent; then he proceeded, with the vehemence often displayed by Napoleon in similar circumstances, to inveigh against the Roman government and people, and concluded by giving all his Roman prisoners to the custody of the several divisions of his army. Then he turned to the Italian allies; they were not his enemies, he said; on the contrary, he had invaded Italy to aid them in casting off the yoke of Rome; he should still deal with them as he had treated

his Italian prisoners taken at the Trebia; they were free from that moment, and without ransom. This being done, he halted for a short time to rest his army, and buried with great solemnity thirty of the most distinguished of those who had fallen on his own side in the battle. His whole loss had amounted only to 1,500 men, of whom the greater part were Gauls. It is said also that he caused careful search, but in vain, to be made for the body of the consul, Flaminius, being anxious to give him honorable burial. So he acted afterwards to L. Æmilius and to Marcellus; and these humanities are worthy of notice, as if he had wished to show that, though his vow bound him to unrelenting enmity towards the Romans while living, it was a pleasure to him to feel that he might honor them when dead.

The army of Hannibal now broke up from the scene of its victory, and, leav-

ing Perusia unassailed, crossed the infant stream of the Tiber, and entered upon the plains of Umbria. Here Maharbal, with the cavalry and light troops, obtained another victory over a party of some thousand men, commanded by C. Centenius, and killed, took prisoners, or dispersed the whole body. Then that rich plain, extending from the Tiber, under Perusia, to Spoletum, at the foot of the Monte Somma, was laid waste by the Carthaginians without mercy. The white oxen of the Clitumnus, so often offered in sacrifice to the gods of Rome by her triumphant generals, were now the spoil of the enemy, and were slaughtered on the altars of the gods of Carthage, amidst prayers for the destruction of Rome. The left bank of the Tiber again heard the Gaulish war-cry; and the terrified inhabitants fled to the mountains or into the fortified cities, from this unwonted storm of barbarian invasion.

The figures and arms of the Gauls, however formidable, might be familiar to many of the Umbrians; but they gazed in wonder on the slingers from the Balearian islands, on the hardy Spanish foot, conspicuous by their white linen coats bordered with scarlet; on the regular African infantry, who had not yet exchanged their long lances and small shields for the long shield and stabbing sword of the Roman soldier; on the heavy cavalry, so numerous, and mounted on horses so superior to those of Italy; above all, on the bands of wild Numidians, who rode without saddle or bridle, as if the rider and his horse were one creature, and who scoured over the country with a speed and impetuosity defying escape or resistance. Amidst such a scene, the colonists of Spoletum deserved well of their country, for shutting their gates boldly, and not yielding to the general panic; and when the Nu-

midian horsemen reined up their horses, and turned away from its well-manned walls, the colonists, with an excusable boasting, might claim the glory of having repulsed Hannibal.

But Hannibal's way lay not over the Monte Somma, although its steep pass, rising immediately behind Spoletum, was the last natural obstacle between him and Rome. Beyond that pass the country was full, not of Roman colonies merely, but of Roman citizens: he would soon have entered on the territory of the thirty-five Roman tribes, where every man whom he would have met was his enemy. His eyes were fixed elsewhere: the south was entirely open to him; the way to Apulia and Samnium was cleared of every impediment. He crossed the Apennines in the direction of Ancona, and invaded Picenum; he then followed the coast of the Adriatic, through the country of the Marrucinians and Fren-

tanians, till he arrived in the northern part of Apulia, in the country called by the Greeks Daunia. He advanced slowly and leisurely, encamping after short marches, and spreading devastation far and wide: the plunder of slaves, cattle, corn, wine, oil, and valuable property of every description, was almost more than the army could carry or drive along. The soldiers, who after their exhausting march from Spain over the Alps, had ever since been in active service, or in wretched quarters, and who from cold and the want of oil for anointing the skin, had suffered severely from scorbutic disorders, were now revelling in plenty in a land of corn and olives and vines, where all good things were in such abundance that the very horses of the army, so said report, were bathed in old wines to improve their condition. Meanwhile, wherever the army passed, all Romans, or Latins, of an age to bear

arms, were, by Hannibal's express orders, put to the sword. Many an occupier of domain land, many a farmer of the taxes, or of those multiplied branches of revenue which the Roman government possessed all over Italy, collectors of customs and port duties, surveyors and farmers of the forests, farmers of the mountain pastures, farmers of the salt on the sea-coast, and of the mines in the mountains, were cut off by the vengeance of the Carthaginians; and Rome, having lost thousands of her poorer citizens in battle, and now losing hundreds of the richer classes in this exterminating march, lay bleeding at every pore.

But her spirit was invincible. When the tidings of the disaster of Thrasymenus reached the city, the people crowded to the Forum, and called upon the magistrates to tell them the whole truth. The prætor peregrinus, M. Pomponius Matho, ascended the rostra, and

said to the assembled multitude, "We have been beaten in a great battle; our army is destroyed; and C. Flaminius, the consul, is killed." Our colder temperaments scarcely enable us to conceive the effect of such tidings on the lively feelings of the people of the south, or to image to ourselves the cries, the tears, the hands uplifted in prayer, or clenched in rage, the confused sounds of ten thousand voices, giving utterance with breathless rapidity to their feelings of eager interest, of terror, of grief, or of fury. All the northern gates of the city were beset with crowds of wives and mothers, imploring every fresh fugitive from the fatal field for some tidings of those most dear to them. The prætors, M. Æmilius and M. Pomponius, kept the senate sitting for several days, from sunrise to sunset, without adjournment, in earnest consultation on the alarming state of their country.

Peace was not thought of for a moment; nor was it proposed to withdraw a single soldier from Spain, or Sicily, or Sardinia; but it was resolved that a dictator ought to be appointed, to secure unity of command. There had been no dictatorship for actual service since that of A. Atilius Calatinus, two-and-thirty years before, in the disastrous consulship of P. Claudius Pulcher and L. Junius Pullus. But it is probable that some jealousy was entertained of the senate's choice, if, in the absence of the consul Cn. Servilius, the appointment, according to ancient usage, had rested with them; nor was it thought safe to leave the dictator to nominate his master of the horse. Hence, an unusual course was adopted; the centuries in their comitia elected both the one and the other, choosing one from each of the two parties in the state; the dictator, Q. Fabius Maximus, from one of the no-

blest, but at the same time the most moderate families of the aristocracy, and himself a man of a nature no less gentle than wise; the master of the horse, M. Minucius Rufus, as representing the popular party.

Religion in the mind of Q. Fabius was not a mere instrument for party purposes; although he may have had little belief in its truth, he was convinced of its excellence, and that a reverence for the gods was an essential element in the character of a nation, without which it must assuredly degenerate. Therefore, on the very day that he entered on his office, he summoned the senate, and, dwelling on the importance of propitiating the gods, moved that the sibylline books should forthwith be consulted. They directed, among other things, that the Roman people should vow to the gods, what was called "a holy spring," that is to say, that every animal fit for

sacrifice born in the spring of that year, between the first day of March and the thirtieth of April, and reared on any mountain, or plain, or river bank, or upland pasture throughout Italy, should be offered to Jupiter. Extraordinary games were also vowed to be celebrated in the Circus Maximus; prayers were put up at all the temples; new temples were vowed to be built; and, for three days, those solemn sacrifices were performed, in which the images of the gods were taken down from their temples, and laid on couches richly covered, with tables full of meat and wine set before them, in the sight of all the people, as if the gods could not but bless the city where they had deigned to receive hospitality.

Then the dictator turned his attention to the state of the war. A long campaign was in prospect; for it was still so early in the season, that the prætors had

not yet gone out of their provinces; and Hannibal was already in the heart of Italy. All measures were taken for the defence of the country; even the walls and towers of Rome were ordered to be made good against an attack. Bridges were to be broken down; the inhabit ants of open towns were to withdraw into places of security; and, in the expected line of Hannibal's march, the country was to be laid waste before him, the corn destroyed, and the houses burnt. This would probably be done effectually in the Roman territory; but the allies were not likely to make such extreme sacrifices: and this, of itself, was a reason why Hannibal did not advance directly upon Rome.

More than thirty thousand men, in killed and prisoners, had been lost to the Romans in the late battle. The consul, Cn. Servilius, commanded above thirty thousand in Cisalpine Gaul; and he was

now retreating in all haste, after having heard of the total defeat of his colleague. Two new legions were raised, besides a large force out of the city tribes, which was employed partly for the defence of Rome itself, and partly, as it consisted largely of the poorer citizens, for the service of the fleet. This last indeed was become a matter of urgent necessity; for the Carthaginian fleet was already on the Italian coast, and had taken a whole convoy of corn-ships, off Cosa, in Etruria, carrying supplies to the army in Spain; while the Roman ships, both in Sicily and at Ostia, had not yet been launched after the winter. Now all the ships at Ostia and in the Tiber were sent to sea in haste, and the consul, Cn. Servilius, commanded them; whilst the dictator and master of the horse, having added the two newly-raised legions to the consul's army, proceeded through Campania and Samnium into Apulia, and, with an

army greatly superior in numbers, encamped at the distance of about five or six miles from Hannibal.

Besides the advantage of numbers, the Romans had that of being regularly and abundantly supplied with provisions. They had no occasion to scatter their forces in order to obtain subsistence; but, keeping their army together, and exposing no weak point to fortune, they followed Hannibal at a certain distance, watched their opportunity to cut off his detached parties, and above all, by remaining in the field with so imposing an army, overawed the allies, and checked their disposition to revolt. Thus Hannibal, finding that the Apulians did not join him, recrossed the Apennines, and moved through the country of the Hirpinians, into that of the Caudinian Samnites. But Beneventum, once a great Samnite city, was now a Latin colony; and its gates were close shut

against the invader. Hannibal laid waste its territory with fire and sword, then moved onwards under the south side of the Matese, and took possession of Telesia, the native city of C. Pontius, but now a decayed and defenceless town: thence descending the Calor to its junction with the Vulturnus, and ascending the Vulturnus till he found it easily fordable, he finally crossed it near Allifæ, and passing over the hills behind Calatia, descended by Cales into the midst of the Falernian plain, the glory of Campania.

Fabius steadily followed him, not descending into the plain, but keeping his army on the hills above it, and watching all his movements. Again the Numidian cavalry were seen scouring the country on every side; and the smoke of burning houses marked their track. The soldiers in the Roman army beheld the sight with the greatest impatience: they were burning for battle, and the master

of the horse himself shared and encouraged the general feeling. But Fabius was firm in his resolution; he sent parties to secure even the pass of Tarracina, lest Hannibal should attempt to advance by the Appian road upon Rome; he garrisoned Casilinum, on the enemy's rear; the Vulturnus, from Casilinum to the sea, barred all retreat southwards; the colony of Cales stopped the outlet from the plain by the Latin road; while from Cales to Casilinum the hills formed an unbroken barrier, steep and wooded, the few paths over which were already secured by Roman soldiers. Thus Fabius thought that Hannibal was caught as in a pitfall; that his escape was cut off, while his army, having soon wasted its plunder, could not possibly winter where it was, without magazines, and without a single town in its possession. For himself, he had all the resources of Campania and Samnium on his rear; while

on his right, the Latin road, secured by the colonies of Cales, Casinum, and Fregellæ, kept his communications with Rome open.

Hannibal, on his part, had no thought of wintering where he was; but he had carefully husbanded his plunder, that it might supply his winter consumption, so that it was important to him to carry it off in safety. He had taken many thousand cattle; and his army besides was encumbered with its numerous prisoners, over and above the corn, wine, oil, and other articles, which had been furnished by the ravage of one of the richest districts in Italy. Finding that the passes in the hills between Cales and the Vulturnus were occupied by the enemy, he began to consider how he could surprise or force his passage without abandoning any of his plunder. He first thought of his numerous prisoners; and dreading lest in a night march they should either

escape or overpower their guards and join their countrymen in attacking him, he commanded them all, to the number, it is said, of 5,000 men, to be put to the sword. Then he ordered 2,000 of the stoutest oxen to be selected from the plundered cattle, and pieces of split pine wood, or dry vine wood, to be fastened to their horns. About two hours before midnight the drovers began to drive them straight to the hills, having first set on fire the bundles of wood about their heads; while the light infantry following them till they began to run wild, then made their own way to the hills, scouring the points just above the pass occupied by the enemy. Hannibal then commenced his march; his African infantry led the way, followed by the cavalry; then came all the baggage; and the rear was covered by the Spaniards and Gauls. In this order he followed the road in the defile, by which

he was to get out into the upper valley of the Vulturnus, above Casilinum and the enemy's army.

He found the way quite clear; for the Romans who had guarded it, seeing the hills above them illuminated on a sudden with a multitude of moving lights, and nothing doubting that Hannibal's army was attempting to break out over the hills in despair of forcing the road, quitted their position in haste, and ran towards the heights to interrupt or embarrass his retreat. Meanwhile Fabius, with his main army, confounded at the strangeness of the sight, and dreading lest Hannibal was tempting him to his ruin as he had tempted Flaminius, kept close within his camp until the morning. Day dawned only to show him his own troops, who had been set to occupy the defile, engaged on the hills above with Hannibal's light infantry. But presently the Spanish foot were seen scaling the

heights to reinforce the enemy; and the Romans were driven down to the plain with great loss and confusion; while the Spaniards and the light troops, having thoroughly done their work, disappeared behind the hills, and followed their main army. Thus completely successful, and leaving his shamed and baffled enemy behind him, Hannibal no longer thought of returning to Apulia by the most direct road, but resolved to extend his devastations still farther before the season ended. He mounted the valley of the Vulturnus towards Venafrum, marched from thence into Samnium, crossed the Apennines, and descended into the rich Peignian plain by Sulmo, which yielded him an ample harvest of plunder; and thence retracing his steps into Samnium, he finally returned to the neighborhood of his old quarters in Apulia.

The summer was far advanced; Hannibal had overrun the greater part of

Italy: the meadows of the Clitumnus and the Vulturnus, and the forest glades of the high Apennines, had alike seen their cattle driven away by the invading army; the Falernian plain and the plain of Sulmo, had alike yielded their tribute of wine and oil; but not a single city had as yet opened its gates to the conqueror, not a single state of Samnium had welcomed him as its champion, under whom it might revenge its old wrongs against Rome. Every where the aristocratical party had maintained its ascendency, and had repressed all mention of revolt from Rome. Hannibal's great experiment therefore had hitherto failed. He knew that his single army could not conquer Italy; as easily might King William's Dutch guards have conquered England: and six months had brought Hannibal no fairer prospect of aid within the country itself, than the first week after his land-

ing in Torbay brought to King William. But among Hannibal's greatest qualities was the patience with which he knew how to abide his time; if one campaign had failed of its main object, another must be tried; if the fidelity of the Roman allies had been unshaken by the disaster of Thrasymenus, it must be tried by a defeat yet more fatal. Meantime he would take undisputed possession of the best winter quarters in Italy; his men would be plentifully fed; his invaluable cavalry would have forage in abundance; and this at no cost to Carthage, but wholly at the expense of the enemy. The point which he fixed upon to winter at, was the very edge of the Apulian plain, where it joins the mountains: on one side was a boundless expanse of corn, intermixed with open grass land, burnt up in summer, but in winter fresh and green; whilst on the other side were the wide pastures of the mountain forests.

where his numerous cattle might be turned out till the first snows of autumn fell. These were as yet far distant; for the corn in the plain, although ripe, was still standing; and the rich harvests of Apulia were to be gathered this year by unwonted reapers.

Descending from Samnium, Hannibal accordingly appeared before the little town of Geronium, which was situated somewhat more than twenty miles north-west of the Latin colony of Luceria, in the immediate neighborhood of Larinum. The town, refusing to surrender, was taken, and the inhabitants put to the sword; but the houses and walls were left standing, to serve as a great magazine for the army; and the soldiers were quartered in a regularly fortified camp without the town. Here Hannibal posted himself; and, keeping a third part of his men under arms to guard the camp and to cover his foragers, he sent out the

other two-thirds to gather in all the corn of the surrounding country, or to pasture his cattle on the adjoining mountains. In this manner the storehouses of Geronium were in a short time filled with corn.

Meanwhile the public mind at Rome was strongly excited against the dictator. He seemed like a man who, having played a cautious game, at last makes a false move, and is beaten; his slow, defensive system, unwelcome in itself, seemed rendered contemptible by Hannibal's triumphant escape from the Falernian plain. But here, too, Fabius showed a patience worthy of all honor. Vexed as he must have been at his failure in Campania, he still felt sure that his system was wise; and again he followed Hannibal into Apulia, and encamped as before in the high grounds in his neighborhood. Certain religious offices called him at this time to Rome;

but he charged Minucius to observe his system strictly, and on no account to risk a battle.

The master of the horse conducted his operations wisely: he advanced his camp to a projecting ridge of hills, immediately above the plain, and, sending out his cavalry and light troops to cut off Hannibal's foragers, obliged the enemy to increase his covering force, and to restrict the range of his harvesting. On one occasion he cut off a great number of the foragers, and even advanced to attack Hannibal's camp, which, owing to the necessity of detaching so many men all over the country, was left with a very inferior force to defend it. The return of some of the foraging parties obliged the Romans to retreat; but Minucius was greatly elated, and sent home very encouraging reports of his success.

The feeling against Fabius could no

longer be restrained. Minucius had known how to manage his system more ably than he had done himself; such merit at such a crisis deserved to be rewarded; nor was it fit that the popular party should continue to be deprived of its share in the conduct of the war. Even among his own party Fabius was not universally popular: he had magnified himself and his system somewhat offensively, and had spoken too harshly of the blunders of former generals. Thus it does not appear, that the aristocracy offered any strong resistance to a bill brought forward by the tribune M. Metilius, for giving the master of the horse power equal to the dictator's. The bill was strongly supported by C. Terentius Varro, who had been prætor in the preceding year, and was easily carried.

The dictator and master of the horse now divided the army between them, and encamped apart, at more than a

mile's distance from each other. Their want of co-operation was thus notorious; and Hannibal was not slow to profit by it. He succeeded in tempting Minucius to an engagement on his own ground; and having concealed about 5000 men in some ravines and hollows close by, he called them forth in the midst of the action to fall on the enemy's rear. The rout of the Trebia was well-nigh repeated; but Fabius was near enough to come up in time to the rescue; and his fresh legions checked the pursuit of the conquerors, and enabled the broken Romans to rally. Still the loss already sustained was severe; and it was manifest that Fabius had saved his colleague from total destruction. Minucius acknowledged this generously: he instantly gave up his equal and separate command, and placed himself and his army under the dictator's orders. The rest of the season passed quietly; and the dictator and master of

the horse resigning their offices as usual at the end of six months, the army during the winter was put under the command of the consuls; Cn. Servilius having brought home and laid up the fleet, which he had commanded during the summer, and M. Atilius Regulus having been elected to fill the place of Flaminius.

Meanwhile the elections for the following year were approaching; and it was evident that they would be marked by severe party struggles. The mass of the Roman people were impatient of the continuance of the war in Italy; not only the poorer citizens, whom it obliged to constant military service through the winter, and with no prospect of plunder, but still more perhaps the moneyed classes, whose occupation as farmers of the revenue was so greatly curtailed by Hannibal's army. Again, the occupiers of domain lands in remote parts of Italy

could get no returns from their property; the wealthy graziers, who fed their cattle on the domain pastures, saw their stock carried off to furnish winter provisions for the enemy. Besides, if Hannibal were allowed to be unassailable in the field, the allies, sooner or later, must be expected to join him; they would not sacrifice every thing for Rome, if Rome could neither protect them nor herself. The excellence of the Roman infantry was undisputed: if with equal numbers they could not conquer Hannibal's veterans, let their numbers be increased, and they must overwhelm him. These were no doubt the feelings of many of the nobility themselves, as well as of the majority of the people; but they were embittered by party animosity: the aristocracy, it was said, seemed bent on throwing reproach on all generals of the popular party, as if none but themselves were fit to conduct the war; Minucius

himself had yielded to this spirit by submitting to be commanded by Fabius, when the law had made him his equal: one consul at least must be chosen, who would act firmly for himself and for the people; and such a man, to whose merits the bitter hatred of the aristocratical party bore the best testimony, was to be found in C. Terentius Varro.

Varro, his enemies said, was a butcher's son; nay, it was added, that he had himself been a butcher's boy, and had only been enabled by the fortune which his father had left him to throw aside his ignoble calling, and to aspire to public offices. So Cromwell was called a brewer: but Varro had been successively elected quæstor, plebeian and curule ædile, and prætor, while we are not told that he was ever tribune; and it is without example in Roman history, that a mere demagogue, of no family, with no other merits, civil or military, should be

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raised to such nobility. Varro was eloquent, it is true; but eloquence alone would scarcely have so recommended him; and if in his prætorship, as is probable, he had been one of the two home prætors, he must have possessed a competent knowledge of law. Besides, even after his defeat at Cannæ, he was employed for several years in various important offices, civil and military; which would never have been the case had he been the mere factious braggart that historians have painted him. The aristocracy tried in vain to prevent his election: he was not only returned consul, but he was returned alone, no other candidate obtaining a sufficient number of votes to entitle him to the suffrage of a tribe. Thus he held the comitia for the election of his colleague: and considering the great influence exercised by the magistrate so presiding, it is creditable to him, and to the temper of the people

generally, that the other consul chosen was L. Æmilius Paullus, who was not only a known partisan of the aristocracy, but having been consul three years before, had been brought to trial for an alleged misappropriation of the plunder taken in the Illyrian war, and, although acquitted, was one of the most unpopular men in Rome. Yet he was known to be a good soldier; and the people, having obtained the election of Varro, did not object to gratify the aristocracy by accepting the candidate of their choice.

No less moderate and impartial was the temper shown in the elections of prætors. Two of the four were decidedly of the aristocratical party, M. Marcellus and L. Postumius Albinus; the other two were also men of consular rank, and no way known as opponents of the nobility, P. Furius Philus and M. Pomponius Matho. The two latter were to

have the home prætorships; Marcellus was to command the fleet, and take charge of the southern coast of Italy; L. Postumius was to watch the frontier of Cisalpine Gaul.

The winter and spring passed without any military events of importance. Servilius and Regulus retained their command as proconsuls for some time after their successors had come into office; but nothing beyond occasional skirmishes took place between them and the enemy. Hannibal was at Geronium, maintaining his army on the supplies which he had so carefully collected in the preceding campaign: the consuls apparently were posted a little to the southward, receiving their supplies from the country about Canusium, and immediately from a large magazine, which they had established at the small town of Cannæ, near the Aufidus.

Never was Hannibal's genius more

displayed than during this long period of inactivity. More than half of his army consisted of Gauls, of all barbarians the most impatient and uncertain in their humor, whose fidelity, it said, could only be secured by an ever-open hand; no man was their friend any longer than he could gorge them with pay or plunder. Those of his soldiers who were not Gauls, were either Spaniards or Africans; the Spaniards were the newly-conquered subjects of Carthage, strangers to her race and language, and accustomed to divide their lives between actual battle and the most listless bodily indolence; so that, when one of their tribes first saw the habits of a Roman camp, and observed the centurions walking up and down before the prætorium for exercise, the Spaniards thought them mad, and ran up to guide them to their tents, thinking that he who was not fighting could do nothing but lie at his ease and

enjoy himself. Even the Africans were foreigners to Carthage: they were subjects harshly governed, and had been engaged within the last twenty years in a war of extermination with their masters. Yet the long inactivity of winter quarters, trying to the discipline of the best national armies, was borne patiently by Hannibal's soldiers: there was neither desertion nor mutiny amongst them; even the fickleness of the Gauls seemed spell-bound; they remained steadily in their camp in Apulia, neither going home to their own country, nor over to the enemy. On the contrary, it seems that fresh bands of Gauls must have joined the Carthaginian army after the battle of Thrasymenus, and the retreat of the Roman army from Ariminum. For the Gauls and the Spaniards and the Africans were overpowered by the ascendency of Hannibal's character: under his guidance they felt themselves

invincible: with such a general the yoke of Carthage might seem to the Africans and Spaniards the natural dominion of superior beings; in such a champion the Gauls beheld the appointed instrument of their country's gods to lead them once more to assault the capital.

Silanus, the Greek historian, was living with Hannibal daily; and though not intrusted with his military and political secrets, he must have seen and known him as a man; he must have been familiar with his habits of life, and must have heard his conversation in those unrestrained moments when the lightest words of great men display the character of their minds so strikingly. His work is lost to us; but had it been worthy of his opportunities, anecdotes from it must have been quoted by other writers, and we should know what Hannibal was. Then, too, the generals who were his daily companions would be something

more to us than names: we should know Maharbal, the best cavalry officer of the finest cavalry service in the world; and Hasdrubal, who managed the commissariat of the army for so many years in an enemy's country; and Hannibal's young brother, Mago, so full of youthful spirit and enterprise, who commanded the ambush at the battle of the Trebia. We might learn something too of that Hannibal, surnamed the Fighter, who was the general's counsellor, ever prompting him, it was said, to deeds of savage cruelty, but whose counsels Hannibal would not have listened to, had they been merely cruel, had they not breathed a spirit of deep devotion to the cause of Carthage, and of deadly hatred to Rome, such as possessed the heart of Hannibal himself. But Silanus saw and heard without heeding or recording; and on the tent and camp of Hannibal there hangs a veil, which the fancy of the

poet may penetrate; but the historian turns away in deep disappointment; for to him it yields neither sight nor sound.

Spring was come, and well-nigh departing; and in the warm plains of Apulia the corn was ripening fast, while Hannibal's winter supplies were now nearly exhausted. He broke up from his camp before Geronium, descended into the Apulian plains, and whilst the Roman army was still in its winter position, he threw himself on its rear, and surprised its great magazine at Cannæ. The citadel of Cannæ was a fortress of some strength; this accordingly he occupied, and placed himself, on the very eve of harvest, between the Roman army and its expected resources, while he secured to himself all the corn of southern Apulia. It was only in such low and warm situations that the corn was nearly ready; the higher country, in the immediate neighborhood of Apulia, is

cold and backward; and the Romans were under the necessity of receiving their supplies from a great distance, or else of retreating, or of offering battle. Under these circumstances the proconsuls sent to Rome, to ask what they were to do.

The turning-point of this question lay in the disposition of the allies. We cannot doubt that Hannibal had been busy during the winter in sounding their feelings; and now it appeared that, if Italy was to be ravaged by the enemy for a second summer, without resistance, their patience would endure no longer. The Roman government, therefore, resolved to risk a battle; but they sent orders to the proconsuls to wait till the consuls should join them with their newly-raised army; for a battle being resolved upon, the senate hoped to secure success by an overwhelming superiority of numbers. We do not exactly know the pro-

portion of the new levies to the old soldiers; but when the two consuls arrived on the scene of action, and took the supreme command of the whole army, there were no fewer than eight Roman legions under their orders, with an equal force of allies; so that the army opposed to Hannibal must have amounted to 90,000 men. It was evident that so great a multitude could not long be fed at a distance from its resources; and thus a speedy engagement was inevitable.

But the details of the movements, by which the two armies were brought in presence of each other, on the banks of the Aufidus, are not easy to discover. It appears that the Romans, till the arrival of the new consuls, had not ventured to follow Hannibal closely; for, when they did follow him, it took them two days' march to arrive in his neighborhood, where they encamped

at about six miles distance from him. They found him on the left bank of the Aufidus, about eight or nine miles from the sea, and busied, probably, in collecting the corn from the early district on the coast, the season being about the middle of June. The country here was so level and open, that the consul, L. Æmilius, was unwilling to approach the enemy more closely, but wished to take a position on the hilly ground farther from the sea, and to bring on the action there. But Varro, impatient for battle, and having the supreme command of the whole army, alternately with Æmilius every other day, decided the question irrevocably on the very next day, by interposing himself between the enemy and the sea, with his left resting on the Aufidus, and his right communicating with the town of Salapia.

From this position Æmilius, when he

again took the command in chief, found it impossible to withdraw. But availing himself of his great superiority in numbers, he threw a part of his army across the river, and posted them in a separate camp on the right bank, to have the supplies of the country, south of the Aufidus, at command, and to restrain the enemy's parties who might attempt to forage in that direction. When Hannibal saw the Romans in this situation, he also advanced nearer to them, descending the left bank of the Aufidus, and encamped over against the main army of the enemy, with his right resting on the river.

The next day, which, according to the Roman calendar, was the last of the month Quinctilis, or July, the Roman reckoning being six or seven weeks in advance of the true season, Hannibal was making his preparations for battle, and did not stir from his camp; so that

Varro, whose command it was, could not bring on an action. But on the 1st of Sextilis, or August, Hannibal, being now quite ready, drew out his army in front of his camp, and offered battle. Æmilius, however, remained quiet, resolved not to fight on such ground, and hoping that Hannibal would soon be obliged to fall back nearer the hills, when he found that he could no longer forage freely in the country near the sea. Hannibal, seeing that the enemy did not move, marched back his infantry into his camp, but sent his Numidian cavalry across the river to attack the Romans on that side, as they were coming down in straggling parties to the bank to get water. For the Aufidus, though its bed is deep and wide to hold its winter floods, is a shallow or a narrow stream in summer, with many points easily fordable, not by horse only, but by infantry. The watering parties were

driven in with some loss, and the Numidians followed them to the very gates of the camp, and obliged the Romans, on the right bank, to pass the summer night in the burning Apulian plain without water.

At daybreak on the next morning, the red ensign, which was the well-known signal for battle, was seeing flying over Varro's head-quarters; and he issued orders, it being his day of command, for the main army to cross the river, and form in order of battle on the right bank. Whether he had any farther object in crossing to the right bank, than to enable the soldiers on that side to get water in security, we do not know; but Hannibal, it seems, thought that the ground on either bank suited him equally; and he, too, forded the stream at two separate points, and drew out his army opposite to the enemy. The strong town of Canusium was

scarcely three miles off in his rear; he had left his camp on the other side of the river; if he were defeated, escape seemed hopeless. But when he saw the wide open plain around him, and looked at his numerous and irresistible cavalry, and knew that his infantry, however inferior in numbers, were far better and older soldiers than the great mass of their opponents, he felt that defeat was impossible. In this confidence his spirits were not cheerful merely, but even mirthful; he rallied one of his officers jestingly, who noticed the overwhelming numbers of the Romans; those near him laughed; and as any feeling at such a moment is contagious, the laugh was echoed by others; and the soldiers, seeing their great general in such a mood, were satisfied that he was sure of victory.

The Carthaginian army faced the north, so that the early sun shone on

their right flank, while the wind, which blew strong from the south, but without a drop of rain, swept its clouds of dust over their backs, and carried them full into the faces of the enemy. On their left, resting on the river, were the Spanish and Gaulish horse; next in the line, but thrown back a little, were half of the African infantry armed like the Romans; on their right, somewhat in advance, were the Gauls and Spaniards, with their companies intermixed; then came the rest of the African foot, again thrown back like their comrades; and on the right of the whole line were the Numidian light horsemen. The right of the army rested, so far as appears, on nothing; the ground was open and level; but at some distance were hills overgrown with copsewood, and furrowed with deep ravines, in which, according to one account of the battle, a body of horsemen and of light infantry lay in

ambush. The rest of the light troops, and the Balearian slingers, skirmished as usual in front of the whole line.

Meanwhile the masses of the Roman infantry were forming their line opposite. The sun on their left flashed obliquely on their brazen helmets, now uncovered for battle, and lit up the waving forest of their red and black plumes, which rose upright from their helmets a foot and a half high.

They stood brandishing their formidable pila, covered with their long shields, and bearing on their right thigh their peculiar and fatal weapon, the heavy sword, fitted alike to cut and to stab. On the right of the line were the Roman legions; on the left the infantry of the allies; while between the Roman right and the river were the Roman horsemen, all of them of wealthy or noble families; and on the left, opposed to the Numidians, were the horsemen of the Italians and

of the Latin name. The velites or light infantry covered the front, and were ready to skirmish with the light troops and slingers of the enemy.

For some reason or other, which is not explained in any account of the battle, the Roman infantry were formed in columns rather than in line, the files of the maniples containing many more than their ranks. This seems an extraordinary tactic to be adopted in a plain by an army inferior in cavalry, but very superior in infantry. Whether the Romans relied on the river as a protection to their right flank, and their left was covered in some manner which is not mentioned,—one account would lead us to suppose that it reached nearly to the sea,—or whether the great proportion of new levies obliged the Romans to adopt the system of the phalanx, and to place their raw soldiers in the rear, as incapable of fighting in the front ranks with Hanni-

bal's veterans,—it appears at any rate that the Roman infantry, though nearly double the number of the enemy, yet formed a line of only equal length with Hannibal's.

The skirmishing of the light-armed troops preluded as usual to the battle: the Balearian slingers slung their stones like hail into the ranks of the Roman line, and severely wounded the consul Æmilius himself. Then the Spanish and Gaulish horse charged the Romans front to front, and maintained a standing fight with them, many leaping off their horses and fighting on foot, till the Romans, outnumbered and badly armed, without cuirasses, with light and brittle spears, and with shields made only of ox-hide, were totally routed, and driven off the field. Hasdrubal, who commanded the Gauls and Spaniards, followed up his work effectually; he chased the Romans along the river till he had almost

destroyed them; and then, riding off to the right, he came up to aid the Numidians, who, after their manner, had been skirmishing indecisively with the cavalry of the Italian allies. These, on seeing the Gauls and Spaniards advancing, broke away and fled; the Numidians, most effective in pursuing a flying enemy, chased them with unweariable speed, and slaughtered them unsparingly; while Hasdrubal, to complete his signal services on this day, charged fiercely upon the rear of the Roman infantry.

He found its huge masses already wel tering in helpless confusion, crowded upon one another, totally disorganized, and fighting each man as he best could, but struggling on against all hope by mere indomitable courage. For the Roman columns on the right and left, finding the Gaulish and Spanish foot advancing in a convex line or wedge, pressed forwards to assail what seemed

the flanks of the enemy's column; so that, being already drawn up with too narrow a front by their original formation, they now became compressed still more by their own movements, the right and left converging towards the centre, till the whole army became one dense column, which forced its way onwards by the weight of its charge, and drove back the Gauls and Spaniards into the rear of their own line. Meanwhile its victorious advance had carried it, like the English column at Fontenoy, into the midst of Hannibal's army; it had passed between the African infantry on its right and left; and now, whilst its head was struggling against the Gauls and Spaniards, its long flanks were fiercely assailed by the Africans, who, facing about to the right and left, charged it home, and threw it into utter disorder. In this state, when they were forced together into one unwieldy crowd, and

already falling by thousands, whilst the Gauls and Spaniards, now advancing in their turn, were barring farther progress in front, and whilst the Africans were tearing their mass to pieces on both flanks, Hasdrubal with his victorious Gaulish and Spanish horsemen broke with thundering fury upon their rear. Then followed a butchery such as has no recorded equal, except the slaughter of the Persians in their camp, when the Greeks forced it, after the battle of Platæa. Unable to fight or fly, with no quarter asked or given, the Romans and Italians fell before the swords of their enemies, till, when the sun set upon the field, there were left out of that vast multitude no more than three thousand men alive and unwounded; and these fled in straggling parties, under cover of the darkness, and found a refuge in the neighboring towns. The consul Æmilius, the proconsul, Cn. Servilius

the late master of the horse, M. Minucius, two quæstors, twenty-one military tribunes, and eighty senators, lay dead amidst the carnage; Varro with seventy horsemen had escaped from the rout of the allied cavalry on the right of the army, and made his way safely to Venusia.

But the Roman loss was not yet completed. A large force had been left in the camp on the left bank of the Aufidus, to attack Hannibal's camp during the action, which it was supposed that, with his inferior numbers, he could not leave adequately guarded. But it was defended so obstinately, that the Romans were still besieging it in vain, when Hannibal, now completely victorious in the battle, crossed the river to its relief. Then the besiegers fled in their turn to their own camp, and there, cut off from all succor, they presently surrendered. A few resolute men had forced their way out of

the smaller camp on the right bank, and had escaped to Canusium: the rest who were in it followed the example of their comrades on the left bank, and surrendered to the conqueror.

Less than six thousand men of Hannibal's army had fallen: no greater price had he paid for the total destruction of more than eighty thousand of the enemy, for the capture of their two camps, for the utter annihilation, as it seemed, of all their means for offensive warfare. It is no wonder that the spirits of the Carthaginian officers were elated by this unequalled victory. Maharbal, seeing what his cavalry had done, said to Hannibal, "Let me advance instantly with the horse, and do thou follow to support me; in four days from this time thou shalt sup in the capitol." There are moments when rashness is wisdom; and it may be that this was one of them. The statue of the goddess Victory in the

capitol may well have trembled in every limb on that day, and have drooped her wings, as if forever; but Hannibal came not; and if panic had for one moment unnerved the iron courage of the Roman aristocracy, on the next their inborn spirit revived; and their resolute will, striving beyond its present power, created, as is the law of our nature, the power which it required.

The Romans, knowing that their army was in presence of the enemy, and that the consuls had been ordered no longer to decline a battle, were for some days in the most intense anxiety. Every tongue was repeating some line of old prophecy, or relating some new wonder or portent; every temple was crowded with supplicants; and incense and sacrifices were offered on every altar. At last the tidings arrived of the utter destruction of both the consular armies, and of a slaughter such as Rome had never

before known. Even Livy felt himself unable adequately to paint the grief and consternation of that day; and the experience of the bloodiest and most embittered warfare of modern times would not help us to conceive it worthily. But one simple fact speaks eloquently; the whole number of Roman citizens able to bear arms had amounted at the last census to 270,000; and supposing, as we fairly may, that the loss of the Romans in the late battle had been equal to that of their allies, there must have been killed or taken, within the last eighteen months, no fewer than 60,000, or more than a fifth part of the whole population of citizens above seventeen years of age. It must have been true, without exaggeration, that every house in Rome was in mourning.

The two home prætors summoned the senate to consult for the defence of the city. Fabius was no longer dictator; yet

the supreme government at this moment was effectually in his hands; for the resolutions which he moved were instantly and unanimously adopted. Light horsemen were to be sent out to gather tidings of the enemy's movements; the members of the senate, acting as magistrates, were to keep order in the city, to stop all loud or public lamentations, and to take care that all intelligence was conveyed in the first instance to the prætors: above all, the city gates were to be strictly guarded that no one might attempt to fly from Rome, but all abide the common danger together. Then the forum was cleared, and the assemblies of the people suspended; for at such a moment, had any one tribune uttered the word "peace," the tribes would have caught it up with eagerness, and obliged the senate to negotiate.

Thus the first moments of panic passed; and Varro's dispatches arrived, inform-

ing the senate that he had rallied the wrecks of the army at Canusium, and that Hannibal was not advancing upon Rome. Hope then began to revive; the meetings of the senate were resumed, and measures taken for maintaining the war.

M. Marcellus, one of the prætors for the year, was at this moment at Ostia, preparing to sail to Sicily. It was resolved to transfer him at once to the great scene of action in Apulia; and he was ordered to give up the fleet to his colleague, P. Furius Philus, and to march with the single legion, which he had under his command, into Apulia, there to collect the remains of Varro's army, and to fall back, as he best could, into Campania, while the consul returned immediately to Rome.

In the mean time, the scene at Canusium was like the disorder of a ship going to pieces, when fear makes men

desperate, and the instinct of self-preservation swallows up every other feeling. Some young men of the noblest families, a Metullus being at the head of them, looking upon Rome as lost, were planning to escape from the ruin, and to fly beyond sea, in the hope of entering into some foreign service. Such an example, at such a moment, would have led the way to a general panic: if the noblest citizens of Rome despaired of their country, what allied state, or what colony, could be expected to sacrifice themselves in defence of a hopeless cause? The consul exerted himself to the utmost to check this spirit, and, aided by some firmer spirits amongst the officers themselves, he succeeded in repressing it. He kept his men together, gave them over to the prætor, Marcellus, on his arrival at Canusium, and prepared instantly to obey the orders of the senate, by returning to Rome. The fate of P.

Claudius, and L. Junius, in the last war, might have warned him of the dangers which threatened a defeated general; he himself was personally hateful to the prevailing party at Rome; and if the memory of Flaminius was persecuted, notwithstanding his glorious death, what could he look for, a fugitive general from that field, where his colleague and all his soldiers had perished? Demosthenes dared not trust himself to the Athenian people after his defeat in Ætolia; but Varro, with a manlier spirit, returned to bear the obloquy and the punishment which the popular feeling, excited by party animosity, was so likely to heap on him. He stopped, as usual, without the city walls, and summoned the senate to meet him in the Campus Martius.

The senate felt his confidence in them, and answered it nobly. All party feeling was suspended; all popular irrita-

tion was subdued; the butcher's son, the turbulent demagogue, the defeated general, were all forgotten; only Varro's latest conduct was remembered, that he had resisted the panic of his officers, and, instead of seeking shelter at the court of a foreign king, had submitted himself to the judgment of his countrymen. The senate voted him their thanks, "because he had not despaired of the commonwealth."

It was resolved to name a dictator; and some writers related that the general voice of the senate and people offered the dictatorship to Varro himself, but that he positively refused to accept it. This story is extremely doubtful; but the dictator actually named was M. Junius Pisa, a member of a popular family, and who had himself been consul and censor. His master of the horse was T. Sempronius Gracchus, the first of that noble, but

ill-fated, name who appears in the Roman annals."

Already, before the appointment of the dictator, the Roman government had shown that its resolution was fixed to carry on the war to the death. Hannibal had allowed his Roman prisoners to send ten of their number to Rome, to petition that the senate would permit the whole body to be ransomed by their friends at the sum of three minæ, or 3000 ases, for each prisoner. But the senate absolutely forbade the money to be paid, neither choosing to furnish Hannibal with so large a sum, nor to show any compassion to men who had allowed themselves to fall alive into the enemy's hands. The prisoners, therefore, were left in hopeless captivity; and the armies, which the state required, were to be formed out of other materials. The expedients adopted showed the urgency of the danger.

When the consuls took the field at the beginning of the campaign, two legions had been left, as usual, to cover the capital. These were now to be employed in active service, and with them was a small detachment of troops which had been drawn from Picenum and the neighborhood of Ariminum, where their services were become of less importance. The contingents from the allies were not ready, and there was no time to wait for them. In order, therefore, to enable the dictator to take the field immediately, eight thousand slaves were enlisted, having expressed their willingness to serve, and arms were provided, by taking down from the temple the spoils won in former wars. The dictator went still farther: he offered pardon to criminals, and release to debtors, if they were willing to take up arms; and amongst the former class were some bands of robbers, who then, as in later

times, infested the mountains, and who consented to serve the state, on receiving an indemnity for their past offences. With this strange force, amounting, it is said, to about 25,000 men, M. Junius marched into Campania, whilst a new levy of the oldest and youngest citizens supplied two new legions for the defence of the capital, in the place of those which followed the dictator into the field. M. Junius fixed his head-quarters at Teanum, on high ground, upon the edge of the Falernian plain, with the Latin colony of Cales in his front, and communicating by the Latin road with Rome.

The dictator was at Teanum, and M. Marcellus, with the army of Cannæ, whom we left in Apulia, is described as now lying encamped above Suessula, that is, on the right bank of the Vulturnus, on the hills which bound the Campanian plain, ten or twelve miles to the

east of Capua, on the right of the Appian road as it ascends the pass of Caudium towards Beneventum. Thus we find the seat of war removed from Apulia to Campania; but the detail of the intermediate movements is lost; and we must restore the broken story as well as we can, by tracing Hannibal's operations after the battle of Cannæ, which are undoubtedly the key to those of his enemies.

The fidelity of the allies of Rome, which had not been shaken by the defeat of Thrasymenus, could not resist the fiery trial of Cannæ. The Apulians joined the conqueror immediately, and Arpi and Salapia opened their gates to him. Bruttium, Lucania and Samnium were ready to follow the example, and Hannibal was obliged to divide his army, and send officers into different parts of the country, to receive and protect those who wished to join him, and

to organize their forces for effective co-operation in the field. Meanwhile he himself remained in Apulia, not, perhaps, without hope that this last blow had broken the spirit as well as the power of the enemy, and that they would listen readily to proposals of peace. With this view, he sent a Carthaginian officer to accompany the deputation of the Roman prisoners to Rome, and ordered him to encourage any disposition on the part of the Romans to open a negotiation. When he found, therefore, on the return of the deputies, that his officers had not been allowed to enter the city, and that the Romans had refused to ransom their prisoners, his disappointment betrayed him into acts of the most inhuman cruelty. The mass of the prisoners left in his hands, he sold for slaves; and, so far, he did not overstep the recognized laws of warfare; but many of the more distinguished

among them he put to death; and those who were senators, he obliged to fight as gladiators with each other, in the presence of his whole army. It is added that brothers were in some instances brought out to fight with their brothers, and sons with their fathers; but that the prisoners refused so to sin against nature, and chose rather to suffer the worst torments than to draw their swords in such horrible combats.[1] Hannibal's vow may have justified all these

1 Diodorus, XXVI. Exc. de Virtut. et Vitiis. Appian, VII. 28. Zonaras, IX. 2. Valerius Maximus, IX. 2, Ext. 2. But as even Livy does not mention these stories, though they would have afforded such a topic for his rhetoric—nor does Polybius, either in IX. 24, when speaking of Hannibal's alleged cruelty, or in VI. 58, where he gives the account of the mission of the captives. There must, doubtless, be a great deal of exaggeration in them, even if they had any foundation at all. The story in Pliny, VIII. 7, that the last survivor of these gladiatorial combats had to fight against an elephant, and killed him, and was then treacherously waylaid and murdered by Hannibal's orders, was probably invented with reference to this very occasion. The remarks of Polybius should make us slow to believe the stories of Hannibal's cruelties, which so soon became a theme for the invention of poets and rhetoricians.

cruelties in his eyes; but his passions deceived him, and he was provoked to fury by the resolute spirit which ought to have excited his admiration. To admire the virtue which thwarts our dearest purposes, however natural it may seem to indifferent spectators, is one of the hardest trials of humanity.

Finding the Romans immovable, Hannibal broke up from his position in Apulia, and moved into Samnium. The popular party in Compsa opened their gates to him, and he made the place serve as a dépôt for his plunder, and for the heavy baggage of his army. His brother Mago was then ordered to march into Bruttium with a division of the army, and after having received the submission of the Hirpinians on his way to embark at one of the Bruttian ports and carry the tidings of his success to Carthage. Hanno, with another division, was sent into Lucania to protect

the revolt of the Lucanians, while Hannibal himself, in pursuit of a still greater prize, descended once more into the plains of Campania. The Pentrian Samnites, partly restrained by the Latin colony of Œsernia, and partly by the influence of their own countryman, Num. Decimius, of Bovianum, a zealous supporter of the Roman alliance, remained firm in their adherence to Rome; but the Hirpinians and the Caudinian Samnites all joined the Carthaginians, and their soldiers, no doubt, formed part of the army with which Hannibal invaded Campania. There, all was ready for his reception. The popular party in Capua were headed by Pacuvius Calavius, a man of the highest nobility, and married to a daughter of Appius Claudius, but whose ambition led him to aspire to the sovereignty, not of his own country only, but, through Hannibal's aid, of the whole of Italy,

Capua succeeding, as he hoped, to the supremacy now enjoyed by Rome. The aristocratical party were weak and unpopular, and could offer no opposition to him, while the people, wholly subject to his influence, concluded a treaty with Hannibal, and admitted the Carthaginian general and his army into the city. Thus the second city in Italy, capable, it is said, of raising an army of 30,000 foot and 4000 horse, connected with Rome by the closest ties, and which for nearly a century had remained true to its alliance under all dangers, threw itself into the arms of Hannibal, and took its place at the head of the new coalition of southern Italy, to try the old quarrel of the Samnite wars once again.

This revolt of Capua, the greatest result, short of the submission of Rome itself, which could have followed from the battle of Cannæ, drew the Roman armies

towards Campania. Marcellus had probably fallen back from Canusium by the Appian road through Beneventum, moving by an interior and shorter line; whilst Hannibal advanced by Compsa upon Abellinum, descending into the plain of Campania by what is now the pass of Monteforte. Hannibal's cavalry gave him the whole command of the country; and Marcellus could do no more than watch his movements from his camp above Suessula, and wait for some opportunity of impeding his operations in detail.

At this point in the story of the war, the question arises, how was it possible for Rome to escape destruction? Nor is this question merely prompted by the thought of Hannibal's great victories in the field, and the enormous slaughter of Roman citizens at Thrasymenus and Cannæ; it appears even more perplexing to those who have attentively studied

the preceding history of Rome. A single battle, evenly contested and hardly won, had enabled Pyrrhus to advance into the heart of Latium; the Hernican cities and the impregnable Prænestе had opened their gates to him; yet Capua was then faithful to Rome; and Samnium and Lucania, exhausted by long years of unsuccessful warfare, could have yielded him no such succor, as now, after fifty years of peace, they were able to afford to Hannibal. But now, when Hannibal was received into Capua, the state of Italy seemed to have gone backwards a hundred years, and to have returned to what it had been after the battle of Lautulæ, in the second Samnite war, with the immense addition of the genius of Hannibal and the power of Carthage thrown into the scale of the enemies of Rome. Then, as now, Capua had revolted, and Campania, Samnium and Lucania, were banded together

against Rome; but this same confederacy was now supported by all the resources of Carthage: and at its head in the field of battle was an army of thirty thousand veterans and victorious soldiers, led by one of the greatest generals whom the world has ever seen. How could it happen that a confederacy so formidable was only formed to be defeated?—that the revolt of Capua was the term of Hannibal's progress?—that from this day forwards his great powers were shown rather in repelling defeat than in commanding victory?—that, instead of besieging Rome, he was soon employed in protecting and relieving Capua?—and that his protection and succors were alike unavailing?

No single cause will explain a result so extraordinary. Rome owed her deliverance principally to the strength of the aristocratical interest throughout Italy,—to her numerous colonies of the

Latin name,—to the scanty numbers of Hannibal's Africans and Spaniards, and to his want of an efficient artillery. The material of a good artillery must surely have existed in Capua; but there seem to have been no officers capable of directing it; and no great general's operations exhibit so striking a contrast of strength and weakness, as may be seen in Hannibal's battles and sieges. And when Cannæ had taught the Romans to avoid pitched battles in the open field, the war became necessarily a series of sieges, where Hannibal's strongest arm, his cavalry, could render little service, while his infantry was in quality not more than equal to the enemy, and his artillery was decidedly inferior.

With two divisions of his army absent in Lucania and Bruttium, and while anxiously waiting for the reinforcements which Mago was to procure from Carthage, Hannibal could not undertake

any great offensive operation after his arrival in Campania. He attempted only to reduce the remaining cities of the Campanian plain and sea-coast, and especially to dislodge the Romans from Casilinum, which, lying within three miles of Capua, and commanding the passage of the Vulternus, not only restrained all his movements, but was a serious annoyance to Capua, and threatened its territory with continual incursions. Atilla and Calatia had revolted to him already with Capua; and he took Nuceria, Alfaterna, and Acerræ. The Greek cities on the coast, Neopolis and Cumæ, were firmly attached to Rome, and were too strong to be besieged with success; but Nola lay in the midst of the plain nearly midway between Capua and Nuceria; and the popular party there, as elsewhere, were ready to open their gates to Hannibal. He was preparing to appear before the town; but

the aristocracy had time to apprise the Romans of their danger; and Marcellus, who was then at Casilinum, marched round behind the mountains to escape the enemy's notice, and descended suddenly upon Nola from the hills which rise directly above it. He secured the place, repressed the popular party by some bloody executions, and when Hannibal advanced to the walls, made a sudden sally, and repulsed him with some loss. Having done this service, and left the aristocratical party in absolute possession of the government, he returned again to the hills, and lay encamped on the edge of the mountain boundary of the Campanian plain, just above the entrance of the famous pass of Caudium. His place at Casilinum was to be supplied by the dictator's army from Teanum; but Hannibal watched his opportunity, and anticipating his enemies this time, laid regular siege to Casilinum, which

was defended by a garrison of about 1000 men.

This garrison had acted the very same part towards the citizens of Casilinum, which the Campanians had acted at Rhegium in the war with Pyrrhus. About 500 Latins of Prænestе, and 450 Etruscans of Perusia, having been levied too late to join the consular armies when they took the field, were marching after them into Apulia by the Appian road, when they heard tidings of the defeat of Cannæ. They immediately turned about, and fell back upon Casilinum, where they established themselves, and for their better security massacred the Campanian inhabitants, and, abandoning the quarter of the town which was on the left bank of the Vulturnus, occupied the quarter on the right bank. Marcellus, when he retreated from Apulia with the wreck of Varro's army, had fixed his head-quarters for a time at

Casilinum; the position being one of great importance, and there being some danger lest the garrison, while they kept off Hannibal, should resolve to hold the town for themselves rather than for the Romans. They were now left to themselves; and dreading Hannibal's vengeance for the massacre of the old inhabitants, they resisted his assaults desperately, and obliged him to turn the siege into a blockade. This was the last active operation of the campaign: all the armies now went into winter quarters. The dictator remained at Teanum; Marcellus lay in his mountain camp above Nola; and Hannibal's army was at Capua. Being quartered in the houses of the city, instead of being encamped by themselves, their discipline, it is likely, was somewhat impaired by the various temptations thrown in their way: and as the wealth and enjoyments of Capua at that time were notorious, the writers

who adopted the vulgar declamations against luxury, pretended that Hannibal's army was ruined by the indulgences of this winter, and that Capua was the Cannæ of Carthage.

Meantime the news of the battle of Cannæ had been carried to Carthage, as we have seen, by Hannibal's brother Mago, accompanied with a request for reinforcements. Nearly two years before, when he first descended from the Alps into Cisalpine Gaul, his Africans and Spaniards were reduced to no more than 20,000 foot and 6000 horse. The Gauls, who had joined him since, had indeed more than doubled this number at first; but three great battles, and many partial actions, besides the unavoidable losses from sickness during two years of active service, must have again greatly diminished it; and this force was now to be divided: a part of it was employed in Bruttium, a part in Lucania, leaving an

inconsiderable body under Hannibal's own command. On the other hand, the accession of the Campanians, Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians supplied him with auxiliary troops in abundance, and of excellent quality; so that large reinforcements from home were not required, but only enough for the Africans to form a substantial part of every army employed in the field, and above all, to maintain his superiority in cavalry. It is said that some of the reinforcements which were voted on Mago's demand, were afterwards diverted to other services; and we do not know what was the amount of force actually sent over to Italy, nor when it arrived.[1] It consisted chiefly, if not entirely, of cavalry and elephants; for all the elephants which Hannibal had brought with him into It-

[1] He is represented as having elephants at the siege of Casilinum. Livy, XXIII. 18. If this be correct, the reinforcements must already have joined him.

aly had long since perished; and his anxiety to obtain others, troublesome and hazardous as it must have been to transport them from Africa by sea, speaks strongly in favor of their use in war, which modern writers are perhaps too much inclined to depreciate.

We have no information as to the feelings entertained by Hannibal and the Campanians towards each other, while the Carthaginians were wintering in Capua. The treaty of alliance had provided carefully for the independence of the Campanians, that they might not be treated as Pyrrhus had treated the Tarentines. Capua was to have its own laws and magistrates; no Campanian was to be compelled to any duty, civil or military, nor to be in any way subject to the authority of the Carthaginian officers. There must have been something of a Roman party opposed to the alliance with Carthage altogether; though the

Roman writers mention one man only, Decius Magius, who was said to have resisted Hannibal to his face with such vehemence, that Hannibal sent him prisoner to Carthage. But three hundred Campanian horsemen of the richer classes, who were serving in the Roman army in Sicily when Capua revolted, went to Rome as soon as their service was over, and were there received as Roman citizens; and others, though unable to resist the general voice of their countrymen, must have longed in their hearts to return to the Roman alliance. Of the leaders of the Campanian people, we know little: Pacuvius Calavius, the principal author of the revolt, is never mentioned afterwards; nor do we know the fate of his son Perolla, who, in his zeal for Rome, wished to assassinate Hannibal at his own father's table, when he made his public entrance into Capua. Vibius Virrius is also named as a lead-

ing partisan of the Carthaginians; and amid the pictures of the luxury and feebleness of the Campanians, their cavalry, which was formed entirely out of the wealthiest classes, is allowed to have been excellent; and one brave and practised soldier, Jubellius Taurea, had acquired a high reputation amongst the Romans when he served with them, and had attracted the notice and respect of Hannibal.

During the interval from active warfare afforded by the winter, the Romans took measures for filling up the numerous vacancies which the lapse of five years, and so many disastrous battles, had made in the numbers of the senate. The natural course would have been to elect censors, to whom the duty of making out the roll of the senate properly belonged; but the vacancies were so many, and the censor's power in admitting new citizens, and degrading old

ones, was so enormous, that the senate feared, it seems, to trust to the result of an ordinary election; and resolved that the censor's business should be performed by the oldest man in point of standing, of all those who had already been censors, and that he should be appointed dictator for this especial duty, although there was one dictator already for the conduct of the war. The person thus selected was M. Fabius Buteo, who had been censor six-and-twenty years before, at the end of the first Punic war, and who had more recently been the chief of the embassy sent to declare war on Carthage after the destruction of Saguntum. That his appointment might want no legal formality, C. Varro, the only surviving consul, was sent for home from Apulia to nominate him, the senate intending to detain Varro in Rome till he should have presided at the comitia for the election of the next year's

magistrates. The nomination as usual took place at midnight; and on the following morning M. Fabius appeared in the forum with his four-and-twenty lictors, and ascended the rostra to address the people. Invested with absolute power for six months, and especially charged with no less a task than the formation, at his discretion, of that great council which possessed the supreme government of the commonwealth, the noble old man neither shrunk weakly from so heavy a burden, nor ambitiously abused so vast an authority. He told the people that he would not strike off the name of a single senator from the list of the senate, and that, in filling up the vacancies, he would proceed by a defined rule; that he would first add all those who had held curule offices within the last five years, without having been admitted as yet into the senate; that in the second place he would take all who

within the same period had been tribunes, ædiles, or quæstors; and thirdly, all those who could show in their houses spoils won in battle from an enemy, or who had received the wreath of oak for saving the life of a citizen in battle. In this manner 177 new senators were placed on the roll; the new members thus forming a large majority of the whole number of the senate, which amounted only to three hundred. This being done forthwith, the dictator, as he stood in the rostra, resigned his office, dismissed his lictors, and went down into the forum a private man. There he purposely lingered amidst the crowd, lest the people should leave their business to follow him home; but their admiration was not cooled by this delay; and when he withdrew at the usual hour, the whole people attended him to his house. Such was Fabius Buteo's dictatorship, so wisely fulfilled, so simply and nobly

resigned, that the dictatorship of Fabius Maximus himself has earned no purer glory.

Varro, it is said, not wishing to be detained in Rome, returned to his army the next night, without giving the senate notice of his departure. The dictator, M. Junius, was therefore requested to repair to Rome to hold the comitia; and Ti. Gracchus and M. Marcellus were to come with him to report on the state of their several armies, and concert measures for the ensuing campaign. There is no doubt that the senate determined on the persons to be proposed at the ensuing elections, and that, if any one else had come forward as a candidate, the dictator who presided would have refused to receive votes for him. Accordingly the consuls and prætors chosen were all men of the highest reputation for ability and experience: the consuls were L. Postumius,

B. C. 215.

whose defeat and death in Cisalpine Gaul were not yet known in Rome, and Ti. Gracchus, now master of the horse. The prætors were M. Valerius Lævinus, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, a grandson of the famous censor, Appius the blind, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, old in years, but vigorous in mind and body, who had already been censor, and twice consul, and Q. Mucius Scævola. When the death of L. Postumius was known, his place was finally filled by no less a person than Q. Fabius Maximus: whilst Marcellus was still to retain his command with proconsular power, as his activity and energy could ill be spared at a time so critical.

The officers for the year being thus appointed, it remained to determine their several provinces, and to provide them with sufficient forces. Fabius was to succeed to the army of the dictator, M. Junius; and his head-quarters were advanced from Teanum to Cales, at the northern

extremity of the Falernian plain, about seven English miles from Casilinum and the Vulturnus, and less than ten from Capua. The other consul, Ti. Sempronius, was to have no other Roman army than two legions of volunteer slaves, who were to be raised for the occasion; but both he and his colleague had the usual contingent of Latin and Italian allies. Gracchus named Sinuessa on the Appian road, at the point where the Massic hills run out with a bold headland into the sea, as the place of meeting for his soldiers; and his business was to protect the towns on the coast, which were still faithful to Rome, such as Cuma and Neapolis. Marcellus was to command two new Roman legions, and to lie as before in his camp above Nola; while his old army was sent into Sicily to relieve the legions there, and enable them to return to Italy, where they formed a fourth army under the com-

mand of M. Valerius Lævinus, the prætor peregrinus, in Apulia. The small force which Varro had commanded in Apulia was ordered to Tarentum, to add to the strength of that important place; while Varro himself was sent with proconsular power into Picenum, to raise soldiers, and to watch the road along the Adriatic by which the Gauls might have sent reinforcements to Hannibal. Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the prætor urbanus, remained at Rome to conduct the government, and had no other military command than that of a small fleet for the defence of the coast on both sides of the Tiber. Of the other two prætors, Ap. Claudius was to command in Sicily, and Q. Mucius in Sardinia; and P. Scipio as proconsul still commanded his old army of two legions in Spain. On the whole, including the volunteer slaves, there appeared to have been fourteen Roman legions in active service at the beginning

of the year 539, without reckoning the soldiers who served in the fleets; and of these fourteen legions, nine were employed in Italy. If we suppose that the Latin and Italian allies bore their usual proportion to the number of Roman soldiers in each army, we shall have a total of 140,000 men, thus divided: 20,000 in Spain, and the same number in Sicily; 10,000 in Sardinia; 20,000 under each of the consuls; 20,000 with Marcellus; 20,000 under Lævinus in Apulia; and 10,000 in Tarentum.

Seventy thousand men were thus in arms, besides the seamen, out of a population of citizens which at the last census before the war had amounted only to 270,213, and which had since been thinned by so many disastrous battles. Nor was the drain on the finances of Rome less extraordinary. The legions in the provinces had indeed been left to their own resources as to money; but the nine le-

gions serving in Italy must have been paid regularly; for war could not there be made to support war; and if the Romans had been left to live at free quarters upon their Italian allies, they would have driven them to join Hannibal in mere self-defence. Yet the legions in Italy cost the government in pay, food, and clothing, at the rate of 541,800 denarii a month; and as they were kept on service throughout the year, the annual expense was 6,501,600 denarii, or in Greek money, reckoning the denarius as equal to the drachma, 1083 Euboic talents. To meet these enormous demands on the treasury, the government resorted to the simple expedient of doubling the year's taxes, and calling at once for the payment of one-half of this amount, leaving the other to be paid at the end of the year. It was a struggle for life and death; and the people were in a mood to refuse no sacrifices,

however costly: but the war must have cut off so many sources of wealth, and agriculture itself must have so suffered from the calling away of so many hands from the cultivation of the land, that we wonder how the money could be found, and how many of the poorer citizens' families could be provided with daily bread.

In addition to the five regular armies which the Romans brought into the field in Italy, an irregular warfare was also going on, we know not to what extent; and bands of peasants and slaves were armed in many parts of the country to act against the revolted Italians, and to ravage their territory. For instance, a great tract of forest in Bruttium, as we have seen, was the domain of the Roman people; this would be farmed like all the other revenues; and the publicani who farmed it, or the wealthy citizens who turned out cattle to pasture in it, would

have large bodies of slaves employed as shepherds, herdsmen, and woodsmen, who, when the Bruttian towns on the coast revolted, would at once form a guerilla force capable of doing them great mischief. And lastly, besides all these forces, regular and irregular, the Romans still held most of the principal towns in the south of Italy; because they had long since converted them into Latin colonies. Brundisium on the Ionian sea, Pæstum on the coast of Lucania, Luceria, Venusia, and Beneventum in the interior, were all so many strong fortresses, garrisoned by soldiers of the Latin name, in the very heart of the revolted districts; whilst the Greek cities of Cumæ and Neapolis in Campania, and Rhegium on the straits of Messina, were held for Rome by their own citizens with a devotion no way inferior to that of the Latin colonies themselves.

Against this mass of enemies, the

moment that they had learnt to use their strength, Hannibal, even within six months after the battle of Cannæ, was already contending at a disadvantage. We have seen that he detached two officers with two divisions of his army, one into Lucania, the other into Bruttium, to encourage the revolt of those countries, and then to organize their resources in men and money for the advancement of the common cause. Most of the Bruttians took up arms immediately as Hannibal's allies, and put themselves under the command of his officer, Himilcon; but Petelia, one of their cities, was for some reason or other inflexible in its devotion to Rome, and endured a siege of eleven months, suffering all extremities of famine before it surrendered. Thus Himilcon must have been still engaged in besieging it long after the campaign was opened in the neighborhood of Capua. The Samnites

also had taken up arms, and apparently were attached to Hannibal's own army: the return of their whole population of the military age, made ten years before during the Gaulish invasion, had stated it at 70,000 foot, and 7000 horse; but the Pentrians, the most powerful tribe of their nation, were still faithful to Rome; and the Samnites, like the Romans themselves, had been thinned by the slaughter of Thrasymenus and Cannæ, which they had shared as their allies. It is vexatious that we have no statement of the amount of Hannibal's old army, any more than of the allies who joined him, at any period of the war later than the battle of Cannæ. His reinforcements from home, as we have seen, were very trifling; while his two divisions in Lucania and Bruttium, and the garrisons which he had been obliged to leave in some of the revolted towns, as, for example, at Arpi in Apulia, must have

considerably lessened the force under his own personal command. Yet, with the accession of the Samnites and Campanians, it was probably much stronger than any one of the Roman armies opposed to him; quite as strong indeed, in all likelihood, as was consistent with the possibility of feeding it.

Before the winter was over, Casilinum fell. The garrison had made a valiant defence, and yielded at last to famine: they were allowed to ransom themselves by paying each man seven ounces of gold for his life and liberty. The plunder which they had won from the old inhabitants enabled them to discharge this large sum; and they were then allowed to march out unhurt, and retire to Cumæ. Casilinum again became a Campanian town; but its important position, at once covering Capua, and securing a passage over the Vulturnus, induced Hannibal to garrison it

with seven hundred soldiers of his own army.

The season for active operations was now arrived. The three Roman armies of Fabius, Gracchus, and Marcellus, had taken up their positions round Campania; and Hannibal marched out of Capua, and encamped his army on the mountain above it, on that same Tifata where the Samnites had so often taken post in old times, when they were preparing to invade the Campanian plain. Tifata did not then exhibit that bare and parched appearance which it has now; the soil, which has accumulated in the plain below, so as to have risen several feet above its ancient level, has been washed down in the course of centuries, and after the destruction of its protecting woods, from the neighboring mountains; and Tifata in Hannibal's time furnished grass in abundance for his cattle in its numerous glades, and offered cool

and healthy summer quarters for his men. There he lay waiting for some opportunity of striking a blow against his enemies around him, and eagerly watching the progress of his intrigues with the Tarentines, and his negotiations with the king of Macedon. A party at Tarentum began to open a correspondence with him immediately after the battle of Cannæ; and since he had been in Campania he had received an embassy from Philip, king of Macedon, and had concluded an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the ambassadors, who acted with full powers in their master's name. Such were his prospects on one side, while, if he looked westward and southwest, he saw Sardinia in open revolt against Rome; and in Sicily the death of Hiero at the age of ninety, and the succession of his grandson Hieronymus, an ambitious and inexperienced youth, were detaching Syracuse also

from the Roman alliance. Hannibal had already received an embassy from Hieronymus, to which he had replied by sending a Carthaginian officer of his own name to Sicily, and two Syracusan brothers, Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had long served with him in Italy and in Spain, being in fact Carthaginians by their mother's side, and having become naturalized at Carthage, since Agathocles had banished their grandfather, and their father had married and settled in his place of exile. Thus the effect of the battle of Cannæ seemed to be shaking the whole fabric of the Roman dominion; their provinces were revolting; their firmest allies were deserting them; while the king of Macedon himself, the successor of Alexander, was throwing the weight of his power, and of all his acquired and inherited glory, into the scale of their enemies. Seeing the fruit of his work thus fast ripening, Hannibal

sat quietly on the summit of Tifata, to break forth like the lightning flash when the storm should be fully gathered.

Thus the summer of 539 was like a breathing time, in which both parties were looking at each other, and considering each other's resources, while they were recovering strength after their past efforts, and preparing for a renewal of the struggle. Fabius, with the authority of the senate, issued an order, calling on the inhabitants of all the country which either actually was, or was likely to become, the seat of war, to clear their corn off the ground, and carry it into the fortified cities, before the first of June, threatening to lay waste the land, to sell the slaves, and burn the farm buildings, of any one who should disobey the order. In the utter confusion of the Roman calendar at this period, it is difficult to know whether in any given year it was in advance of the

true time, or behind it; so that we can scarcely tell whether the corn was only to be got in when ripe without needless delay, or whether it was to be cut when green, lest Hannibal should use it as forage for his cavalry. But at any rate Fabius was now repeating the system which he had laid down in his dictatorship, and hoped by wasting the country to oblige Hannibal to retreat; for his means of transport were not sufficient for him to feed his army from a distance: hence, when the resources in his immediate neighborhood were exhausted, he was obliged to move elsewhere.

Meanwhile Gracchus had crossed the Vulturnus near its mouth, and was now at Liternum, busily employed in exercising and training his heterogeneous army. The several Campanian cities were accustomed to hold a joint festival every year at a place called Hamæ, only three miles from Cumæ. These festivals were

seasons of general truce, so that the citizens even of hostile nations met at them safely: the government of Capua announced to the Cumæans, that their chief magistrate and all their senators would appear at Hamæ as usual on the day of the solemnity; and they invited the senate of Cumæ to meet them. At the same time they said that an armed force would be present to repel any interruption from the Romans. The Cumæns informed Gracchus of this; and he attacked the Capuans in the night, when they were in such perfect security, that they had not even fortified a camp, but were sleeping in the open country, and massacred about 2000 of them, among whom was Marius Alfius, the supreme magistrate of Capua. The Romans charge the Capuans with having meditated treachery against the Cumæans, and say that they were caught in their own snare; but this could only

be a suspicion, while the overt acts of violence were their own. Hannibal no sooner heard of this disaster, then he descended from Tifata, and hastened to Hamæ, in the hope of provoking the enemy to battle in the confidence of their late success. But Gracchus was too wary to be so tempted, and had retreated in good time to Cumæ, where he lay safe within the walls of the town. It is said that Hannibal, having supplied himself with all things necessary for a siege, attacked the place in form, and was repulsed with loss, so that he returned defeated to his camp at Tifata. A consular army defending the walls of a fortified town was not indeed likely to be beaten in an assault; and neither could a maritime town, with the sea open, be easily starved; nor could Hannibal linger before it safely, as Fabius, with a second consular army, was preparing to cross the Vulturnus.

Casilinum being held by the enemy, Fabius was obliged to cross at a higher point behind the mountains, nearly opposite to Allifæ; and he then descended the left bank to the confluence of the Calor with the Vulturnus, crossed the Calor, and passing between Taburnus and the mountains above Caserta and Maddaloni, stormed the town of Saticula, and joined Marcellus in his camp above Suessula. He was again anxious for Nola, where the popular party were said to be still plotting the surrender of the town to Hannibal: to stop this mischief, he sent Marcellus with his whole army to garrison Nola, while he himself took his place in the camp above Suessula. Gracchus on his side advanced from Cumæ towards Capua; so that three Roman armies, amounting in all to about sixty thousand men, were on the left bank of the Vulturnus together; and all, so far as appears, in free communication with

each other. They availed themselves of their numbers and of their position, to send plundering parties out on their rear to overrun the lands of the revolted Samnites and Hirpinians; and as the best troops of both these nations were with Hannibal on Tifata, no force was left at home sufficient to check the enemy's incursions. Accordingly the complaints of the sufferers were loud, and a deputation was sent to Hannibal imploring him to protect his allies.

Already Hannibal felt that the Roman generals understood their business, and had learnt to use their numbers wisely. On ground where his cavalry could act, he would not have feared to engage their three armies together; but when they were amongst mountains, or behind walls, his cavalry were useless, and he could not venture to attack them; besides, he did not wish to expose the territory of Capua to their ravages: and,

therefore, he did not choose lightly to move from Tifata. But the prayers of the Samnites were urgent: his partisans in Nola might require his aid, or might be able to admit him into the town; and his expected reinforcement of cavalry and elephants from Carthage had landed safely in Bruttium, and was on its way to join him, which the position of Fabius and Marcellus might render difficult, if he made no movement to favor it. He therefore left Tifata, advanced upon Nola, and timed his operation so well, that his reinforcements arrived at the moment when he was before Nola; and neither Fabius nor Marcellus attempted to prevent their junction.

Thus encouraged, and perhaps not aware of the strength of the garrison, Hannibal not only overran the territory of Nola, but surrounded the town with his soldiers, in the hope of taking it by escalade. Marcellus was alike watchful

and bold; he threw open the gates and made a sudden sally, by which he drove back the enemy within their camp; and this success, together with his frank and popular bearing, won him, it is said, the affections of all parties at Nola, and put a stop to all intrigues within the walls. A more important consequence of this action was the desertion of above twelve hundred men—Spanish foot and Numidian horse—from Hannibal's army to the Romans; as we do not find that their example was followed by others, it is probable that they were not Hannibal's old soldiers, but some of the troops which had just joined him, and which could not as yet have felt the spell of his personal ascendency. Still their treason naturally made him uneasy, and would for the moment excite a general suspicion in the army; the summer two was drawing to a close; and wishing to relieve Capua from the burden of feed-

ing his troops, he marched away into Apulia, and fixed his quarters for the winter near Arpi. Gracchus, with one consular army, followed him; while Fabius, after having ravaged the country round Capua, and carried off the green corn, as soon as it was high enough out of the ground, to his camp above Suessula, to furnish winter food for his cavalry, quartered his own army there for the winter, and ordered Marcellus to retain a sufficient force to secure Nola, and to send the rest of his men home to be disbanded.

Thus the campaign was ended, and Hannibal had not marked it with a victory. The Romans had employed their forces so wisely, that they had forced him to remain mostly on the defensive; and his two offensive operations against Cumæ and against Nola, had both been baffled. In Sardinia, their success had been brilliant and decisive. Fortune in

another quarter served the Romans no less effectually. The Macedonian ambassadors, after having concluded their treaty with Hannibal at Tifata, made their way back into Bruttium in safety, and embarked to return to Greece. But their ship was taken off the Calabrian coast by the Roman squadron on that station; and the ambassadors, with all their papers, were sent prisoners to Rome. A vessel which had been of their company escaped the Romans, and informed the king what had happened. He was obliged, therefore, to send a second embassy to Hannibal, as the former treaty had never reached him; and, although this second mission went and returned safely, yet the loss of time was irreparable, and nothing could be done till another year. Meanwhile the Romans, thus timely made aware of the king's intentions, resolved to find such employment for him at home as should

prevent his invading Italy. M. Valerius Lævinus was to take the command of the fleet at Tarentum and Brundisium, and to cross the Ionian Gulf in order to rouse the Ætolians, and the barbarian chiefs whose tribes bordered on Philip's western frontier, and, with such other allies as could be engaged in the cause, to form a Greek coalition against Macedon.

These events, and the continued successes of their army in Spain, revived the spirits of the Romans, and encouraged them to make still greater sacrifices, in the hope that they would not be made in vain. Whilst the commonwealth was making extraordinary efforts, it was of the last importance that they should not be wasted by incompetent leaders, either at home or abroad. Gracchus was watching Hannibal in Apulia, so that Fabius went to Rome to hold the comitia. It was not by accident, doubtless, that he had pre-

A. U. C. 540.
B. C. 214.

viously sent home to fix the day of the meeting, or that his own arrival was so nicely timed, that he reached Rome when the tribes were actually met in the Campus Martius; thus, without entering the city, he passed along under the walls, and took his place as presiding magistrate at the comitia, while his lictors still bore the naked axe in the midst of their faces, the well-known sign of that absolute power which the consul enjoyed every where out of Rome. Fabius, in concert no doubt with Q. Fulvius and T. Manlius, and other leading senators, had already determined who were to be consuls: when the first century, in the free exercise of its choice, gave its vote in favor of T. Otacilius and M. Æmilius Regillus, he at once stopped the election, and told the people that this was no time to choose ordinary consuls; that they were electing generals to oppose Hannibal, and should fix

upon those men under whom they would most gladly risk their sons' lives and their own, if they stood at that moment on the eve of battle. "Wherefore, crier," he concluded, "call back the century to give its votes over again."

Otacilius, who was present, although he had married Fabius' niece, protested loudly against this interference with the votes of the people, and charged Fabius with trying to procure his own re-election. The old man had always been so famous for the gentleness of his nature, that he was commonly known by the name of "the Lamb;" but now he acted with the decision of Q. Fulvius or T. Manlius; he peremptorily ordered Otacilius to be silent, and bade him remember that his lictors carried the naked axe: the century was called back, and now gave its voice for Q. Fabius and M. Marcellus. All the centuries of all the tribes unanimously confirmed

this choice. Q. Fulvius was also re-elected prætor; and the senate by a special vote continued him in the prætorship of the city, an office which put him at the head of the home government.

The election of the other three prætors, it seems, was left free; so the people, as they could not have Otacilius for their consul, gave him one of the remaining prætorships, and bestowed the other two on Q. Fabius, the consul's son, who was then curule ædile, and on P. Cornelius Lentulus.

Great as the exertions of the commonwealth had been in the preceding year, they were still greater this year. Ten legions were to be employed in different parts of Italy, disposed as follows: Cales, and the camp above Suessula and Nola, were again to be the head-quarters of the two consuls, each of whom was to command a regular consular army of two legions. Grac-

chus, with proconsular power, was to keep his own two legions, and was at present wintering near Hannibal in the north of Apulia. Q. Fabius, one of the new prætors, was to be ready to enter Apulia with an army of equal strength, so soon as Gracchus should be called into Lucania and Samnium, to take part in the active operations of the campaign. C. Varro, with his single legion, was still to hold Picenum; and M. Lævinus, also with proconsular power, was to remain at Brundisium with another single legion. The two city legions served as a sort of dépôt, to recruit the armies in the field in case of need; and there was a large armed population, serving as garrisons in the Latin colonies, and in other important posts in various parts of the country, the amount of which it is not possible to estimate. Nor can we calculate the numbers of the guerilla bands, which were on foot in Lucania,

Bruttium, and possibly in Samnium, and which hindered Hannibal from having the whole resources of those countries at his disposal. The Roman party was nowhere probably altogether extinct. Wealthy Lucanians, who were attached to Rome, would muster their slaves and peasantry, and either by themselves, or getting some Roman officer to head them, would ravage the lands of the Carthaginian party, and carry on a continued harassing warfare against the towns or districts which had joined Hannibal. Thus the whole south of Italy was one wide flood of war, the waters were every where dashing and eddying, and running in cross currents innumerable; whilst the regular armies, like the channels of the rivers, held on their way, distinguishable amidst the chaos by their greater rapidity and power.

Hannibal watched this mass of war

with the closest attention. To make head against it directly being impossible, his business was to mark his opportunities, to strike wherever there was an opening; and being sure that the enemy would not dare to attack him on his own ground, he might maintain his army in Italy for an indefinite time, whilst Carthage, availing herself of the distraction of her enemy's power, renewed her efforts to conquer Spain, and recover Sicily. He hoped ere long to win Tarentum; and, if left to his own choice, he would probably have moved thither at once, when he broke up from his winter quarters; but the weakness or fears of the Campanians hung with encumbering weight upon him; and an earnest request was sent to him from Capua, calling on him to hasten to its defence, lest the two consular armies should besiege it. Accordingly he broke up from his winter quarters at Arpi, and march-

ed once more into Campania, where he established his army as before on the summit of Tifata.

The perpetual carelessness and omissions in Livy's narrative, drawn as it is from various sources, with no pains to make one part correspond with another, render it a work of extreme difficulty to present an account of these operations, which shall be at once minute and intelligible. We also miss that notice of chronological details, which is essential to the history of a complicated campaign. Even the year in which important events happened is sometimes doubtful; yet we want not to fix the year only, but the month, that we may arrange each action in its proper order. When Hannibal set out on his march into Campania, Fabius was still at Rome; but the two new legions, which were to form his army, were already assembled at Cales; and Fabius, on hearing of Hannibal's

approach, set out instantly to take the command. His old army, which had wintered in the camp above Suessula, had apparently been transferred to his colleague, Marcellus; and a considerable force had been left at the close of the last campaign to garrison Nola. Fabius, however, wished to have three Roman armies co-operating with each other, as had been the case the year before; and he sent orders to Gracchus to move forwards from Apulia, and to occupy Beneventum; while his son, Q. Fabius, the prætor, with a fourth army, was to supply the place of Gracchus, at Luceria. It seemed as if Hannibal, having once entered Campania, was to be hemmed in on every side, and not permitted to escape; but these movements of the Roman armies induced him to call Hanno to his aid, the officer who commanded in Lucania and Bruttium, and who, with a small force of Numidian

cavalry, had an auxiliary army under his orders, consisting chiefly of Italian allies. Hanno advanced accordingly in the direction of Beneventum, to watch the army of Gracchus, and if an opportunity offered, to bring it to action.

Meanwhile, Hannibal, having left some of his best troops to maintain his camp at Tifata, and probably to protect the immediate neighborhood of Capua, descended into the plain towards the coast, partly in the hope of surprising a fortified post which the Romans had lately established at Puteoli, and partly to ravage the territory of Cumæ and Neapolis. But the avowed object of his expedition was to offer sacrifice to the powers of the unseen world, on the banks of the dreaded lake of Avernus." That crater of an old volcano, where the very soil still seemed to breath out fire, while the unbroken rim of its basin was covered

with the uncleared masses of the native woods, was the subject of a thousand mysterious stories, and was regarded as one of those spots where the lower world approached most nearly to the light of day, and where offerings, paid to the gods of the dead, were most surely acceptable. Such worship was a main part of the national religion of the Carthaginians; and Hannibal, whose latest act before he set out on his great expedition, had been a journey to Gades, to sacrifice to the god of his fathers, the Hercules of Tyre, visited the lake of Avernus, it is probable, quite as much in sincere devotion, as in order to mask his design of attacking Puteoli. Whilst he was engaged in his sacrifice, five noble citizens of Tarentum came to him, entreating him to lead his army into their country, and engaging that the city should be surrendered as soon as his standard should be visible from the walls.

He listened to their invitation gladly; they offered him one of the richest cities in Italy, with an excellent harbor, equally convenient for his own communication with Carthage, and for the reception of the fleet of his Macedonian allies, whom he was constantly expecting to welcome in Italy. He promised that he would soon be at Tarentum; and the Tarentines returned home to prepare their plans against his arrival.

With this prospect before him, it is not likely that he would engage in any serious enterprise in Campania. Finding that he could not surprise Puteoli, he ravaged the lands of the Cumæans and Neapolitans. According to the ever suspicious stories of the exploits of Marcellus, he made a third attempt upon Nola, and was a third time repulsed, Marcellus having called down the army from the camp above Suessula to assist him in defending the town. Then, says

the writer whom Livy copied, despairing of taking a place which he had so often attacked in vain, he marched off at once towards Tarentum. The truth probably is, that, finding a complete consular army in Nola, and having left his light cavalry and some of the flower of his infantry in the camp on Tifata, he had no thought of attacking the town, but returned to Tifata to take the troops from thence; and having done this, and stayed long enough in Campania for the Capuans to get in their harvest safely, he set off on his march for Tarentum. None of the Roman armies attempted to stop him, or so much as ventured to follow him. Fabius and Marcellus took advantage of his absence to besiege Casilinum with their united forces; Gracchus kept wisely out of his reach, whilst he swept on like a fiery flood, laying waste all before him from Tifata to the shores of the Ionian Sea.

He certainly did not burn or plunder the lands of his own allies, either in Samnium or Lucania; but his march lay near the Latin colony of Venusia, and the Lucanians and Samnites in his army would carefully point out those districts which belonged to their countrymen of the Roman party; above all, those ample tracts which the Romans had wrested from their fathers, and which were now farmed by the Roman publicani, or occupied by Roman citizens. Over all these, no doubt, the African and Numidian horse poured far and wide, and the fire and sword did their work.

Yet, after all, Hannibal missed his prey. Three days before he reached Tarentum, a Roman officer arrived in the city, whom M. Valerius Lævinus had sent in haste from Brundisium to provide for its defence. There was probably a small Roman garrison in the

citadel to support him in case of need; but the aristocratical party in Tarentum itself, as elsewhere, was attached to Rome; and with their aid, Livius, the officer whom Lævinus had sent, effectually repressed the opposite party, embodied the population of the town, and made them keep guard on the walls, and selecting a certain number of persons, whose fidelity he most suspected, sent them off as hostages to Rome. When the Carthaginian army, therefore, appeared before the walls, no movement was made in their favor, and after waiting a few days in vain, Hannibal was obliged to retreat. His disappointment, however, did not make him lose his temper; he spared the Tarentine territory, no less when leaving it, than when he first entered it, in the hope of winning the city, a moderation which doubtless produced its effect, and confirmed the Tarentines in the belief

that his professions of friendship had been made in honesty. But he carried off all the corn which he could find in the neighborhood of Metapontum and Heraclea, and then returned to Apulia, and fixed his quarters for the winter at Salapia. His cavalry overran all the forest country above Brundisium, and drove off such numbers of horses which were kept there to pasture, that he was enabled to have four thousand broken in for the service of his army.

Meanwhile the Roman consuls in Campania were availing themselves of his absence to press the siege of Casilinum. The place was so close to Capua, that it was feared the Capuans would attempt to relieve it; Marcellus, therefore, with a second consular army, advanced from Nola to cover the siege. The defence was very obstinate, for there were seven hundred of Hannibal's soldiers in the place, and two thousand Capuans, and

Fabius, it is said, was disposed to raise the siege, but his colleague reminded him of the loss of reputation, if so small a town were allowed to baffle two consular armies, and the siege was continued. At last the Capuans offered to Fabius to surrender the town, on condition of being allowed to retire to Capua; and it appears that he accepted the terms, and that the garrison had begun to march out, when Marcellus broke in upon them, seized the open gate from which they were issuing, cut them down right and left, and forced his way into the city. Fabius, it is said, was able to keep his faith to no more than fifty of the garrison, who had reached his quarters before Marcellus arrived, and whom he sent unharmed to Capua. The rest of the Capuans and of Hannibal's soldiers were sent prisoners to Rome, and the inhabitants were divided amongst the neighboring cities, to be kept in custody

till the senate should determine their fate.

After this scandalous act of treachery, Marcellus returned to Nola, and there remained inactive, being confined, it was said, by illness, till the senate, before the end of the summer, sent him over to Sicily to meet the danger that was gathering there. Fabius advanced into Samnium, combining his operations, it seems, with his son, who commanded a prætorian army in Apulia, and with Gracchus, who was in Lucania, and whose army formed the link between the prætor in Apulia and his father in Samnium. These three armies were so formidable, that Hanno, the Carthaginian commander in Lucania, could not maintain his ground, but fell back towards Bruttium, leaving his allies to their own inadequate means of defence. Accordingly the Romans ravaged the country far and wide, and took so many

towns that they boasted of having killed or captured 25,000 of the enemy. After these expeditions, Fabius, it seems, led back his army to winter quarters in the camp above Suessula; Gracchus remained in Lucania, and Fabius, the prætor, wintered at Luceria.

I have endeavored to follow the operations of the main armies on both sides throughout the campaign, without noticing those of Gracchus and Hanno in Lucania. But the most important action of the year, if we believe the Roman accounts, was the victory obtained by Gracchus, near Beneventum, when he moved thither out of Apulia to co-operate with the consuls in Campania, and Hanno was ordered by Hannibal to march to the same point out of Lucania. Hanno, it is said, had about 17,000 foot, mostly Bruttians and Lucanians, and 1200 Numidian and Moorish horse; and Gracchus, encountering him near Bene-

ventum, defeated him, with the loss of almost all his infantry; he himself and his cavalry being the only part of the army that escaped. The numbers, as usual, are probably exaggerated immensely; but there is no reason to doubt that Gracchus gained an important victory; and it was rendered famous by his giving liberty to the volunteer slaves, by whose valor it had mainly been won. Some of these had behaved ill in the action, and were afraid that they should be punished, rather than rewarded; but Gracchus first set them all free without distinction, and then, sending for those who had misbehaved, made them severally swear that they would eat and drink standing, so long as their military service should last, by way of penance for their fault. Such a sentence, so different from the usual merciless severity of the Roman discipline, added to the general joy of the army; the sol-

diers marched back to Beneventum in triumph; and the people poured out to meet them, and entreated Gracchus that they might invite them all to a public entertainment. Tables were set out in the streets; and the freed slaves attracted every one's notice by their white caps, the well-known sign of their enfranchisement, and by the strange sight of those who, in fulfilment of their penance, ate standing, and waited upon their worthier comrades. The whole scene delighted the generous and kind nature of Gracchus: to set free the slave, and to relieve the poor, appear to have been hereditary virtues in his family: to him, no less than to his unfortunate descendants, beneficence seemed the highest glory. He caused a picture to be painted, not of his victory over Hanno, but of the feasting of the enfranchised slaves in the streets of Beneventum, and placed it in the tem-

ple of Liberty on the Aventine, which his father had built and dedicated.

The battle of Beneventum obliged Hanno to fall back into Lucania, and perhaps as far as the confines of Bruttium. But he soon recruited his army, the Lucanians and Bruttians, as well as the Picentines, who lived on the shores of the gulf of Salerno, being very zealous in the cause; and ere long he revenged his defeat by a signal victory over an army of Lucanians of the Roman party, whom Gracchus had enlisted to act as an irregular force against their countrymen of the opposite faction. Still Hanno was not tempted to risk another battle with a Roman consular army; and when Gracchus advanced from Beneventum into Lucania, he retired again into Bruttium.

There seems to have been no farther dispute with regard to the appointment of consuls. Fabius and the leading

members of the senate appear to have nominated such men as they thought most equal to the emergency; and no other candidates came forward. Fabius again held the comitia; and his son, Q. Fabius, who was prætor at the time, was elected consul together with Gracchus. The prætors were entirely changed. Q. Fulvius was succeeded in the city prætorship by M. Atilius Regulus, who had just resigned the censorship, and who had already been twice consul; the other three prætors were M. Æmilius Lepidus, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, and P. Sempronius Tuditanus. The two former were men of noble families: Sempronius appears to have owed his appointment to his resolute conduct at Cannæ, when he cut his way from the camp through the surrounding enemies, and escaped in safety to Canusium.

Thus another year passed over; and although the state of affairs was still

dark, the tide seemed to be on the turn. B. C. 213. Hannibal had gained no new victory; Tarentum had been saved from his hands; and Casilinum had been wrested from him.

The forces to be employed in Italy in the approaching campaign were to consist of nine legions, three fewer than in the year before. The consuls were each to have their two legions, Gracchus in Lucania, and Fabius in Apulia. M. Æmilius was to command two legions also in Apulia, having his head-quarters at Luceria; Cn. Fulvius with two more was to occupy the camp above Suessula; and Varro was to remain with his one legion in Picenum. Two consular armies of two legions each were required in Sicily; one commanded by Marcellus as proconsul, the other by P. Lentulus as proprætor: two legions were employed in Cisalpine Gaul under P. Sempronius, and two in Sardinia under their old com-

mander, Q. Mucius. M. Valerius Lævinus retained his single legion and his fleet, to act against Philip on the eastern side of the Ionian sea; and P. Scipio and his brother were still continued in their command in Spain.

Hannibal passed the winter at Salapia, where, the Romans said, was a lady whom he loved, and who became famous from her influence over him. Whether his passion for her made him careless of every thing else, or whether he was really taken by surprise, we know not; but the neighboring town of Arpi was attacked by the consul Fabius, and given up to him by the inhabitants; and some Spaniards, who formed part of the garrison, entered into the Roman service. Gracchus obtained some slight successes in Lucania; and some of the Bruttian towns returned to their old alliance with Rome; but a Roman contractor, T. Pomponius Veientanus, who

had been empowered by the government to raise soldiers in Bruttium, and to employ them in plundering the enemies' lands, was rash enough to venture a regular action with Hanno, in which he was defeated and made prisoner. This disaster checked the reaction in Bruttium for the present.

Meanwhile Hannibal's eyes were still fixed upon Tarentum; and thither he marched again as soon as he took the field, leaving Fabius behind him in Apulia. He passed the whole summer in the neighborhood of Tarentum, and reduced several small towns in the surrounding country: but his friends in Tarentum made no movement; for they dared not compromise the safety of their countrymen and relations, who had been carried off as hostages to Rome. Accordingly the season wore away unmarked by any memorable action. Hannibal still lingered in the country of the

Sallentines, unwilling to give up all hope of winning the prize he had so long sought; and to lull the suspicions of the Romans, he gave out that he was confined to his camp by illness, and that this had prevented his army from returning to its usual winter quarters in Apulia.

Matters were in this state when letters arrived at Tarentum that the hostages, for whose safety their friends had been so anxious, had been all cruelly put to death at Rome for having attempted to escape from their captivity. Released in so shocking a manner from their former hesitation, and burning to revenge the blood of their friends, Hannibal's partisans no longer delayed. They communicated secretly with him, arranged the details of their attempt, and signed a treaty of alliance, by which he bound himself to respect the independence and liberty of the Tarentines,

and only stipulated for the plunder of such houses as were occupied by Roman citizens. Two young men, Philemenus and Nicon, were the leaders of the enterprise. Philemenus, under the pretence of hunting, had persuaded the officer at one of the gates to allow him to pass in and out of the town by night without interruption. He was known to be devoted to his sport; he scarcely ever returned without having caught or killed some game or other; and by liberally giving away what he had caught, he won the favor and confidence, not only of the officer of the gate, but also of the Roman governor himself, M. Livius Macatus, a relation of M. Livius Salinator, who afterwards defeated Hasdrubal, but a man too indolent and fond of good cheer to be the governor of a town threatened by Hannibal. So little did Livius suspect any danger, that on the very day which the conspirators had

fixed for their attempt, and when Hannibal with ten thousand men was advancing upon the town, he had invited a large party to meet him at the Temple of the Muses near the market-place, and was engaged from an early hour in festivity.

The city of Tarentum formed a triangle, two sides of which were washed by the water; the outer, or western side, by the Mediterranean; the inner or northeastern side, by that remarkable land-locked basin, now called the Little Sea, which has a mouth narrower than the entrance into the Norwegian Fiords, but runs deep into the land, and spreads out into a wide surface of the calmest water, scarcely ruffled by the hardest gales. Exactly at the mouth of this basin was a little rocky knoll, forming the apex of the triangle of the city, and occupied by the citadel: the city itself stood on low and mostly level ground; and its

south-eastern wall, the base of the triangle, stretched across from the Little Sea to the Mediterranean. Thus the citadel commanded the entrance into the basin, which was the port of the Tarentines; and it was garrisoned by the Romans, although many of the officers and soldiers were allowed to lodge in the city. All attempts upon the town by land must be made then against the south-eastern side, which was separated from the citadel by the whole length of the city: and there was another circumstance which was likely to favor a surprise; for the Tarentines, following the direction of an oracle, as they said, buried their dead within the city walls; and the street of the tombs was interposed between the gates and the inhabited parts of the town. This the conspirators turned to their own purposes: in this lonely quarter two of their number, Nicon and Tragiscus, were waiting

for Hannibal's arrival without the gates. As soon as they perceived the signal which was to announce his presence, they, with a party of their friends, were to surprise the gates from within, and put the guards to the sword; while others had been left in the city to keep watch near the museum, and prevent any communication from being made to the Roman governor.

The evening wore away; the governor's party broke up; and his friends attended him to his house. On their way home they met some of the conspirators, who, to lull all suspicion, began to jest with them, as though themselves going home from a revel, and joining the party amidst riotous shouts and loud laughter, accompanied the governor to his own door. He went to rest in joyous and careless mood; his friends were all gone to their quarters; the noise of revellers returning from

their festivities died away through the city; and when midnight was come, the conspirators alone were abroad. They now divided into three parties: one was posted near the governor's house—a second secured the approaches to the market-place—and the third hastened to the quarter of the tombs, to watch for Hannibal's signal.

They did not watch long in vain; a fire in a particular spot without the walls assured them that Hannibal was at hand. They lit a fire in answer; and presently, as had been agreed upon, the fire without the walls disappeared. Then the conspirators rushed to the gate of the city, surprised it with ease, put the guards to the sword, and began to hew asunder the bar by which the gates were fastened. No sooner was it forced, and the gates opened, than Hannibal's soldiers were seen ready to enter; so exactly had the time of the operations been cal-

culated. The cavalry were left without the walls as a reserve; but the infantry, marching in regular column, advanced through the quarter of the tombs to the inhabited part of the city.

Meantime Philemenus with a thousand Africans had been sent to secure another gate by stratagem. The guards were accustomed to let him in at all hours, whenever he returned from his hunting expeditions; and now, when they heard his usual whistle, one of them went to the gate to admit him. Philemenus called to the guard from without to open the wicket quickly; for that he and his friends had killed a huge wild boar, and could scarcely bear the weight any longer. The guard accustomed to have a share in the spoil, opened the wicket; and Philemenus, and three other conspirators, disguised as countrymen, stepped in, carrying the boar between them. They instantly killed the

poor guard, as he was admiring and feeling their prize; and then let in about thirty Africans, who were following close behind. With this force they mastered the gate-house and towers, killed all the guards, and hewed asunder the bars of the main gates to admit the whole column of Africans, who marched in on this side also in regular order, and advanced towards the market-place.

No sooner had both Hannibal's columns reached their destination, and as it seems without exciting any general alarm, than he detached three bodies of Gaulish soldiers to occupy the principal streets which led to the market-place. The officers in command of these troops had orders to kill every Roman who fell in their way; but some Tarentine conspiritors were sent with each party to warn their countrymen to go home and remain quiet, assuring them that no mischief was intended to them. The toils

being thus spread, the prey was now to be enticed into them. Philemenus and his friends had provided some Roman trumpets; and these were loudly blown, sounding the well-known call to arms to the Roman soldier. Roused at this summons, the Romans quartered about the town armed themselves in haste, and poured into the streets to make their way to the citadel. But they fell in scattered parties into the midst of Hannibal's Gauls, and were cut down one after another. The governor alone had been more fortunate: the alarm had reached him in time; and being in no condition to offer any resistance,—for he felt, says Polybius, that the fumes of wine were still overpowering him,—he hastened to the harbor, and getting on board a boat, was carried safe to the citadel.

Day at last dawned, but did not quite clear up the mystery of the night's alarm

to the mass of the inhabitants of Tarentum. They were safe in their houses, unmassacred, unplundered; the only blast of war had been blown by a Roman trumpet; yet Roman soldiers were lying dead in the streets; and Gauls were spoiling their bodies. Suspense at length was ended by the voice of the public crier summoning the citizens of Tarentum, in Hannibal's name, to appear without their arms in the market-place; and by repeated shouts of "Liberty! Liberty!" uttered by some of their own countrymen, who ran round the town calling the Carthaginians their deliverers. The firm partisans of Rome made haste to escape into the citadel, while the multitude crowded to the market-place. They found it regularly occupied by Carthaginian troops; and the great general, of whom they had heard so much, was preparing to address them. He spoke to them, in Greek apparently,

declaring as usual, that he had come, to free the inhabitants of Italy from the dominion of Rome. "The Tarentines therefore had nothing to fear; they should go home and write each over his door, *a Tarentine's house;* these words would be a sufficient security; no door so marked should be violated. But the mark must not be set falsely upon any Roman's quarters; a Tarentine guilty of such treason would be put to death as an enemy; for all Roman property was the lawful prize of the soldiers." Accordingly, all houses where Romans had been quartered, were given up to be plundered; and the Carthaginian soldiers gained a harvest, says Polybius, which fully answered their hopes. This can only be explained by supposing that the Romans were quartered generally in the houses of the wealthier Tarentines, who were attached to the Roman alliance; and that the plunder was not

the scanty baggage of the legionary soldiers, but the costly furniture of the richest citizens in the greatest city of southern Italy.

Thus Tarentum was won; but the citadel on its rocky knoll was still held by the Romans; and its position at once threatened the town, and shut up the Tarentine fleet useless in the harbor. Hannibal proceeded to sink a ditch, and throw up a wall along the side of the town towards the citadel, in order to repress the sallies of the garrison. While engaged in these works he purposely tempted the Romans to a sally, and having lured them on to some distance from their cover, turned fiercely upon them, and drove them back with such slaughter, that their effective strength was greatly reduced. He then hoped to take the citadel: but the garrison was reinforced by sea from Metapontum, the Romans withdrawing their troops from

thence for this more important service; and a successful night-sally destroyed the besiegers' works, and obliged them to trust to a blockade. But as this was hopeless, while the Romans were masters of the sea, Hannibal instructed the Tarentines to drag their ships overland, through the streets of the city, from the harbour to the outer sea; and this being effected without difficulty, as the ground was quite level, the Tarentine fleet became at once effective, and the sea communications of the enemy were cut off. Having thus, as he hoped, enabled the Tarentines to deal by themselves with the Roman garrison, he left a small force in the town, and returned with the mass of his troops to his winter quarters in the country of the Sallentines, or on the edge of Apulia.

Hannibal was far away in the farthest corner of Italy; and as long as the citadel of Tarentum held out, he would be

unwilling to move towards Campania. Even if he should move, four armies were ready to oppose him; those of the two consuls, of the consul's brother, Cn. Fulvius, who was prætor in Apulia, and of another prætor, C. Claudius Nero, who commanded two legions in the camp above Suessula. Besides this mass of forces, Ti. Gracchus, the consul of the preceding year, still retained his army as proconsul in Lucania, and might be supposed capable of keeping Hanno and the army of Bruttium in check.

It was late in the spring before the consuls took the field. One of them succeeded to the army of the late consul, Fabius; the other took the two legions with which Cn. Fulvius Centumulas had held the camp above Suessula. These armies marching, the one from Apulia, the other from Campania, met at Bovianum: there, at the back of the Matese, in the country of the Pentrian Samnites,

the faithful allies of Rome, the consuls were making preparations for the siege of Capua, and perhaps were at the same time watching the state of affairs in the south, and the movements of Hannibal. The Campanians suspected that mischief was coming upon them, and sent a deputation to Hannibal praying him to aid them. If they were to stand a siege, it was important that the city should be well supplied with provisions; and their own harvest had been so insufficient, owing to the devastation caused by the war, that they had scarcely enough for their present consumption. Hannibal would therefore be pleased to order that supplies should be sent to them from the country of his Samnite and Lucanian allies, before their communications were cut off by the presence of the Roman armies.

Hannibal was still near Tarentum, whether hoping to win the town or the

citadel, the doubtful chronology of this period will not allow us to decide. He ordered Hanno, with the army of Bruttium, to move forward into Samnium; a most delicate operation, if the two consuls were with their armies at Bovianum, and Gracchus in Lucania itself, in the very line of Hanno's march, and if C. Nero with two legions more was lying in the camp above Suessula. But the army from Suessula had been given to one of the consuls; and the legions which were to take its place were to be marched from the coast of Picenum, and perhaps had hardly reached their destination. The Lucanians themselves seem to have found sufficient employment for Gracchus; and Hanno moved with a rapidity which friends and enemies were alike unprepared for. He arrived safely in the neighborhood of Beneventum, encamped his army in a strong position about three miles from

the town, and dispatched word to the Capuans that they should instantly send off every carriage and beast of burden in their city, to carry home the corn which he was going to provide for them. The towns of the Claudine Samnites emptied their magazines for the purpose, and forwarded all their corn to Hanno's camp. Thus far, all prospered; but the negligence of the Capuans ruined every thing; they had not carriages enough ready; and Hanno was obliged to wait in his perilous situation, where every hour's delay was exposing him to destruction. Beneventum was a Latin colony, in other words, a strong Roman garrison, watching all his proceedings: from thence, information was sent to the consuls at Bovianum; and Fulvius with his army instantly set out, and entered Beneventum by night. There he found that the Capuans, with their means of transport, were at length

arrived; and all disposable hands had been pressed into the service; that Hanno's camp was crowded with cattle and carriages, and a mixed multitude of unarmed men, and even of women and children; and that a vigorous blow might win it with all its spoil: the indefatigable general was absent, scouring the country for additional supplies of corn. Fulvius sallied from Beneventum a little before day-break, and led his soldiers to assault Hanno's position. Under all disadvantages of surprise and disorder, the Carthaginians resisted so vigorously, that Fulvius was on the point of calling off his men, when a brave Pelignian officer threw the standard of his cohort over the enemy's wall, and desperately climbed the rampart and scaled the wall to recover it. His cohort rushed after him; and a Roman centurion then set the same example, which was followed with equal alacrity.

Then the Romans broke into the camp on every side, even the wounded men struggling on with the mass, that they might die within the enemy's ramparts. The slaughter was great, and the prisoners many; but, above all, the whole of the corn which Hanno had collected for the relief of Capua was lost, and the object of his expedition totally frustrated. He himself, hearing of the wreck of his army, retreated with speed into Bruttium.

Again the Capuans sent to Hannibal requesting him to aid them ere it was too late. Their negligence had just cost him an army, and had frustrated all his plans for their relief; but with unmoved temper he assured them that he would not forget them, and sent back 2000 of his invincible cavalry with the deputation, to protect their lands from the enemy's ravages. It was important to him not to leave the south of Italy till

the very last moment; for since he had taken Tarentum, the neighboring Greek cities of Metapontum, Heraclea, and Thurii, had joined him; and as he had before won Croton and Locri, he was now master of the whole coast from the straits of Messana, to the mouth of the Adriatic, with the exception of Rhegium and the citadel of Tarentum. Into the latter the Romans had lately thrown supplies of provisions; and the garrison was so strong, that Hannibal was unwilling to march into Campania, while such a powerful force of the enemy was left behind in so favorable a position.

The consuls, meanwhile, not content with their own two armies, and with the two legions expected, if not yet arrived, in the camp above Suessula, sent to Gracchus in Lucania, desiring him to bring up his cavalry and light troops to Beneventum, to strengthen them in that kind of force, in which they fully

felt their inferiority. But before he could leave his own province, he was drawn into an ambuscade by the treachery of a Lucanian in the Roman interest, and perished. His quæstor, Cn. Cornelius, marched with his cavalry towards Beneventum, according to the consuls' orders; but the infantry, consisting of the slaves whom he had enfranchised, thought that their services were ended by the death of their deliverer, and immediately dispersed to their homes. Thus Lucania was left without either a Roman army or general; but M. Centenius, an old centurian, distinguished for his strength and courage, undertook the command there, if the senate would intrust him with a force equal to a single legion. Perhaps, like T. Pomponius Veientanus, he was connected with some of the contractors and moneyed men, and owed his appointment as much to their interest as to his own reputation.

But he was a brave and popular soldier; and so many volunteers joined him on his march, hoping to be enriched by the plunder of Lucania, that he arrived there with a force, it is said, amounting to near sixteen thousand men. His confidence and that of his followers was doomed to be wofully disappointed.

The consuls knew that Hannibal was far away; and they did not know that any of his cavalry were in Capua. They issued boldly therefore from the Caudine Forks on the great Campanian plain, and scattered their forces far and wide to destroy the still green corn. To their astonishment the gates of Capua were thrown open; and with the Campanian infantry they recognized the dreaded cavalry of Hannibal. In a moment their foragers were driven in; and as they hastily formed their legions in order of battle to cover them, the horsemen broke upon them like a whirlwind, and drove

them with great loss and confusion to their camp. This sharp lesson taught them caution; but their numbers were overwhelming; and their two armies, encamped before Capua, cut off the communications of the city, and had the harvest of the whole country in their power.

But ere many days had elapsed, an unwelcome sight was seen on the summit of Tifata; Hannibal was there once more with his army. He descended into Capua; two days afterwards he marched out to battle; again his invincible Numidians struck terror into the Roman line, when the sudden arrival of Cn. Cornelius with the cavalry of Gracchus' army broke off the action; and neither side, it is said, knowing what this new force might be, both as if by common consent retreated. How Hannibal so outstripped Cornelius as to arrive from Tarentum on the scene of action two or three days before him, who

was coming from Lucania, we are not told, and can only conjecture. But the arrival of this reinforcement, though it had saved the consuls from defeat, did not embolden them to hold their ground: they left their camps as soon as night came on; Fulvius fell down upon the coast, near Cumæ; Appius Claudius retreated in the direction of Lucania.

Few passages in history can offer a parallel to Hannibal's campaigns; but this confident gathering of the enemies' overflowing numbers round the city of his nearest allies, his sudden march, the unlooked-for appearance of his dreaded veterans, and the instant scattering of the besieging armies before him, remind us of the deliverance of Dresden in 1813, when Napoleon broke in upon the allies' confident expectations of victory, and drove them away in signal defeat. And, like the allies in that great campaign, the Roman generals knew their own

strength; and though yielding to the shock of their adversary's surpassing energy and genius, they did not allow themselves to be scared from their purpose, but began again steadily to draw the toils which he had once broke through. Great was the joy in Capua, when the people rose in the morning and saw the Roman camps abandoned: there needs no witness to tell us with what sincere and deep admiration they followed and gazed on their deliverer; how confident they felt that, with him for a shield, no harm could reach them. But almost within sight and hearing of their joy, the stern old Fulvius was crouching as it were in his thicket, watching the moment for a second spring upon his prey; and when Hannibal left that rejoicing and admiring multitude to follow the traces of Appius, he passed through the gates of Capua, to enter them again no more.

Appius retreated in the direction of Lucania: this is all that is reported of his march; and then, after a while, having led his enemy in the direction which suited his purposes, he turned off by another road, and made his way back to Campania. With such a total absence of details, it is impossible to fix the line of his march exactly. It was easy for Appius to take the round of the Matese; retiring first by the great road to Beneventum, then turning to his left and regaining his old quarters at Bovianum, from whence, the instant that Hannibal ceased to follow him, he would move along under the north side of the Matese to Æsernia, and descend again upon Campania by the valley of the Vulturnus. Hannibal's pursuit was necessarily stopped as soon as Appius moved northwards from Beneventum: he could not support his army in the country of the Pentaian Samnites, where every thing

was hostile to him; nor did he like to abandon his line of direct communication with southern Italy. He had gained a respite for Capua, and had left an auxiliary force to aid in its defence; meanwhile other objects must not be neglected; and the fall of the citadel of Tarentum might, of itself, prevent, or raise the siege of Capua. So he turned off from following Appius, and was marching back to the south, when he was told that a Roman army was attempting to bar his passage in Lucania. This was the motley multitude commanded by Centenius, which had succeeded, as we have seen, to the army of Gracchus. With what mad hope, or under what false impression, Centenius could have been tempted to rush upon certain destruction, we know not; but, in the number, no less than in the quality of his troops, he must have been far inferior to his adversary. His men

fought bravely; and he did a centurion's duty well, however he may have failed as a general: but he was killed, and nearly fifteen thousand men are said to have perished with him.

Thus Lucania was cleared of the Romans; and as the firmest partisan of the Roman interest among the Lucanians had been the very man who had betrayed Gracchus to his fate, it is likely that the Carthaginian party was triumphant through the whole country. Only one Roman army was left in the south of Italy, the two legions commanded by Cn. Fulvius Flaccus, the consul's brother, in Apulia. But Cn. Fulvius had nothing of his brother's ability; he was a man grown old in profligacy; and the discipline of his army was said to be in the worst condition. Hannibal, hoping to complete his work, moved at once into Apulia, and found Fulvius in the neighborhood

of Herdonea. The Roman general met him in the open field, without hesitation, and was presently defeated: he himself escaped from the action, but Hannibal had occupied the principal roads in the rear of the enemy with his cavalry; and the greatest part of the Roman army was cut to pieces.

We naturally ask, What result followed from these two great victories? and to this question we find no recorded answer. Hannibal, we are told, returned to Tarentum; but finding that the citadel still held out, and could neither be forced nor surprised, and that provisions were still introduced by sea, a naval blockade, in ancient warfare, being always inefficient, he marched off towards Brundisium, on some prospect that the town would be betrayed into his hands. This hope also failed him; and he remained inactive in Apulia, or in the country of the Sallentines,

during the rest of the year. Meantime, the consuls received orders from the senate to collect the wrecks of the two beaten armies, and to search for the soldiers of Gracchus' army, who had dispersed, as we have seen, after his death. The city prætor, P. Cornelius, carried on the same search nearer Rome; and these duties, says Livy, were all performed most carefully and vigorously. This is all the information which exists for us in the remains of the ancient writers; but, assuredly, this is no military history of a campaign.

It is always to be understood that Hannibal could not remain long in an enemy's country, from the difficulty of feeding his men, especially his cavalry. But the country round Capua was not all hostile; Atella and Calatia, in the plain of Campania itself, were still his allies: so were many of the Caudine Samnites, from whose cities Hanno had

collected the corn early in this year for the relief of Capua. Again, we can conceive how the number of the Roman armies sometimes oppressed him: how he dared not stay long in one quarter, lest a greater evil should befall him in another. But at this moment, three great disasters, the dispersion of the army of Gracchus, and the destruction of those of Centenius and Fulvius, had cleared the south of Italy of the Romans; and his friends in Apulia, in Lucania, at Tarentum, and in Bruttium, could have nothing to fear, had he left them, for the time, to their own resources. Why, after defeating Fulvius, did he not retrace his steps towards Campania, hold the field, with the aid of his Campanian and Samnite allies, till the end of the military season, and then winter, close at hand, on the shores of the gulf of Salerno, in the country of his allies, so as to make it impossible

for the Romans either to undertake or to maintain the siege of Capua?

That his not doing this was not his own fault, his extraordinary ability and energy may sufficiently assure us; but, where the hindrance was, we cannot, for certain, discover: his army must have been worn by its long and rapid march to and from Campania, and by two battles fought with so short an interval: his wounded must have been numerous; nor can we tell how such hard service, in the heat of summer, may have tried the health of his soldiers: his horses, too, must have needed rest; and to overstrain the main arm of his strength, would have been fatal: perhaps, too, great as was Hannibal's ascendency over his army, there was a point beyond which it could not be tried with safety: long marches and hard-fought battles gave the soldier, especially the Gaul and the Spaniard,

what, in his eyes, was a rightful claim to a season of rest and enjoyment: the men might have murmured, had they not been permitted to taste some reward of their victories: besides all these reasons, the necessity of a second march into Campania may not have seemed urgent: the extent of Capua was great; if the Roman consuls did encamp before it, still, the city was in no immediate danger; after the winter, another advance would again enable him to throw supplies into the town, and to drive off the Roman armies; so Capua was left, for the present, to its own resources, and Hannibal passed the autumn and winter in Apulia.

Immediately the Roman armies closed again upon their prey. Three grand magazines of corn were established, to feed the besieging army during the winter, one at Casilinum within three miles of Capua; another at a fort built for the

purpose at the mouth of the Vulturnus; and a third at Puteoli. Into these two last magazines the corn was conveyed by sea from Ostia, whither it had already been collected from Sardinia and Etruria. Then the consuls summoned C. Nero from his camp above Suessula; and the three armies began the great work of surrounding Capua with double continuous lines, strong enough to repel the besieged on one side, and Hannibal on the other, when he should again appear in Campania. The inner line was carried round the city, at a distance of about a quarter of a mile from the walls; the outer line was concentric with it; and the space between the two served for the cantonments and magazines of the besiegers. The lines, says Appian, looked like a great city, inclosing a smaller city in the middle; like the famous lines of the Peloponnesians before Platæa. What time was employ-

ed in completing them we know not: they were interrupted by continual sallies of the besieged; and Jubellius Taurea and the Capuan cavalry were generally too strong for the Roman horsemen. But their infantry could do nothing against the legions; the besieging army must have amounted nearly to sixty thousand men; and slowly but surely the imprisoning walls were raised and their circle completed, shutting out the last gleams of light from the eyes of the devoted city.

Before the works were closed all round, the consuls, according to the senate's directions signified to them by the city prætor, announced to the Capuans, that whoever chose to come out of the city with his family and property before the ides of March, might do so with safety, and should be untouched in body or goods. It would seem, then, that the works were

B. C. 211.

not completed till late in the winter; for we cannot suppose that the term of grace would have been prolonged to a remote day, especially as the ides of March were the beginning of the new consular year; and it could not be known long beforehand whether the present consuls would be continued in their command or no. The offer was received by the besieged, it is said, with open scorn; their provisions were as yet abundant, their cavalry excellent; their hope of aid from Hannibal, as soon as the campaign should open, was confident. But Fulvius waited his time; nor was his thirst for Capuan blood to be disappointed by his removal from the siege at the end of the year: it would seem as if the new consuls were men of no great consideration, appointed probably for that very reason, that their claims might not interfere with those of their predecessors. One of them, P. Sulpicius Galba, had

filled no curule office previously: the other, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, had been prætor two years before, but was not distinguished by any remarkable action. The siege of Capua was still to be conducted by Appius Claudius and Fulvius; and they were ordered not to retire from their positions till they should have taken the city.

What was the state of affairs in Capua meantime, we know not. The Roman stories are little to be credited, which represent all the richer and nobler citizens as abandoning the government, and leaving the office of chief magistrate, Meddix Tuticus, to be filled by one Seppius Lesius, a man of obscure condition, who offered himself as a candidate. Neither Vibius Virrius nor Jubellius Taurea wanted resolution to abide by their country to the last; and it is expressly said that, down to the latest period of the siege, there was no Roman

party in Capua; no voice was heard to speak of peace or surrender; no citizen had embraced the consul's offers of mercy. Even when they had failed to prevent the completion of the Roman lines, they continued to make frequent sallies; and the proconsuls could only withstand their cavalry by mixing light armed foot soldiers amongst the Roman horsemen, and thus strengthening that weakest arm in the Roman service. Still, as the blockade was now fully established, famine must be felt sooner or later; accordingly a Numidian was sent to implore Hannibal's aid, and succeeded in getting through the Roman lines, and carrying his message safely to Bruttium.

Hannibal listened to the prayer, and leaving his heavy baggage, and the mass of his army behind, set out with his cavalry and light infantry, and with thirty-three elephants. Whether his

Samnite and Lucanian allies joined him on the march is not stated; if they did not, and if secrecy and expedition were deemed of more importance than an addition of force, the troops which he led with him must have been more like a single corps, than a complete army. Avoiding Beneventum, he descended the valley of the Calor towards the Vulturnus, stormed a Roman post, which had been built apparently to cut off the communications of the besieged with the upper valley of the Vulturnus, and encamped immediately behind the ridge of Tifata. From thence he descended once more into the plain of Capua, displayed his cavalry before the Roman lines in the hope of tempting them out to battle, and finding that this did not succeed, commenced a general assault upon their works.

Unprovided with any artillery, his best hope was that the Romans might

be allured to make some rash sally: his cavalry advanced by squadrons up to the edge of the trench, and discharged showers of missiles into the lines; while his infantry assailed the rampart, and tried to force their way through the palisade which surmounted it. From within, the lines were attacked by the Campanians and Hannibal's auxiliary garrison; but the Romans were numerous enough to defend both fronts of their works; they held their ground steadily, neither yielding nor rashly pursuing; and Hannibal, finding his utmost efforts vain, drew off his army. Some resolution must be taken promptly; his cavalry could not be fed where he was, for the Romans had previously destroyed or carried away every thing that might serve for forage; nor could he venture to wait till the new consuls should have raised their legions, and be ready to march from Rome and threat-

en his rear. One only hope remained; one attempt might yet be made, which should either raise the siege of Capua or accomplish a still greater object: Hannibal resolved to march upon Rome.

A Numidian was again found, who undertook to pass over to the Roman lines as a deserter, and from thence to make his escape into Capua, bearing a letter from Hannibal, which explained his purpose, and conjured the Capuans patiently to abide the issue of his attempt for a little while. When this letter reached Capua, Hannibal was already gone; his camp fires had been seen burning as usual all night in his accustomed position on Tifata; but he had begun his march the preceding evening, immediately after dark, while the Romans still thought that his army was hanging over their heads, and were looking for a second assault.

His army disappeared from the eyes

of the Romans behind Tifata; and they knew not whither he was gone. Even so it is with us at this day; we lose him from Tifata; we find him before Rome; but we know nothing of his course between. Conflicting and contradictory accounts have made the truth undiscoverable: what regions of Italy looked with fear or hope on the march of the great general and his famous soldiers, it is impossible from our existing records to determine. All accounts say that, descending nearly by the old route of the Gauls, he kept the Tiber on his right, and the Anio on his left; and that, finally, he crossed the Anio, and encamped at a distance of less than four miles from the walls of Rome.

Before the sweeping pursuit of his Numidians, crowds of fugitives were seen flying towards the city, while the smoke of burning houses arose far and wide into the sky. Within the walls

the confusion and terror were at their height; he was come at last, this Hannibal, whom they had so long dreaded; he had at length dared what even the slaughter of Cannæ had not emboldened him to venture; some victory greater even than Cannæ must have given him this confidence; the three armies before Capua must be utterly destroyed; last year he had destroyed or dispersed three other armies, and had gained possession of the entire south of Italy; and now he had stormed the lines before Capua, had cut to pieces the whole remaining force of the Roman people, and was come to Rome to finish his work. So the wives and mothers of Rome lamented, as they hurried to the temples; and there, prostrate before the gods, and sweeping the sacred pavement with their unbound hair in the agony of their fear, they remained pouring forth their prayers for deliverance. Their sons and husbands

hastened to man the walls and the citadel, and to secure the most important points without the city; whilst the senate, as calm as their fathers of old, whom the Gauls massacred when sitting at their own doors, but with the energy of manly resolution, rather than the resignation of despair, met in the forum, and there remained assembled, to direct every magistrate on the instant how he might best fulfill his duty.

But God's care watched over the safety of a people whom he had chosen to work out the purposes of his providence: Rome was not to perish. Two city legions were to be raised, as usual, at the beginning of the year; and it so happened that the citizens from the country tribes were to meet at Rome on this very day for the enlistment for one of these legions; while the soldiers of the other, which had been enrolled a short time before, were to appear at

Rome on this same day in arms, having been allowed, as the custom was, to return home for a few days after their enlistment, to prepare for active service. Thus it happened that ten thousand men were brought together at the very moment when they were most needed, and were ready to repel any assault upon the walls. The allies, it seems, were not ordinarily called out to serve with the two city legions; but on this occasion it is mentioned that the Latin colony of Alba, having seen Hannibal pass by their walls, and guessing the object of his march, sent its whole force to assist in the defence of Rome; a zeal which the Greek writers compared to that of Platæa, whose citizens fought alone by the side of the Athenians on the day of Marathon.

To assault the walls of Rome was now hopeless; but the open country was at Hannibal's mercy, a country which had

seen no enemy for near a hundred and fifty years, cultivated and inhabited in the full security of peace. Far and wide it was overrun by Hannibal's soldiers; and the army appears to have moved about, encamping in one place after another, and sweeping cattle and prisoners and plunder of every sort, beyond numbering, within the enclosure of its camp.

It was probably in the course of these excursions, that Hannibal, at the head of a large body of cavalry, came close up to the Colline gate, rode along leisurely under the walls to see all he could of the city, and is said to have cast his javelin into it as in defiance. From farthest Spain he had come into Italy; he had wasted the whole country of the Romans and their allies with fire and sword for more than six years, had slain more of their citizens than were now alive to bear arms against him; and at

last he was shutting them up within their city, and riding freely under their walls, while none dared meet him in the field. If any thing of disappointment depressed his mind at that instant; if he felt that Rome's strength was not broken, nor the spirit of her people quelled, that his own fortune was wavering, and that his last effort had been made, and made in vain; yet thinking where he was, and of the shame and loss which his presence was causing to his enemies, he must have wished that his father could have lived to see that day, and must have thanked the gods of his country that they had enabled him so fully to perform his vow.

For some time, we know not how long, this devastation of the Roman territory lasted without opposition. Meanwhile the siege of Capua was not raised; and Fabius, in earnestly dissuading such a confession of fear, showed that he could

be firm no less than cautious, when boldness was the highest prudence. But Fulvius, with a small portion of the besieging army, was recalled to Rome: Fabius had ever acted with him, and was glad to have the aid of his courage and ability; and when he arrived, and by a vote of the senate was united with the consuls in the command, the Roman forces were led out of the city, and encamped, according to Fabius' old policy, within ten stadia of the enemy, to check his free license of plunder. At the same time, parties acting on the rear of Hannibal's army had broken down the bridges over the Anio, his line of retreat, like his advance, being on the right bank of that river, and not by the Latin road.

Hannibal had purposely waited to allow time for his movement to produce its intended effect in the raising of the siege of Capua. That time, according

to his calculations, was now come: the news of his arrival before Rome must have reached the Roman lines before Capua; and the armies from that quarter, hastening by the Latin road to the defence of their city, must have left the communication with Capua free. The presence of Fulvius with his army in Latium, which Hannibal would instantly discover, by the thrice-repeated sounding of the watch, as Hasdrubal found out Nero's arrival in the camp of Livius near Sena, would confirm him in his expectation that the other proconsul was on his march with the mass of the army; and he accordingly commenced his retreat by the Tiburtine road, that he might not encounter Appius in front, while the consuls and Fabius were pressing on his rear.

Accordingly, as the bridges were destroyed, he proceeded to effect his passage through the river, and carried over

his army under the protection of his cavalry, although the Romans attacked him during the passage, and cut off a large part of the plunder which he had collected from the neighborhood of Rome He then continued his retreat; and the Romans followed him, but at a careful distance, and keeping steadily on the higher grounds, to be safe from the assaults of his dreaded cavalry.

In this manner Hannibal marched with the greatest rapidity for five days, which, if he was moving by the Valerian road, must have brought him at least as far as the country of the Marsians, and the shores of the lake Fucinus. From thence, he would again have crossed by the Forca Carrosa to the plain of the Pelignians, and so retraced his steps through Samnium, towards Capua. But at this point, he received intelligence that the Roman armies were still in their lines; that his march upon Rome

had, therefore, failed; and that his communications with Capua were as hopeless as ever. Instantly, he changed all his plans; and, feeling obliged to abandon Capua, the importance of his operations in the south rose upon him in proportion. Hitherto, he had not thought fit to delay his march for the sake of attacking the army which was pursuing him; but now, he resolved to rid himself of this enemy; so he turned fiercely upon them, and assaulted their camp in the night. The Romans, surprised and confounded, were driven from it, with considerable loss, and took refuge in a strong position in the mountains. Hannibal then resumed his march; but, instead of turning short to his right, towards Campania, descended towards the Adriatic, and the plains of Apulia, and from thence returned to what was now the stronghold of his power in Italy, the country of the Bruttians.

The citadel of Tarentum still held out against him; but Rhegium, confident in its remoteness, had never yet seen his cavalry in its territory, and was now less likely than ever to dread his presence, as he had so lately been heard of in the heart of Italy, and under the walls of Rome. With a rapid march, therefore, he hastened to surprise Rhegium. Tidings of his coming reached the city just in time for the Rhegians to shut their gates against him; but half their people were in the country, in the full security of peace; and these all fell into his power. We know not whether he treated them kindly, as hoping through their means to win Rhegium, as he had won Tarentum; or whether disappointment was now stronger than hope, and despairing of drawing the allies of Rome to his side, he was now as inveterate against them as against the Romans. He retired from

his fruitless attempt to win Rhegium only to receive the tidings of the loss of Capua.

The Romans had patiently waited their time, and were now to reap their reward. The consuls were both to command in Apulia with two consular armies; one of them therefore must have returned to Rome, to raise the two additional legions which were required. Fulvius hastened back to the lines before Capua. His prey was now in his power; the straitness of the blockade could no longer be endured, and aid from Hannibal was not to be hoped. It is said that mercy was still promised to any Capuan who should come over to the Romans before a certain day, but that none availed themselves of the offer, feeling, says Livy, that their offence was beyond forgiveness. This can only mean that they believed the Romans to be as faithless as they were cruel, and

felt sure that every promise of mercy would be evaded or openly broken. One last attempt was made to summon Hannibal again to their aid; but the Numidians employed on the service were detected this time in the Roman lines, and were sent back torn with stripes, and with their hands cut off, into the city.

No Capuan writer has survived to record the last struggle of his country; and never were any people less to be believed than the Romans, when speaking of their enemies. Yet the greatest man could not have supported the expiring weakness of an unheroic people; and we hear of no great man in Capua. Some of the principal men in the senate met, it is said, at the house of one of their number, Vibius Virrius, where a magnificent banquet had been prepared for them; they ate and drank, and when the feast was over, they all swallowed

poison. Then, having done with pleasure and with life, they took a last leave of each other; they embraced each other, lamenting with many tears their own and their country's calamity; and some remained to be burned together on the same funeral pile, while others went away to die at their own homes. All were dead before the Romans entered the city.

In the meanwhile the Capuan government, unable to restrain their starving people, had been obliged to surrender to the enemy. In modern warfare the surrender of a besieged town involves no extreme suffering; even in civil wars, justice or vengeance only demands a certain number of victims, and the mass of the population scarcely feels its condition affected. But surrender, *deditio*, according to the Roman laws of war, placed the property, liberties, and lives of the whole surrendered people at the

absolute disposal of the conquerors; and that not formally, as a right, the enforcement of which were monstrous, but as one to abate which in any instance was an act of free mercy.

The conquest of Capua was one of the most important services ever rendered by a Roman general to his country. It did not merely deprive Hannibal of the greatest fruit of his greatest victory, and thus seem to undo the work of Cannæ; but its effect was felt far and wide, encouraging the allies of Rome, and striking terror into her enemies; tempting the cities which had revolted to return without delay to their allegiance, and filling Hannibal with suspicions of those who were still true to him, as if they only waited to purchase their pardon by some act of treachery towards his garrisons. By the recovery of Capua his great experiment seemed decided against him. It appeared impossible,

under any circumstances, to rally such a coalition of the Italian states against the Roman power in Italy, as might be able to overthrow it. We almost ask, With what reasonable hopes could Hannibal from this time forward continue the war? or, Why did he not change the seat of it from Southern Italy to Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul?

But with whatever feelings of disappointment and grief he may have heard of the fall of Capua, of the ruin of his allies, the bloody death of so many of the Capuan senators, and of the brave Jubellius Taurea, whom he had personally known and honoured, yet, the last campaign was not without many solid grounds of encouragement. Never had the invincible force of his army been more fully proved. He had overrun half Italy, had crossed and re-crossed the passes of the Apennines, had plunged into the midst of the Roman allies,

and had laid waste the territory of Rome with fire and sword. Yet no superiority of numbers, no advantage of ground, no knowledge of the country, had ever emboldened the Romans to meet him in the field, or even to beset his road, or to obstruct and harass his march. Once only, when he was thought to be retreating, had they ventured to follow him at a cautious distance; but he had turned upon them in his strength; and the two consuls, and Q. Fulvius with them, were driven before him as fugitives to the mountains, their camp stormed, and their legions scattered. It was plain, then, that he might hold his ground in Italy as long as he pleased, supporting his army at its cost, and draining the resources of Rome and her allies year after year, till, in mere exhaustion, the Roman commons would probably join the Latin colonies and the allies, in forcing the senate to make peace.

At this very moment Etruria was restless, and required an army of two legions to keep it quiet: the Roman commons, in addition to their heavy taxation and military service, had seen their lands laid waste, and yet were called upon to bear fresh burdens: and there was a spirit of discontent working in the Latin colonies, which a little more provocation might excite to open revolt. Spain, besides, seemed at last to be freed from the enemy; and the recent defeats and deaths of the two Scipios there, held out the hope to Hannibal, that now at length his brother Hasdrubal, having nothing to detain him in Spain, might lead a second Carthaginian army into Italy, and establish himself in Etruria, depriving Rome of the resources of the Etruscan and Umbrian states, as she had already lost those of half Samnium, of Lucania, Bruttium, and Apulia. Then, assailed, at once, by two sons of Hamil-

car, on the north and the south, the Roman power, which one of them, singly, had so staggered, must, by the joint efforts of both, be beaten to the ground and destroyed. With such hopes, and with no unreasonable confidence, Hannibal consoled himself for the loss of Capua, and allowed his army, after its severe marching, to rest for the remainder of the year in Apulia.

The commencement of the next season was marked by the fall of Salapia, which was betrayed by the inhabitants to Marcellus; but this loss was soon avenged by the total defeat and destruction of the army of the proconsul Cn. Fulvius, at Herdonea. Marcellus, on his part, carefully avoided an action for the rest of the campaign; while he harassed his opponent by every possible means. Thus the rest of that summer, too, wore away without any important results. But this state

B. C. 210.

of comparative inactivity was necessarily injurious to the cause of Hannibal: the nations of Italy that had espoused that cause, when triumphant, now began to waver in their attachment; and, in the course of the following summer, B. C. 209. the Samnites and Lucanians submitted to Rome, and were admitted to favorable terms. A still more disastrous blow to the Carthaginian cause, was the loss of Tarentum, which was betrayed into the hands of Fabius, as it had been into those of Hannibal. In vain did the latter seek to draw the Roman General into a snare; the wary Fabius eluded his toils. But Marcellus, after a pretended victory over Hannibal, during the earlier part of the campaign, had shut himself up within the walls of Venusia, and remained there in utter inactivity. Hannibal, meanwhile, still traversed the open country unopposed, and laid waste the territories of

his enemies. Yet we cannot suppose that he any longer looked for ultimate success from any efforts of his own: his object was, doubtless, now only to maintain his ground in the south, until his brother Hasdrubal should appear in the north of Italy, an event to which he had long looked forward with anxious expectation.

B. C. 208. Yet the following summer was not unmarked by some brilliant achievements. The Romans having formed the siege of Locri, a legion, which was despatched to their support from Tarentum, was intercepted in its march, and utterly destroyed; and not long afterwards, the two consuls, Crispinus and Marcellus, who, with their united armies, were opposed to Hannibal in Lucania, allowed themselves to be led into an ambush, in which Marcellus was killed, and Crispinus was mortally wounded. After this, the Ro-

man armies withdrew, while Hannibal hastened to Locri, and not only raised the siege, but utterly destroyed the besieging army. Thus he again found himself undisputed master of the south of Italy during the remainder of this campaign.

Of the two consuls of the ensuing year, C. Nero was opposed to Hannibal, while M. Livius was appointed to take the field against Hasdrubal, who had at length crossed the Alps, and descended into Cisalpine Gaul. According to Livy, Hannibal was apprised of his brother's arrival at Placentia before he had himself moved from his winter quarters; but it is difficult to believe that, if this had been the case, he would not have made more eneregtic efforts to join him. If we can trust the narrative transmitted to us, which is certainly in many respects unsatisfactory, Hannibal spent much time in various

B. C. 207.

unimportant movements, before he advanced northwards into Apulia, where he was met by the Roman consul, and not only held in check, but so effectually deceived, that he knew nothing of Nero's march to support his colleague, until after his return; and the first tidings of the battle of Metaurus were conveyed to him by the sight of the head of Hasdrubal.

But, whatever exaggeration we may justly suspect in this relation, it is not the less certain that the defeat and death of Hasdrubal was decisive of the fate of the war in Italy; and the conduct of Hannibal shows that he felt it to be such. From this time he abandons all thoughts of offensive operations, and, withdrawing his garrisons from Metapontum and other towns that he still held in Lucania, collected together his forces within the peninsula of Bruttium. In the fastnesses of that wild and moun-

tainous region, he maintained his ground for nearly four years; while the towns that he still possessed on the coast gave him the command of the sea. Of the events of these four years, we know but little. It appears that the Romans at first contented themselves with shutting him up within the peninsula, but gradually began to encroach upon these bounds; and though the statements of their repeated victories are gross exaggerations, if not altogether unfounded, yet the successive loss of Locri, Consentia and Pandosia, besides smaller towns, must have hemmed him in within limits continually narrowing. Crotona seems to have been his chief stronghold and centre of operations; and it was during this period that he erected, in the temple of the Lacinian Juno, near that city, a column bearing an inscription which recorded the leading events of his memorable expedition. To this important monument,

which was seen and consulted by Polybius, we are indebted for many of the statements of that author.

It is difficult to judge, whether it was the expectation of effective assistance from Carthage, or the hopes of a fresh diversion being operated by Mago in the North, that induced Hannibal to cling so pertinaciously to the corner of Italy that he still held. It is certain that he was, at any time, free to quit it; and when, at length, he was induced to comply with the urgent request of the Carthaginian government that he should return to Africa, to make head against Scipio, he was able to embark his troops without an attempt at opposition. His departure from Italy seems, indeed, to have been the great object of desire with the Romans. For more than fifteen years had he carried on the war in that country, laying it waste from one extremity to the other, and during all this

period, his superiority in the field had been uncontested. The Romans calculated that in these fifteen years their losses in the field alone amounted to not less than 300,000 men; a statement which will hardly appear exaggerated, when we consider the continual combats in which they were engaged by their ever-watchful foe.

Hannibal landed, with the small but veteran army which he was able to bring with him from Italy, at Leptis, in Africa, apparently before the close of the year 203. From thence he proceeded to the strong city of Hadrumetum. The circumstances of the campaign which followed are very differently related; nor will our space allow us to enter into any discussion of the details. Some of these, especially the well-known account of the interview between Scipio and Hannibal, savor strongly of romance, notwithstanding the high au-

thority of Polybius. The decisive action was fought at a place called Naragara, not far from the city of Zama; and Hannibal, according to the express testimony of his antagonist, displayed, on this occasion, all the qualities of a consummate General. But he was now particularly deficient in that formidable cavalry which had so often decided the victory in his favor: his elephants, of which he had a great number, were rendered unavailing by the skillful management of Scipio; and the battle ended in his complete defeat, notwithstanding the heroic exertions of his veteran infantry. Twenty thousand of his men fell on the field of battle; as many more were made prisoners, and Hannibal himself with difficulty escaped the pursuit of Masinissa, and he fled with a few horsemen to Hadrumetum. Here he succeeded in collecting about 6000 men, the remnant of his scattered army, with whom he re-

paired to Carthage. But all hopes of resistance were now at an end, and he was one of the first to urge the necessity of an immediate peace. Much time, however, appears to have been occupied in the negotiations for this purpose; and the

B. C. 201. treaty was not finally concluded until after the battle of Zama.

By this treaty, Hannibal saw the object of his whole life frustrated, and Carthage was effectually humbled before her imperious rival. But his enmity to Rome was unabated; and though now more than 45 years old, he set himself to work, like his father Hamilcar after the end of the first Punic war, to prepare the means of renewing the contest at a distant period. His first measures related to the internal affairs of Carthage, and were directed to the reform of abuses in the administration, and in the introduction of certain constitutional changes, which our im-

perfect knowledge of the government of Carthage wholly disqualifies us clearly to understand. We are told that after the termination of the war with Rome, Hannibal was assailed by the opposite faction, with charges of remissness, and even treachery, in his command; accusations so obviously false, that they appear to have recoiled on the heads of his accusers; and he was not only acquitted, but shortly afterwards was raised to the chief magistracy of the republic, the office styled by Livy *praetor:* by which it is probable that he means one of the suffetes. But the virtual control of the whole government had at this time been assumed by the assembly of judges, apparently the same as the council of one hundred; evidently a high and aristocratic body; and it was only by the overthrow of this power that Hannibal was enabled to introduce order into the finances of the state, and

thus prepare the way for the gradual restoration of the republic. But though he succeeded in accomplishing this object, and in introducing the most beneficial reforms, such a revolution could not but irritate the adverse faction, and they soon found an opportunity of revenging themselves, by denouncing him to the Romans, as being engaged in negotiations with Antiochus III, King of Syria, to induce him to take up arms against Rome. There can be little doubt that the charge was well founded, and Hannibal saw that his enemies were too strong for him. No sooner, therefore, did the Roman envoys appear at Carthage, than he secretly took to flight, and escaped by sea to the island of Cercina, from whence he retired to Tyre, and thence again, after a short interval, to the court of Antiochus at Ephesus.

B. C. 193. The Syrian monarch was at this time on the eve of war with

Rome, though hostilities had not yet commenced. Hence Hannibal was welcomed with the utmost honors. But Antiochus, partly perhaps from incapacity, partly, also, from personal jealousy, encouraged by the intrigues of his courtiers, could not be induced to listen to his judicious counsels, the wisdom of which he was compelled to acknowledge when too late. Hannibal in vain urged the necessity of carrying the war at once into Italy, instead of awaiting the Romans in Greece. The king could not be persuaded to place a force at his disposal for this purpose, and sent him instead to assemble a fleet for him from the cities of Phœnicia. This Hannibal effected, and took the command of it in person; but his previous habits could have little qualified him for this service, and he was defeated by the Rhodian fleet, in an action near Side. But unimportant as his services in this war

appear to have been, he was still regarded by the Romans with such apprehension, that his surrender was one of the conditions of the peace granted to Antiochus after his defeat at Magnesia. Hannibal, however, foresaw his danger, and made his escape to Crete, from whence he afterward repaired to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia. Another account represents him as repairing from the court of Antiochus to Armenia, where it is said he found refuge for a time with Artaxias, one of the Generals of Antiochus, who had revolted from his master, and that he superintended the foundation of Artaxata, the new capital of the Armenian kingdom. In any case, it was in the kingdom of Prusias that he took up his abode. That monarch was in a state of hostility with Eumenes, the faithful ally of Rome, and on that account unfriendly, at least, to the Romans. Here, therefore,

B. C. 190.

he found, for some years, a secure asylum, during which time we are told that he commanded the fleet of Prusias in a naval action against Eumenes, and gained a victory over that monarch, absurdly attributed, by Cornelius Nepos and Justin, to the stratagem of throwing vessels filled with serpents into the enemy's ships! But the Romans could not be at ease, so long as Hannibal lived; and T. Quintius Flamininus was at length despatched to the court of Prusias to demand the surrender of the fugitive. The Bithynian king was unable to resist, and he sent troops to arrest his illustrious guest; but Hannibal, who had long been in expectation of such an event, as soon as he found that all approaches were beset, and that flight was impossible, took poison, to avoid falling into the hands of his enemies. The year of his death is uncertain, having been a subject of much dispute among the

Roman chronologers. The testimony of Polybius on the point, which would have appeared conclusive, is doubtful. From the expressions of Livy, we should certainly have inferred that he placed the death of Hannibal, together with those of Scipio and Philopœmen, in the consulship of M. Claudius Marcellus and Q. Fabius Labes; and this, which was the date adopted by Atticus, appears on the whole the most probable: but Cornelius Nepos expressly says that Polybius assigned it to the following year, and Sulpicius to the year after that. The scene of his death and burial was a village named Libyssa, on the coast of Bithynia.

B. C. 183.

Hannibal's character has been very variously estimated by different writers.

A man who had rendered himself formidable to the Roman power, and had wrought them such extensive mischief, could hardly fail to be the object of the

falsest calumnies and misrepresentations during his life; and there can be no doubt that many such were recorded in the pages of the historian, Fabius, and have been transmitted to us by Appian and Zonares, He was judged with less passion, and, on the whole, with great impartiality, by Polybius. An able review of his character will be found also in Dion Cassius. But that writer tells us that he was accused of avarice by the Carthaginians, and of cruelty by the Romans. Many instances of the latter are certainly recorded by the Roman historians; but even if we were to admit them all as true, (and many of them are demonstrably false,) they do not exceed, or even equal, what the same writers have related of their own generals: and severity, often degenerating into cruelty, seems to have been so characteristic of the Carthaginians in general, that Hannibal's conduct in this

respect, as compared with that of his countrymen, deserves to be regarded as a favorable exception. We find him readily entering into an agreement with Fabius for an exchange of prisoners; and it was only the sternness of the Romans themselves that prevented the same humane arrangements from being carried throughout the war. On many occasions, too, his generous sympathy for his fallen foes bears witness of a noble spirit, and his treatment of the dead bodies of Flaminius, of Gracchus, and of Marcellus, contrasts most favorably with the barbarity of Claudius Nero to that of Hasdrubal. The charge of avarice appears to have been as little founded: of such a vice, in its lowest acceptation, he was certainly incapable; though it is not unlikely that he was greedy of money for the prosecution of his great schemes; and, perhaps, un-

scrupulous in his modes of acquiring it. Among other virtues he is extolled for his temperance and continence, and for the fortitude with which he endured every species of toil and hardship. Of his abilities as a General it is unnecessary to speak: all the great masters of the art of war, from Scipio to Napoleon, have concurred in their homage to his genius. But in comparing Hannibal with any other of the great leaders of antiquity, we must ever bear in mind the peculiar circumstances in which he was placed. He was not in the position either of a powerful monarch, disposing at his pleasure of the whole resources of the state, nor yet in that of a republican leader supported by the patriotism and national spirit of the people that followed him to battle. Feebly and grudgingly supported by the government at home, he he stood alone at the head of an army com-

posed of mercenaries of many nations, of men fickle and treacherous to all others but himself, men who had no other bond of union than their common confidence in their leader. Yet, not only did he retain the attachment of these men, unshaken by any change of fortune, for a period of more than fifteen years, but he trained up army after army; and, long after the veterans that followed him over the Alps, had dwindled to an inconsiderable remnant, his new levies were still as invincible as their predecessors.

Of the private character of Hannibal, we know very little: no man ever played so conspicuous a part in history of whom so few personal anecdotes have been recorded. Yet this can hardly have been for want of the opportunity of preserving them; for we are told that he was accompanied throughout his campaigns by two Greek writers, Silen-

us and Sosilus; and we know that the works of both these authors were extant in later times; but they seem to have been unworthy of their subject. Sosilus is censured by Polybius for the fables and absurdities with which he had overlaid his history; and Silenus is cited only as an authority for dreams and prodigies. The former is said also to have acted as Hannibal's instructor in Greek, a language which, at least in the latter years of his life, he spoke with fluency; and in which he even composed, during his residence at the court of Prusias, a history of the expedition of Cn. Manlius Vulso against the Galatians. If we may believe Zonares, he was, at an early age, master of several other languages also, Latin among the rest; but this seems at least very doubtful. Dion Cassius, however, also bears testimony to his having received an excellent education, not only

in Punic, but in Greek learning and literature. During his residence in Spain, Hannibal had married the daughter of a Spanish chieftain; but we do not learn that he left any children.

THE END.